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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the role of the Information Research Department (IRD) in 
countering Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda directed at British interests in the 
Middle East and Africa between 1954 and 1963.  It argues that the 1956 Suez Crisis and its 
fallout was the catalyst that drove a significant expansion of IRD's remit and responsibility.  
From 1956 the department – which up to this point had had a purely anti-Communist function – 
was given the responsibility of countering the increasing flow of Arab nationalist propaganda 
emerging from Egypt.  The same year, the Communist powers mounted a renewed and 
concerted effort to culturally and ideologically penetrate Africa.  IRD, who to this point had 
been excluded from directly operating in Africa, began counter-Communist work in the face of 
stiff Colonial Office resistance. 
Analysis of IRD in the Middle East has rarely considered events beyond the immediate 
aftermath of Suez.  IRD's work in Africa is almost wholly unexplored.  It is a central contention 
of this thesis that the two regions cannot be viewed in isolation post-Suez.  Egypt's standing was 
buoyed by the propaganda capital of victory over Suez, and Nasser's position as the figurehead 
of Arab nationalism was assured.  In seeking the removal of colonial influence from the Middle 
East and Africa, Arab propaganda – particularly the Voice of the Arabs programme of Cairo Radio 
– ties the regions together.  Communist and African nationalist propagandists were drawn to 
Cairo in the wake of the Suez Crisis.  The former, building relationships through aid, sought to 
leverage Cairo's expanding influence to their own advantage.  The latter sought facilities and 
support for their own propaganda efforts. 
After Suez, IRD sought to manage Egyptian propaganda whilst avoiding direct 
confrontation, seeking to normalise relations.  In Africa, the department sought to build an 
infrastructure for information work aimed at influencing future leaders, their efforts constrained 
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by the timetable of British decolonisation.  In both regions, through developing relationships 
with local agencies and the BBC, and from initiatives such as the Transmission 'X' news 
commentary service, IRD continued to address Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda 
with a flexibility and responsiveness not recognised in the current literature on IRD.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is about the Information Research Department (IRD) of the British Foreign Office, 
and that department's work in the Middle East and Africa between 1954 and 1963.  Through this 
period, and in both regions, British power, influence and prestige were subjected to fundamental 
reassessment.  IRD's role, and the department itself, expanded to cover Britain's changing 
situation. Three factors were at work: the growth of Communist interest and influence, the rise 
of Arab nationalism, and Britain's withdrawal from Empire. 
IRD researched, created and distributed propaganda material, at home and abroad, to 
British and foreign recipients in positions of influence.  Much of this propaganda was banal, 
factual information; sometimes these facts were twisted – 'spun' – and occasionally facts were 
stretched or massaged, but there is little evidence that IRD promulgated straight falsehoods.1  
IRD predominantly produced printed material, in the form of publications, factsheets, briefing 
papers, and radio scripts.  If the department's material was often mundane, its mission was not.  
The purpose of IRD in 1954 was much as it had been from the department's creation in 1948: to 
support British and Western Cold War interests through the provision of counter- and anti-
                                                
1 Without seeking too fine a definition, grey propaganda is information which may either be inaccurate, or the 
source of which may be disguised or hidden.  It falls thus on the spectrum between white propaganda – truthful 
information from a known source, though supporting an agenda, and black propaganda – the 'big lie' – where the 
source of the information is hidden, and the information itself untruthful or fabricated.  IRD was set up to provide 
unattributable information, and so its output was rarely white propaganda. The principle, learned through experience 
in both world wars was that truth, albeit carefully selected truth, was more effective than fabrication, and it would 
appear that IRD rarely crossed the line into black propaganda.  Historians such as Phillip Deery have confidently 
asserted that IRD utilised both grey and black propaganda, though without examples. (Phillip Deery, "The 
Terminology of Terrorism: Malaya, 1948-52", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 02 (2003).  John Jenks 
notes that though IRD did not appear to have ever fabricated any material, it had 'a propensity for speculation, 
rumour, and wilful disregard of the facts if they got in the way of a good story.'  (John Jenks, British propaganda and 
news media in the cold war (Edinburgh, 2006), p. 66).  IRD officers tell a different story, however: IRD's Norman 
Reddaway is quoted as stressing that 'Anything but the truth is too hot to handle' was an IRD slogan.  (Interview 
with Norman Reddaway by Anthony Gorst and W. Scott Lucas 6/1989, cited in Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, 
Britain's secret propaganda war (Stroud, 1998), p. 36).  H H Tucker, head of IRD's Editorial Section for much of the 
department's life, defended the department robustly: '[IRD] has been accused of all sorts of sinister methods, of 
waging black propaganda, of misleading people and so on, all of which - and I can speak of this as an insider - are 
false.  It was an information department providing information based on good honest to goodness research.'  
(Harold Herbert Tucker, OBE, transcript of interview by J Hutson, April 19, 1996, British Diplomatic Oral History 
Project, (hereafter BDOHP), DOHP 11, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge). 
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Communist propaganda.  In 1956 this remit was expanded, with IRD's skills turned to the task 
of countering Arab nationalism in the Middle East, and ultimately shaping and supporting the 
propaganda and information campaign directed at Egypt over the course of the Suez Crisis. 
The study of such a department is naturally of interest in and of itself, but there is a 
wider historical relevance to the study of the propaganda within the confines of the Cold War.  
As David Caute has argued, the battle of culture and ideology between East and West was at 
least as significant as military and economic factors in bringing about the West's 'victory'.2  
Propaganda as a term defies easy definition, but within the context of what is under study here it 
suffices to define it as the methods and material by which government and private institutions 
sought to influence public or private opinion, and to bring it in line, supportive of their aims and 
goals within the confines of their interests and ideology.  It was, as James Vaughan has 
explained, the 'psychological dimension' of diplomacy.3  The ubiquity of propaganda during the 
Cold War had a profound and lasting impact; as Gary Rawnsley has argued, the mobilisation of 
culture and propaganda by all sides did not just further political aims but 'helped to define the 
unfolding drama in easily understood and readily acceptable terms of reference …[that] endured, 
giving shape and meaning to the remaining years of the Cold War.'4  That the third dimension to 
Middle Eastern political discourse beyond the opposing Western and Communist ideologies – 
the Arab nationalist movement – was supported by a significant and far-reaching propaganda 
campaign centred on Cairo only adds to the justification for studying it here. 
IRD's role within the wider study of the Cold War is also important.  When the existence 
of IRD was made public by press revelations in 1978, it quickly became evident that Britain had 
been first amongst the Western allies to develop an apparatus for anti-Communist propaganda.  
The first scholarly account of IRD, by Lyn Smith, published in 1980, was quick to recognise this, 
                                                
2 David Caute, The dancer defects: the struggle for cultural supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford, 2003), p. 395. 
3 James Vaughan, The failure of American and British propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57: unconquerable minds 
(Basingstoke, 2005), Anthony Adamthwaite, "Suez Revisited", International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 3 (1988), p. 3. 
4 Gary D. Rawnsley, "Introduction", in Rawnsley, ed, Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s (Basingstoke, 1999), p. 2. 
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and to note that IRD necessitated a broadening of research into Britain's role and importance in 
the Cold War.5  It soon became clear that IRD was of great significance to an analysis of the 
Cold War as a whole, debunking the conventional wisdom of Britain's subservient – indeed, 
superficial – role to that of the US ascribed within the contemporary literature.  Though Hugh 
Wilford's early study concluded that IRD, and Britain's propaganda effort generally was quickly 
subordinated to the needs and policy of the United States,6 more recent and complete studies, 
especially those of Andrew Defty, James Vaughan, and John Jenks, have shown that Britain 
remained a significant player.7  Britain and America evolved a complimentary approach – though 
in some areas with a divided focus – with America actively targeting those behind the Iron 
Curtain, and Britain's low-key approach more suited to combating Communism in the free 
world.8  Christopher Warner, one of the architects of IRD, described this division of resources as 
'shooting into the same target from different angles'.9 
If Britain surged to the fore in respect of propaganda during the early years of the Cold 
War, then this was as much through necessity as any other reason.  Wesley K Wark has argued 
that the importance given to propaganda by British policymakers was a direct result of the 
straightened circumstances the nation found itself in following the Second World War.  When 
IRD was created in 1948, Wark notes, 'propaganda represented one of the few fronts on which a 
counter-offensive against the USSR could be conceived as possible.'10  Taking this one step 
further, Scott Lucas and C J Morris have reasoned that, unable to compete on military terms 
with the Soviets, and playing a distant second fiddle to the Americans in terms of technology, 
                                                
5 Lyn Smith, "Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department: 1947-77", Millenium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1980), p. 68. 
6 Hugh Wilford, "The Information Research Department: Britain's secret Cold War weapon revealed", Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1998), p. 354. 
7 Vaughan, Failure; Andrew Defty, Britain, America and anti-communist propaganda, 1945-53: the Information Research 
Department (London, 2005), Jenks, Propaganda. 
8 Defty, Britain, p.252. 
9 Christopher Warner, letter to Sir John Balfour, 26 Feb. 1948. FO 1110/1/7, cited in Wilford, "Information 
Research Department", p. 367. 
10 Wesley K. Wark, "Coming in from the Cold: British Propaganda and Red Army Defectors, 1945-1952", The 
International History Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1987), p.50. 
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propaganda was the only means by which Britain could seek to preserve her standing as a world 
power, whilst disguising the shortcomings that would reveal her loss of status.11 
In light of the above, studying IRD and British propaganda during the Cold War is easy 
to justify.  The focus of this thesis on the Middle East and Africa, and the choice of timescale, 
requires further explanation.  The most obvious answer is that beyond 1957 there has been no 
effort to do so.  IRD was in existence from 1948 until its closure in 1977, a considerable 
timescale, and most studies have concentrated on the department's role during discrete events 
during that period, or have focussed on the earlier years of the department.12  Of the general 
histories of IRD, Andrew Defty's Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda ends its analysis 
in 1953.  John Jenks' British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War also focuses on the earlier 
years of IRD's existence, though it extends analysis a few years beyond that of Defty's work.  
                                                
11  W. Scott Lucas and C. J. Morris, "A Very British Crusade: The Information Research Department and the 
Origins of the Cold War", in Aldrich, ed, British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War (London, 1992), p.86. 
12 There are several texts on IRD that provide an insight into the creation of the department and a general history of 
the early years of its operation.  These include accounts of those involved in setting up the department, for example 
Christopher Mayhew, A war of words: a cold war witness (London, 1998).  Further context for the creation of IRD can 
be found in Richard Aldrich, "Putting culture into the Cold War: the Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and 
British Covert Information Warfare", Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2003); R. Merrick, "The Russia 
Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946-47", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 20, No. 3 
(1985); and Raymond Smith, "A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of British Soviet Policy, 
1945-7", International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 64, No. 4 (1988).  Particular campaigns 
by IRD are explored in Tony Shaw, "'Some writers are more equal than others': George Orwell, the state and cold 
war privilege", Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2003); Jacek Tebinka, "British Propaganda Directed at Poland 
Between 1947 and 1956", Acta Poloniae Historica, Vol. 95, No. 1 (2007).  IRD's role in conflicts or crises other than 
Suez include Anne Deighton, "'A Different 1956': British Responses to the Polish Events, June-November 1956", 
Cold War History, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2006); Gary D. Rawnsley, "The BBC External Services and the Hungarian Uprising, 
1956", in Rawnsley, ed, Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s (Basingstoke, 1999); Tony Shaw, "The Information 
Research Department of the British Foreign Office and the Korean War, 1950-53", Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 34, No. 2 (1999).  This thesis places particular emphasis on IRD's relationship with other information 
organisations, and so IRD's key relationship with the NATO Information Service (NATIS) – detailed in Linda 
Risso, "'Enlightening Public Opinion': A Study of NATO's Information Policies between 1949 and 1959 based on 
Recently Declassified Documents", Cold War History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007) – is of great interest.  IRD's role naturally 
led it to target both international organisations and students, and analysis of this has formed part of a number of 
studies, but the focus of a few.  The monitoring of Commonwealth students in Britain by IRD, over concerns of the 
political direction of the 'successor generation' of newly independent nations, is explored in J. M. Lee, 
"Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940–1960: Student Welfare and World Status", Minerva, Vol. 44, 
No. 1 (2006).  IRD's role in the denial of access to delegates of the second World Peace Council in Sheffield is 
examined in Phillip Deery, "The Dove Flies East: Whitehall, Warsaw and the 1950 World Peace Congress", 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2002).  The role of the BBC is central to IRD work within the 
context of this thesis, and the relationship between IRD and the BBC is bookended by two studies: Alban Webb, 
"Auntie Goes To War Again", Media History, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2006) which looks at the formative years of this 
relationship and Paul Gliddon, "Programmes Subjected to Interference: The Heath Government, Broadcasting and 
the European Community, 1970-1971", History, Vol. 91, No. 303 (2006) which examines IRD's role in shaping 
positive opinion on Britain's entry to the EEC via the nation's media.  This list is not exhaustive. 
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Paul Lashmar and James Oliver's Britain's Secret Propaganda War, whatever weaknesses it may 
otherwise display, aims to cover the whole of IRD's operations between its creation and closure, 
but it covers little about the Middle East outside of the Suez Crisis.13  Indeed, Suez and its 
immediate aftermath have to this point provided the conclusion to studies of the department's 
role in the Middle East, and Africa has barely been touched upon.  The most complete studies of 
IRD in the Middle East are those of James Vaughan, who has examined both the wider subject 
of British propaganda and diplomacy in the Middle East, and the role of IRD within it, though 
Vaughan's work also largely concludes with Suez.14 
Of the number of published articles and general historical works that engage with IRD in 
the Middle East and Africa, Stephen Dorrill and Richard Aldrich, in general works on MI6/SIS 
and British intelligence respectively, contribute to the study of IRD but again find Suez to be the 
logical end-point for any examination of the department in the Middle East.15  Susan Carruthers' 
exploration of IRD's work against a number of colonial insurgencies provides a tantalising early 
glimpse of IRD's early wranglings with the Colonial Office over Africa, this during the Mau Mau 
emergency of 1952.16  Johan Franzén lays the blame squarely on IRD's shoulders for the British 
failure to adequately manage, or appreciate, the Communist threat to Nuri as-Said's regime prior 
to the 1958 coup in Iraq.  As such his work bucks the trend of ending analysis with Suez, and 
hopefully presages further integration of IRD into post-Suez narratives in the Middle East and 
Africa.17  Furthermore, there are three, unpublished, texts that engage with IRD's work in the 
                                                
13 Defty, Britain, Jenks, Propaganda, Lashmar and Oliver, Secret Propaganda War.  
14 James Vaughan, "Propaganda by Proxy?: Britain, America, and Arab Radio Broadcasting, 1953-1957", Historical 
Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2002); James Vaughan, "'Cloak Without Dagger': How the 
Information Research Department Fought Britain's Cold War in the Middle East, 1948-56", Cold War History, Vol. 4, 
No. 3 (2004); James Vaughan, "'A Certain Idea of Britain': British Cultural Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1945-57", 
Contemporary British History, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2005); Vaughan, Failure.  
15 Stephen Dorril, MI6: fifty years of special operations (London, 2000); Richard Aldrich, The hidden hand: Britain, America, 
and Cold War secret intelligence (London, 2001).  
16 Susan Carruthers, "'A Red Under Every Bed?': Anti-Communist Propaganda and Britain's Response to Colonial 
Insurgency", Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1995).  See also Carruthers' expansion of that article in her book, 
Susan Carruthers, Winning hearts and minds: British governments, the media, and colonial counter-insurgency, 1944-1960 
(London, 1995) though there is no further exploration of IRD's role. 
17 Johan Franzén, "Losing hearts and minds in Iraq: Britain, Cold War propaganda and the challenge of 
communism, 1945-58", Historical Research, Vol. 83, No. 222 (2009).  
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Middle East and Africa beyond 1958:  Chikara Hashimoto's thesis on intelligence and counter-
subversion liaison and collaboration between Britain and Middle Eastern nations investigates 
IRD's work within this context, amidst the wider intelligence and security activities of MI5, MI6 
and British Middle Eastern policy.  James Brennan briefly explores IRD's Transmission 'X' ('X') 
news comentary service, IRD's response to the threat posed by Cairo Radio broadcasting to East 
Africa, as part of a general survey of short-wave broadcasting-as-propaganda in the region 
between 1940 and 1965.  Philip Murphy's examination of the various British intelligence 
organisations, and their role within the decolonisation process, includes a discussion of the early 
difficulties between IRD and the Colonial Office over how to engage with Communism in 
British Africa in the mid 1950s.18   
The post-Suez period is therefore ripe for exploration, both in the Middle East and 
Africa.  This core of this thesis begins with the aftermath of Suez, though it is necessary to 
provide context for this period and so certain themes, and the general background for IRD 
work, Communist involvement and the rise of Arab nationalism, require a fresh look at events as 
far back as 1954, the year of the creation of the Voice of the Arabs radio programme.  With this in 
mind, Chapter One separates out IRD's methods, products, structure and organisational 
relationships, and aims to provide a point of reference for what follows – essentially it is a 
snapshot of IRD as a department in 1954, and this is a snapshot almost exclusively concerned 
with the Middle East.  Whilst IRD did produce material on Africa at that stage, the department 
                                                
18 Chikara Hashimoto, "British Intelligence, Counter Subversion, and 'Informal Empire' in the Middle East, 1949-
63" (PhD Thesis, University of Aberystwyth, 2013); James R. Brennan, "Poison and Dope: Radio and the art of 
political invective in East Africa, 1940-1965", (Paper delivered at the African Studies Center Seminar, University of 
Leiden, 15 May 2008); Philip Murphy, "Exporting a British intelligence culture: The British intelligence community 
and decolonisation, 1945-1960" (unpublished, 2004).  IRD's counter-subversion work in the Middle East was 
conducted through the Baghdad Pact/CENTO Counter Subversion Office, and so Hashimoto largely focusses on 
the department's activities within the CSO.  'X' is not the main focus of Brennan's paper, but the inclusion of 'X' – 
which this thesis will argue is a one of the most significant developments for IRD and British information work in 
the region over the period under study – is notable, as is his inclusion of other British responses and IRD's role 
within them.  The section on IRD and the Colonial Office in this thesis was written before Murphy's unpublished 
paper came to the author's attention, and both draw from broadly the same sources. Whilst this thesis does extend 
the examination of the particular situation between IRD and the CO, Murphy approaches the subject from a 
different angle, and his heavier emphasis on the Colonial Office provides a useful counterpoint.  Murphy's article 
extends its analysis to the role of the Security Service and MI6, Brennan's provides much on the influence of Cairo 
Radio and regional broadcasting: both provide valuable context and wider analysis to sections of what follows. 
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did not have a direct role to play in either British or French African territories until 1956/7.  The 
department did send a selection of material to the British Consulate General in the Belgian 
Congo, though up to the end of 1956 IRD saw 'no reports on what they do with it'.19  Congo, 
however, was the exception.  IRD material only found its way into British colonies when the 
Colonial Office, who handled both distribution and intelligence gathering, specifically requested 
it.  For their part, the FO avoided any information work in French-controlled territories in Africa 
due to 'extreme French sensitivity' over any such actions.20  A primary reason for this lack of 
activity was the absence of a Communist threat, which only became of serious concern by 
1955/6.  The only IRD work of interest during the pre-Suez period detailed so far is Susan 
Carruthers' investigation into propaganda during the Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya from 1952.  
Carruthers showed that IRD creatively interpreted possible connections between Mau Mau and 
international Communism in an effort to generate propaganda.21  In any case, whilst IRD were 
producing, or attempting to produce, material on Africa, this thesis is concerned with the 
department's activities in the regions under study.  Africa, therefore, is somewhat conspicuous by 
its absence from what follows until Chapter Four. 
Chapter Two examines the pre-Suez landscape of IRD's anti-Communist work in the 
Middle East, and the reaction from various Foreign Office posts to the material they received. 
The final sections of the chapter consider the emergence of Egypt-centred Arab nationalism as a 
concrete threat to British interests – a threat that after Suez would become highly significant to 
British territories in Africa.  An analysis of the Suez Crisis – or even the entirety of IRD's 
involvement in it – does not form part of this thesis, and Suez is explored largely in regard to a 
pair of themes that have relevance for the later period under study.  The decolonisation process 
                                                
19 Minute, J Sanders (IRD), June 7, 1956, TNA FO 1110/922/PR1058/2.  Responding to IRD enquiries, the 
Consulate-General reported that it had made material available to the Sûreté, the Belgian government's information 
department, and had placed some material in the press., though there were no more details.  J R Cotton (British 
Consulate-General, Leopoldville) to L C W Figg (IRD), Spetember 26, 1956, TNA FO 1110/922/PR1058/2'A'. 
20 Information work in North Africa, undated (1956), TNA FO 1110/1924/PG1281/2. 
21 See both Carruthers, "Red" and Carruthers, hearts and minds. 
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in Africa provides one reason for concluding this thesis in 1963, at the point at which Kenya, the 
last significant British colonial territory in Africa, gained independence.  It was also the year in 
which IRD began to break free of the policy constraints imposed after Suez, and to recommence 
unattributable propaganda against Egypt.  As explained later, it is the role and actions of Egypt 
after Suez that tie these two regions together and, as this thesis will argue, necessitate integrating 
the two regions. 
The Suez Crisis of 1956 represents a pivotal moment in the history of British 
imperialism, and it was also one for IRD.  The head of IRD, John Rennie, was in charge of the 
Information Coordination Executive (ICE) that was responsible for developing and executing 
Britain's propaganda strategy during the crisis, and the department took a central role.  The Suez 
Crisis was a political-military disaster that exposed Britain's true global and regional standing.    
Britain's actions were neither justified, nor rationalised, by the propaganda campaign deployed in 
support of them.  If the propaganda campaign was a failure, then by extension so was IRD's 
effort. 
James Vaughan reaches a number of conclusions as to why British (and American) 
propaganda failed in the Middle East. There was a failure of perspective, with a continued 
casting of local issues in a Cold-War context that was not only erroneous, but also self-defeating.  
The Cold War was an issue that existed largely outside the day to day concerns of Arabs who 
saw the issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Western colonialism as much more pressing 
and relevant.  These issues provided potent fuel to the flames of regional, Arab nationalism.  As 
regards the Arab-Israeli dispute, British propagandists were constrained by wider policy.  There 
was also a separation between British policymakers and those responsible for directing British 
propaganda and information work in the region.  This found its ultimate expression in the 
complete divorce of propaganda from policy during the Suez Crisis, where an ever-diminishing 
clique of policymakers, centred on the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, obscured the true 
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direction of Britain's policy – military intervention – from propagandists who believed they were 
supporting an altogether different agenda.22  What this thesis will show is that the these issues, 
bar the latter, extended well beyond both the Suez Crisis and the Middle East, and the evidence 
herein serves to reinforce Vaughan's conclusions. 
British propagandists' failure to manage the precipitous drop in British fortunes in the 
Middle East is exemplified by Suez, and the crisis appears to form a powerful coda to British 
efforts to counter Arab nationalism in the Middle East.  Indeed, Vaughan concludes that, after 
Suez, British propaganda strategy largely returned to anti-Communism, and that IRD returned its 
focus to the Soviet Union.  With regional issues now polarized within a Cold War frame of 
reference, IRD forewent much of the flexibility it displayed pre-Suez in dealing with issues of 
nationalism and Communism.23  Within the context of the Middle East, and constrained by the 
Suez Crisis, Vaughan's conclusions hold much weight.  Framed by these arguments, IRD's 
campaign preceding and during the crisis was largely exceptional, and brought to an end by the 
failure at Suez. 
Moving beyond the Suez Crisis, and beyond the Middle East, Vaughan's conclusions 
regarding the variety and flexibility of IRD's future campaign require some qualification, 
however.  IRD's return to standard anti-Communist work was in fact less complete than 
Vaughan suggests.  The growth of Nasser's prestige after Suez, and the expanding regional 
presence of Egypt, moved the issue of Arab nationalism beyond the Arab Middle East and into 
North and East Africa, where IRD actively defended British interests against it.  Additionally, 
Soviet strategists believed that they could leverage Egypt's expanding influence to bolster their 
own, renewed drive for influence in Africa.24  IRD certainly believed that the Soviets were using 
                                                
22 Vaughan, Failure, p. 239. 
23 Vaughan, "Cloak", pp. 76, 78. 
24 Galia Golan, Soviet policies in the Middle East: from World War Two to Gorbachev (Cambridge, 1990), p. 20. 
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Egypt and the Sudan as a bridgehead to further their own African agenda.25  Furthermore, whilst 
Egyptian propaganda remained a threat to British interests, particularly in Africa, it was 
increasingly seen as a bulwark against Communism in the Middle East, and Egypt successfully 
manipulated Communist attention to her own advantage, without tying her own interests to 
those of the Soviets.  These factors therefore muddied such clear water as existed between the 
issues of Arab nationalism and Communism. 
It is a contention of this thesis that IRD continued to grow and diversify its propaganda 
campaign across the Middle East and Africa, not despite, but because of, British failures at Suez.  
The Suez Crisis exposed the limits of British propaganda in the Middle East, and was a 
substantial blow to British prestige in the region, but it by no means signalled the end – indeed 
should be seen as the beginning – of IRD's work against Nasserism and Arab nationalism.  
Vaughan has comprehensively shown that Western propagandists lost the battle for the 
'unconquerable minds' of the Arab Middle East.  But did this matter – at least to IRD – as much 
in the long run as it would first appear?  Judged against the process of decolonisation as a whole, 
the Suez Crisis was more symptom than source of Britain's problems.  If the battle to manipulate 
Arab nationalist attitudes towards Britain in the Middle East was lost at Suez, the battle against 
the same nationalist force across northern and eastern Africa was just beginning.  The battle 
against Communist influence was far from lost.  If British propagandists were subsequently more 
restrained in their actions against Nasser and Arab nationalism it was due to the constraints of 
policy, not a sense of defeat – the battle against Arab nationalism was surrendered as well as lost 
following Suez.  A swift rapprochement with Nasser was seen as of central importance to future 
British strategy, initially for financial reasons to do with the Suez Canal and trade.  Once it was 
evident that Egypt would not suborn its nationalist interests to Communist designs on the 
region, accommodation with Arab nationalism came to be seen as an aid in the fight against 
                                                
25 'Soviet Penetration of Africa', February 1956, enclosure with H A H Cortazzi (IRD) to W T A Cox (CO), 
February 9, 1956, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), CO 1035/17/ISD61/01. 
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Communism.  In a Cold War context, the question became less about whether Arab nationalism 
could be tamed, and more about whether it could be relied upon to not impinge too greatly on 
British defence and oil interests, whilst providing an effective bulwark against Communism. 
Shaped by the need to find a favourable position for Britain in Africa following 
decolonisation, IRD pressed hard for a direct role in propaganda to the nation's African 
colonies.  Up to 1956, whilst IRD had provided material upon request to the Colonial Office, the 
CO had vigorously resisted IRD pursuing an unmediated campaign in Africa, believing that the 
department, the wider Foreign Office, and the Joint Intelligence Committee's assessment of the 
Communist threat to Africa was exaggerated – even fabricated.  The CO was in error:  1956 
heralded a renewed effort to culturally and ideologically penetrate Africa by both the Soviet bloc 
and China, and this drive was greatly aided by the Communist nations' relationship with Egypt, 
and Egypt's own drive into Africa following the Suez Crisis. 
Egypt ties the regions of Africa and the Middle East together for a number of reasons.  
Egypt's strategic interests in the Sudan (jointly administered by Egypt and Britain until 1956) 
derived both from security concerns, and the wider diplomatic possibilities of influencing anti-
Westernism during the process of decolonisation.  Cairo supported Pan-Arabist and pan-African 
movements, and propagandised such themes to their own benefit.  The new push of Soviet and 
Chinese interest in Africa quickly accelerated through 1956 to a point where IRD became fully 
committed to obtaining a role in countering it.  With Egyptian influence and political capital 
enhanced by Suez, Communist influence-by-association was also enhanced, and this confluence 
of Communist and Egyptian interest in Africa adds further complexity to the relationship 
between Arab nationalist and Communist propaganda.  Chapter Four examines the links 
between, and reasons for, both sides interest in Africa, and IRD's analysis of the situation.  
Colonial Office resistance caused significant delay to the expansion of IRD work across the 
colonies.  It is reasonable to assume that that this resistance squandered much of the advantage 
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in information and propaganda networks and relationships that the British, as a colonial power, 
enjoyed through the few short years of the decolonisation process.26 
During the period under study in this thesis, Arab nationalism was seen by British and 
Western policymakers as a more significant threat to their interests over the Middle East, 
northern and eastern Africa than that posed by Communism.27  This propaganda threat, though 
it had several facets, was in the main supported by the broadcasting reach, and vituperative anti-
Westernism, of Cairo Radio.  One stand-out result of the Suez Crisis was the loss of credibility 
of the Near East Arab Broadcasting Station's Sharq al-Adna programme, a British, certainly MI6- 
and probably IRD-run programme that was arguably Britain's most useful asset.  Developing 
Sharq al-Adna perhaps represented the one means by which IRD could have competed with 
Cairo Radio on anything approaching equal terms after Suez.  The programme could not have 
competed like-for-like with Cairo, but in the climate of rapprochement would have been perfectly 
pitched to deflect Egyptian polemic without recourse to direct confrontation, by offering a more 
reasonable window on affairs.  As Peter Partner explains, Sharq 'could not tackle head-on the 
pan-Arab challenge of the Voice of the Arabs.  But at least it addressed part of the same 
audience.'28  As chapter 3 will detail, British requisitioning of the station in direct support of Suez 
wholly undermined the station's credibility. 
IRD was subsequently tasked with the management of the influence of Cairo Radio in 
the Middle East, and, perhaps more urgently, British dependent territories in northern and 
eastern Africa – territories that were approaching decolonisation.  Unable to resort to 
                                                
26 Tareq Ismael and Jaques Baulin have both written on the UAR's cultural/political/religious drive into Africa.  
These are both useful studies, written in 1971 and 1962 respectively, though Ismael's is the more scholarly work.  
See Tareq Ismael, The UAR in Africa (Evanston, 1971); Jacques Baulin, The Arab role in Africa (Baltimore, 1962). Ali 
A`Mazrui's text on the relationship between Arabs and 'black' African nations is wider in scope, and provides a 
general historical overview.  Ali A. Mazrui, "Black Africa and the Arabs", Foreign Affairs; an American Quarterly Review, 
Vol. 53, No. 4 (1975).   Other relevant works analyse China's economic relationship with Africa in the early 1960s, 
and the BBC's role in developing a broadcasting infrastructure in Africa between the end of the Second World War 
and the beginning of the decolonisation process in 1956: Jan Prybyla, "Communist China's Economic Relations with 
Africa, 1960-1964", Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 11 (1964); Charles Armour, "The BBC and the Development of 
Broadcasting in British Colonial Africa 1946-1956", African Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 332 (1984).  
27 The Activities and Influence of Cairo Radio, December 11, 1958, TNA CAB/134/2342/JIC (58) 63. 
28 Peter Partner, Arab voices: the BBC Arabic Service, 1938-1988 (London, 1988), p. 94. 
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confrontational or covert propaganda because of policy considerations, and robbed of the utility 
of Sharq al-Adna, IRD nevertheless developed a flexible, innovative and successful response to 
Cairo Radio: the rebuttal service called Transmission 'X'.  Despite Information Policy 
Department and Colonial Office assertions that such a service – one that required a constant 
flow of supporting material and a near instantaneous response to any propaganda – was 
impossible to implement, IRD successfully built a limited response based on research sourced 
from the BBC's Monitoring Service, and delivered by the Central Office of Information's 
London Press Service.  Transmission 'X' was essentially a news commentary service, and was so 
successful that it was rapidly turned towards combatting Communism in the Middle East and 
Africa, and subsequently deployed world-wide, though with an emphasis on developing regions.  
Chapter 5 explores the development of Transmission 'X', and asserts that the service grew into 
one of IRD's most significant and successful counter-Nasserite and (particularly) counter-
Communist initiatives.  IRD's development of Transmission 'X' counters arguments that IRD 
returned to a traditional anti-Communist role, and that IRD significantly halted its efforts to 
manage Arab nationalism.  Chapter 5 also details the wider use of the London Press Service, an 
omission from current histories of the department. 
As noted above, the BBC's Monitoring Service was integral to the operation of 
Transmission 'X'; in fact it was vital to IRD's operation throughout the Middle East and Africa – 
likely the most significant and regular source of material to the department.  The significance of 
BBC Monitoring, though noted, has been somewhat underplayed in the literature on IRD to this 
point.  There was a genuine relationship between IRD and the Monitoring Service, with IRD's 
need to combat Arab nationalism driving the expansion of monitoring across Africa from 1957, 
and the BBC directly contributing content written specifically for 'X'.  IRD's connection to the 
BBC is emphasised throughout the following chapters.  It is paralleled by the department's 
reliance on the Regional Information Office (RIO) in Beirut, but for a different reason. 
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As Vaughan and Defty have shown, IRD struggled to provide tailored, regionally-
appropriate, locally-interesting material to the Middle East.  This was largely born of the 
misplaced confidence IRD had in providing material intended to appeal to a world-wide 
audience, and Vaughan cites this as one of the main reasons for the failure of IRD's message in 
the Middle East.  Any future success, therefore, rested on improving the appropriateness and 
diversity of material, and in this the RIO was key.  Increased use of the RIO by IRD, and the 
fact that the RIO almost wholly took over production of Arabic-language material, progressively 
improved the reception of IRD material in the region. The fact that the RIO was run by old IRD 
hands aided the smooth interoperability of both.  IRD's direct involvement in the Counter 
Subversion Office (CSO) of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) that replaced the 
Baghdad Pact also provided alternative, more acceptable (though limited), routes in to the region 
for the department's product largely centred on Turkey.  These three institutions – the BBC, 
RIO Beirut and the CENTO CSO, and one product – Transmission 'X' – provided the 
framework for IRD's improving post-Suez campaign in the Middle East and Africa. 
Transmission 'X' was far from the only means by which IRD sought to manage 
Communist and Nasserite propaganda in the Middle East and Africa.  Chapter 6 considers IRD's 
direct involvement in Britain's African colonies, with the department having largely overcome 
CO resistance, and the nature of information work on all sides of the conflict.  With Cairo's 
influence in decline by 1961 the focus is on IRD's counter-Communist work.  The work of 
British information departments, and their counterparts in the Communist nations, largely 
amounted to a manoeuvring for a favourable position with the successor regimes of the various 
colonies prior to independence.  IRD's work in Africa has not been analysed to this point, and 
this chapter seeks to address both the department's assessment of Communist tactics towards 
Africa, and IRD's response to them.  It also touches on continuing issues of resistance to IRD 
work both in and outside of the Colonial Office, and issues of race and African nationalism. 
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The final chapter of this thesis returns to the post-Suez Middle East, again a period 
where the work of IRD remains largely unexplored.  IRD work across the region was 
constrained by the policy of rapprochement with Nasser, and the difficulty of addressing 
Communism when the two most significant nations in the Middle East – Egypt and Iraq – were 
closed to IRD propaganda for political reasons.  Chapter 7 explores the impact of British policy 
on IRD, and explains how that policy shaped propaganda work in the region.  Much of the 
material for the Middle East was produced by the RIO, or if by IRD then distributed by the RIO 
or the CENTO CSO, and so an analysis of the work of these two institutions forms a major part 
of this chapter.  Of particular significance is that by 1963 the policy of avoiding anti-Egyptian 
propaganda was under serious review.  Pressure for a change of policy was driven by IRD and 
the RIO, and the department began to reinstate a (limited) campaign of unattributable 
propaganda against Egypt. 
That IRD was able to diversify as noted above was itself a product of the Suez Crisis. 
The crisis forced British officials to properly implement many of the recommendations of the 
Drogheda report on the information services that had been delivered 3 years previously, and 
appoint Sir Charles Hill to both head up an enquiry, and maintain oversight of the information 
services to ensure that the lessons learned were applied.  Hill's appointment, as the Chancellor of 
the Duchy of Lancaster, was at Cabinet level.  J M Lee has argued that Suez caused the British to 
adopt a more systematic approach to the merits of cultural diplomacy, previously seen as 
secondary to the 'more prestigious' fields of psychological and political warfare, and the effects 
of this would be seen over the remainder of the Cold War.  During the period of Hill's oversight, 
which ended in 1961, government spending on the information budget rose from £13m to 
16 
 
£20m per year.  Lee, though he does not expand on this comment, asserts that this period saw 
IRD enjoy 'a fresh lease of life'.29  This thesis details that expansion. 
This dissertation is open to criticism that it draws heavily on the records at the National 
Archives, especially those of IRD and IPD.  Where other sources, such as the BBC's Written 
Archives Centre at Caversham have provided additional information, these have been integrated, 
though beyond Suez the lack of alternative primary sources parallels the absence of secondary 
ones.  This thesis does not set out to provide a comparison of British and American propaganda, 
seek to integrate domestic British opinion, or to explore the political situation in the Middle East 
or Africa.  This is a dissertation about IRD, and as such draws deeply from the department's own 
files.  The release of IRD files has, in Andrew Defty's words, provided historians of the 
department with  'almost an embarrassment of riches'.30  In the case of the regions under study 
following Suez, and the desired focus on IRD, said material is more restrictive than it would first 
appear.  Much of what follows is pieced together from correspondence.31 
 
                                                
29 J. M. Lee, "British cultural diplomacy and the cold war: 1946-61", Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), 
pp.126-127, 130. 
30 Defty, Britain, p. 17. 
31 It has recently been reported in the British press that the Foreign Office has been withholding some 1.2 million 
files that should have been transferred to the National Archives at Kew under the Public Records Act.  The 
inventory of these files, which are held at Hanslope Park in Buckinghamshire, includes records from IRD.  Whether 
these files are genuinely of great interest, or have merely been retained to protect reputations is unclear – as is the 
timescale for their transfer to Kew, and to what extent they have been weeded.  'Foreign Office hoarding 1m 
historic files in secret archive', The Guardian, Saturday 19 October, 2013, p.24. 
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Chapter One 
IRD, its Organisation, Relationships and Methodology in 
the Middle East, 1954-1956 
 
The truth is an unexciting weapon1 
Hugh Carleton-Greene, 1969 
This chapter will examine in general terms how IRD was organised, and how the department 
generated and distributed propaganda in the Middle East prior to the Suez Crisis.  IRD's 
organisational structure, distribution methods and relationships are relevant throughout this 
thesis, and so it makes sense to briefly tour what was in place at this point.  This chapter does 
not look at sub-Saharan Africa; as already noted, IRD was not active there at this stage. 
Though a large department, much of the decision making at IRD in London, and abroad 
on its behalf, was in the hands of a comparatively small number of people – the heads of various 
desks, partner offices and the department itself.  These individuals are constantly referenced in 
what follows.  That they are perhaps disproportionately so is a product of the correspondence-
based archival sources that inform much of this thesis.  Staff moved in and out of IRD to other 
departments, were promoted to roles that supervised IRD, or transferred to partner 
organisations.  This can only have reinforced the department's position within the FO and with 
overseas information establishments.  Without pausing to look at these personalities in brief, this 
thesis would be a very impersonal affair, and so this chapter looks first towards a number of 
personalities within IRD, and how they fitted in to the structure of the department. 
At the other end of the line from IRD, so to speak, were the Information Officers (IOs) 
that operated in the information departments of embassies and chanceries, or regional offices, or 
                                                
1 Hugh Greene, "The third floor front: a view of broadcasting in the sixties" (The Bodley Head Ltd,: London, 1963),  
pp. 28-29 cited in full in Partner, Arab, p. 146. 
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alone.  These were the individuals responsible for carrying out IRD's work abroad, though in the 
main they were not directly employed by the department, and for requesting and generating 
complementary material.  The relationship between these individuals and the individuals in IRD 
formed the nexus through which the department's work in the Middle East and Africa was 
carried out.  Discussion of the work of IOs, and of the two information organisations in the 
Middle East with which IRD had a major interest and role – the Regional Information Office in 
Beirut, and the Baghdad Pact Counter Subversion Office – forms the middle section of this 
chapter.  The chapter finishes with an overview of the material produced by IRD during this 
period, and explains in broad strokes how IRD went about its business in 1954.  
 
IRD's Organisation 
IRD was under the direction of two heads of department during the period covered by this 
thesis.  Both were career diplomats – one ex-IRD employee has stated that all the department's 
heads, deputies, and often heads of section were2 - yet the first was more involved in information 
work than that assertion would suggest.  John Ogilvie Rennie had worked from 1942 to 1946 as 
head of the radio section of the British Information Services in New York, producing radio 
programmes in support of British interests.  Joining the FO's Information Policy Department in 
1946 he held two commercial first-secretary positions in Washington (1949) and Warsaw (1951) 
before his appointment as head of IRD in 1953.  Rennie was therefore responsible for steering 
IRD through the waxing of Nasser's influence in the Middle East, and the fallout from the Suez 
Crisis.  During the crisis itself, he headed up the Information Coordination Executive, the 
committee responsible for coordinating the British political warfare campaign, whilst his deputy, 
Norman Reddaway, ran the department.  Following his tenure, Rennie was appointed 
                                                
2 Tucker Transcript, BDOHP, DOHP 11. 
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commercial minister in Buenos Aires in 1958.  He would repeat this post in Washington in 1960, 
and became assistant under-secretary for the Americas at the FO in 1964 and deputy under-
secretary for concerned with defence issues in 1966.  Rennie's most significant achievement was 
in 1968, when he was appointed 'C', the head of the Secret Intelligence Service, a post he held 
until 1974.3 
Succeeding Rennie, Donald Hopson was head of IRD from 1958 to 1962.  Hopson 
presided over IRD's increasing involvement in Africa, and the process of decolonisation, as well 
as consolidating IRD's expanded remit in the Middle East.  Hopson was at Oxford during the 
war; afterwards he entered the diplomatic service, rising to head the Chancery in Buenos Aires 
by 1955.  He followed his stewardship of IRD with a return to mainstream diplomatic work, 
becoming Ambassador to Laos in 1962 and Chargé d'Affaires to Peking in 1965, followed by 
further postings as Ambassador.4 
Reporting directly to the head of the department were three First Secretaries, who 
supervised various geographical desks.  These desks were responsible for research, for 
maintaining contacts with posts and IOs abroad, and for issues of a technical nature.  By 1960, 
the staff of the various desks numbered 'several dozen'.5  Between 1958 and 1961, Hugh Carless 
was responsible for the Middle East and Africa.  Carless had extensive experience of the region; 
his appointment followed foreign service postings to Kabul, Brazil and Iran.  Carless also took 
an interest in IRD's publishing activities.  Carless became a Private Secretary to a Minister of 
State, Lord Dundee, following IRD, before further foreign postings culminating in Chargé 
d'Affaires to Buenos Aires from 1976 to 1980.6 
                                                
3 Nigel Clive, 'Rennie, Sir John Ogilvy (1914–1981)', rev. Michael Smith, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31597, accessed 27 Feb 2013]. 
4 Obituary, Sir Donald Hopson, The Times, Wednesday August 28, 1974, p. 15. 
5 Hugh Michael Carless, CMG, transcript of interview by Malcolm McBain, February 23, 2002, BDOHP, DOHP 55. 
6 Carless transcript, BDOHP, DOHP 55. 
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  The Middle East desk itself was run by Ann Elwell, a wartime and post-war MI5 
officer, who had married another MI5 officer, Charles Elwell, in 1950.  She joined IRD in 1955, 
and stayed with the department for the next twenty years until her retirement.  Elwell travelled 
extensively to the Middle East, above and beyond the high-level meetings which Carless also 
attended.7  The Baghdad Pact Counter Subversion Office and the Regional Information Office 
in Beirut were both within Elwell's area of responsibility. 
The business of IRD was of course to produce material – everything from background 
briefings based on their research, to regular printed books, publications, articles, news stories and 
radio programmes.  These were the responsibility of the Editorial Section, which took the 
research of the regional desks and turned it into propaganda.  An old SOE hand, Leslie Sheridan, 
initially ran the section.  Sheridan had joined SOE from Fleet Street.  Working in neutral cities 
and using journalists as cover, he had organised propaganda and espionage networks during the 
war, before joining IRD in 1948 at the department's inception.  He also worked as a PR 
consultant.8  In the 1950s the department again turned to Fleet Street for expertise.  H H 
'Tommy' Tucker had worked for the regional press after the war, alongside a short spell in the 
government's Economic Information Unit which was tasked with promoting British economic 
interests and encouraging growth.  He subsequently returned to full-time journalism, rising to 
Chief Foreign Sub-Editor at the Daily Telegraph.  Predominantly evening work, this left him 
substantial free time during the day, so when he was approached in 1951 by the department's 
head, Ralph Murray, to help 'knock into shape' IRD's briefing and background papers on a part-
time basis he agreed.  As Sheridan's replacement, Tucker was required to shape the raw 
information from the regional desks into material tailored for particular audiences.  This was an 
onerous task in the Middle East, as can be seen later.  He remained at IRD until 1974, having 
                                                
7 Anne Pimlott Baker, 'Elwell, Ann Catherine (1922–1996)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2007 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/60758, accessed 27 Feb 
2013]. 
8 Jenks, Propaganda, p. 63. 
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risen to be the assistant to the department's head.  When he left, it was to become the director of 
British Information Services in Australia.  In 1979 Tucker became Consul General in Vancouver, 
before being recalled to London as Disarmament and Arms Control Information Coordinator, in 
which role he found himself positioned against the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).9 
IRD was of course directly supervised by the Foreign Office.  The most significant figure 
here was Ralph Murray.  Ex-BBC, during 1939-1945 Murray had worked at SOE preparing 
'black' radio programming aimed at Germany, and for the Political Warfare Executive.  Murray 
subsequently worked for the Allied Control Commission for Germany and Austria before 
returning to London in 1947 to become the first head of IRD in 1948.  When he left IRD in 
1951, he became a counsellor at the embassy in Madrid.  He was appointed minister at the 
embassy in Cairo in 1954, but following the nationalisation of the Canal he returned to London 
to coordinate the Anglo-American OMEGA plan.  He worked as political advisor to General 
Keightley during the Suez operation and its aftermath, before becoming assistant under-secretary 
of state at the FO in 1957 and deputy under-secretary of state, responsible for information work, 
in 1961.  In this latter post he was directly responsible for IRD.  He left the FO in 1967 for 
various commercial positions including time spent as a BBC governor.10  Murray, perhaps more 
than anyone in the information services, is a thread that runs through all of IRD's work in the 
Middle East and Africa, and he was deeply involved in the formulation of the wider strategy into 
which IRD's work fitted.  
 
                                                
9 Tucker Transcript, BDOHP, DOHP 11; Mary Tucker, wife of H H Tucker, letter to Andrew Defty, November 
1996, Defty, Britain, p. 78. 
10 Michael T. Thornhill, 'Murray, Sir (Francis) Ralph Hay (1908–1983)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64928, accessed 27 
Feb 2013]. 
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Information Officers: IRD's Contacts Abroad. 
IRD was by no means the only British information organisation at work in the Middle East, nor 
was anti-Communism the only game in town.  The Cairo Embassy in 1952 was unequivocal that 
their 'main information task [was]…to proclaim that Britain is still strong and a Power…and 
whose friendship is well worth having.'11  On balance, IRD had comparatively less to do with 
this form of propaganda than the other branches of the Foreign Office and the British Council, 
who were its major exponents. 
As James Vaughan has pointed out, a number of factors – primarily anti-Imperialism and 
British 'cultural assumptions' (particularly the colonialist, stereotypical, Orientalist assumptions 
that shaped the viewpoint of many British officials)12 – provided British cultural diplomacy in the 
Middle East with a unique set of challenges.  Taking a positive view of these challenges, J M Lee 
has concluded that '[o]nly the circumstances of the Middle East in the mid-1950s obliged 
policymakers to find ways of coordinating the [cultural diplomacy] apparatus at their disposal.'  
The weight of cultural propaganda deployed by the British in the years to follow underlines the 
significance of this statement.  Of all the cultural avenues available to the British, education was a 
particular focus, and a number of British officials saw the provision of British schools as an 
especially important strand of cultural diplomacy; in the case of the Ambassador in Beirut 'the 
best single contribution we could make to the future of the Middle East.'13  IRD would turn its 
hand to other work. 
                                                
11 Chancery (Cairo) to IPD, October 7, 1952, TNA FO 953/1316/PG1161/12 cited in Vaughan, Failure, p. 78. 
12 Orientalism is a somewhat elastic term.  Of relevance here, the term defines the Western view of the East – in this 
case the mid- or near-East – as culturally separate from the West, backward, inextricably linked to Islam, despotic, 
yet full of wonders; it's population childlike, often cruel, and in need of guidance.  This positioned the Orient, 
therefore, as lacking when weighed against Western modernity, Christian values, and established superiority.  
Orientalism draws on these assumptions to also describe the paternalist and dominant forms of government, 
influence and imperialism through which Britain and France interacted with the East, and attempted to shape it.  
For a fuller explanation of the term and its importance in the study of Britain's propaganda campaigns in the Middle 
East see Vaughan, Failure, Ch. 2, and more generally Edward Said, Orientalism (London, 2003). 
13 Vaughan, "Certain idea", p. 153; Lee, "Cultural", p. 132; Chapman Andrews (Ambassador, Beirut) to P F Grey 
(FO), May 2, 1955, TNA FO 1110/820/PR1088/3/G cited in Vaughan, "Certain idea", p. 155.  
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If IRD was but one department among many tasked with information work abroad, it 
was unique in the sense that its wide-ranging activities were (at this stage) all deployed in support 
of Cold War, anti-Communist aims.  This narrow focus often brought it into conflict with other 
foreign departments, most significantly the Colonial Office (CO), who saw other factors as both 
more pressing and more relevant to local issues.  The CO agreed with the FO regarding the 
threat from Arab nationalism, and in 1954 IRD had been asked to pass on all information on the 
impact of Egyptian cultural propaganda to Colonial territories.14  Where Colonial Office senior 
officials disagreed with IRD was on whether there was a significant - or any – Communist threat 
to the territories they administered.  Whilst information work within the CO was handled by the 
Colonial Office Information Department (COID), this had no comparable function to that of 
IRD.  The COID had, therefore, looked to IRD to supply anti-Communist material 'as and when 
we think it desirable to "place" it in the Colonies', as the Colonial Office's C Y Carstairs 
described it.  IRD had been pushing for a direct role for itself in the colonies since the late 
1940s, but had been consistently rebuffed.  As discussed in Chapter 4, this situation would only 
begin to change in 1956, facilitated in large part by a change in leadership in the COID.  In the 
meantime, Carstairs' view of IRD and the department's material was typical, though far from the 
extreme, when he explained how 
we in the Colonial Office have been somewhat discriminating in our approach to 
the value of this kind of material, considering that not every Colony is necessarily 
a suitable place for its widespread use, and having to bear in mind also the 
suitability of the means at our disposal for its dissemination.  We have also to 
bear in mind the nature of our total policy in respect of given territories, in a way 
that this branch of the Foreign Office are not in a position to do.  Furthermore, I 
understand that the attitude of other branches of the Foreign Office, and of 
many diplomatic posts abroad, is much the same as ours – I have heard it 
described as "all very interesting but not in my territory, please."15 
It is worth remembering that by and large British information agencies operated at the 
forbearance of the host government, though certain propaganda methods – broadcasting in 
                                                
14 Minute, June 25, 1954; Minute, September 7, 1954; TNA CO 1035/20/S811 (signatures unclear). 
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particular – operated across national borders.  Agencies were expected to respect local 
sovereignty, and to combat Communism by advising local governments, disseminating 
information, exposing Communist activities and suggesting ways to tackle the problem – to 
provide the tools for a country to act for itself.  IRD often went further than this, however: 
'where local governments are weak, ignorant and unreceptive, as they often are', explained the 
department – who were presumably the arbiters of such criteria – 'it may be necessary for us to 
take a hand ourselves'.16  In these circumstances, British Information Officers – the foreign 
service staff responsible for coordinating and disseminating British propaganda in all its forms 
from within a host nation – would exploit contacts outside of government channels. 
IRD was predominantly a Whitehall-based organisation; whilst staff would regularly visit 
posts or tour regions, and were in any case in constant contact, it was the job of the IOs to 
disseminate IRD output locally (over time a small number of IRD staff were posted overseas).  
As discussed later, IRD was often roundly criticised that this approach consistently failed to 
produce material with any local appeal.  Whilst IRD intended for their material to be tailored by 
the recipients (and often translated by them), it was often considered wholly unsuitable.  It was 
the job of IOs to adapt material where they could, and request changes where they could not. 
Information Officers were employed in the press or information offices at local 
embassies and chanceries.  In smaller posts they often worked alone.  There was also a Regional 
Information Office (RIO) in Beirut, which co-ordinated information work and produced 
propaganda of its own.  RIO Beirut existed to tackle the thorny problem of producing material 
in Arabic with local relevance, and handled the lion's share of British Arabic-language 
propaganda and information.  The RIO and local information offices were responsible for 
maintaining contacts with the press and radio, the primary avenues for distribution of 
widespread propaganda, alongside printed pamphlets and book schemes.  IRD material in 
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particular targeted individuals, rather than being intended for mass consumption, and so IOs' 
personal contacts with local persons of interest was accordingly of great importance.  The 
particular linguistic and cultural landscape of the region explains why experienced Information 
Officers, with local knowledge and 'of the highest calibre', were identified by the Drogheda 
Report as being of the utmost importance in the Middle East.17  The situation in Africa could not 
have been more different.  Prior to 1956, there were only two (Colonial Office) IOs covering the 
whole of Britain's African colonies, and IRD were less than impressed by one of them.18  There 
was no equivalent to the RIO.  This was far from ideal, though indicative of the paucity of the 
Communist threat to Africa as seen by the Colonial Office. 
'The Information Officer is essentially a salesman and like any other salesman he has to 
discover the needs of his customers and try to provide them with what they want', explained the 
FO's Bob Marett in the early 1960s.  The purpose of information officers was to cultivate both 
rulers and leaders of opinion, in order to 'assist Her Majesty's Government in the prosecution of 
foreign policy in the broadest sense' through long term publicity designed to promote the 
national life, and everyday publicity aimed at explaining policy or advancing a particular aim.  The 
main source for the continuous flow of material necessary for the information officers to do 
their jobs on the political side – IOs also had a significant commercial role – were guidance 
telegrams and 'intels' provided by IPD, supported by material from the COI.  IOs were 
responsible for selling British policy abroad, and for reporting back on the market for 
information that was their post.19 
The maintenance and development of contacts, and the other particulars of IRD work, 
often meant that lone information officers, responsible for all the duties noted above, found it 
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hard to strike a balance.  R E Gamble, a foreign service officer with experience of several small 
information offices, argued that it was difficult for the lone IO 
however well served with local staff, to divert adequate time to I.R.D. work.  He 
has to make and cultivate contacts, and it takes some months to know people 
well enough to make use of them in this way.  Moreover, he will want to make 
some I.R.D. contacts outside the capital, which is usually possible only when on 
tour, and he will not have the time or the means to cover the same ground very 
often… material still has to be read, selectively distributed and, preferably, 
followed up occasionally…the information officer has many pressing, short term 
demands on his time… I.R.D. work tends to take a lower priority, to be fitted in 
when time permits… the Information Officer may find it difficult to secure the 
cooperation of other Departments of the Embassy… there is the problem of 
language… reproduction facilities at the post are often strained to the limit… I 
have always found that I could make a minimum of useful I.R.D. contacts 
without difficulty… It is the extension beyond this nucleus which presents 
problems.20 
At the other end of the scale were the regional information organisations through which 
IRD material was passed, and with which the department supplied staff and advice.  There were 
two distinct groups into which propaganda could be divided, although with some overlap: 
material produced in Britain and dispatched for use abroad, and material produced locally or 
regionally.  These organisations formed the foreign end of information production.  One of 
these was a wholly British affair, the aforementioned RIO in Beirut, which by 1955 had largely 
supplanted its controller-cum-predecessor, the British Middle East Office (BMEO).  The other 
was a multinational affair, the information and counter-subversion arm of the wider regional 
alliance known as the Baghdad Pact.  
 
Middle East Agencies: the BMEO and RIO Beirut 
Set up in 1945 to aid British territories in the region, pressure from the Chiefs of Staff two years 
later had secured political responsibilities for the BMEO.21  The BMEO was in essence a 
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development office and provider of technical expertise, yet it held the responsibility for 
coordinating information policy through the RIO, and this expanded its role beyond 
development into the realms of political intelligence. The RIO fell under BMEO supervision, 
until this function was removed in 1955, leaving the RIO effectively independent.22  
The BMEO were sceptical of the suitability of IRD material, having concluded that 
IRD's campaign for the Middle East had been concocted with Europe as the focus; an 
assessment that Andrew Defty has argued had some basis in fact.23  For their part, IRD saw 
BMEO practice as flawed, and fundamentally disagreed with the basis of their future strategy.  
Responding to a comprehensive and widely distributed report put forward by the BMEO in 
1955, IRD noted that the BMEO suffered from the 'erroneous idea that we can and should 
answer Communist propaganda point by point...I.P.D. are, I think, suggesting politely to the 
B.M.E.O that it is time to get on with the job [of producing propaganda] and [to] stop 
proliferating theoretical paper.'24 
IRD in fact produced their own report, 'Communist Propaganda and Developments in 
the Middle East', which was produced on a bi-monthly basis and covered much the same ground 
as this fledgling BMEO report.  Despite a second report from the BMEO in July 1955, IRD and 
RIO Beirut had taken over such work from the office, and nothing further was produced.  The 
BMEO reduced its anti-Communist propaganda and increased production of material that 
focussed on a positive spin on Britain.  The office also scaled back production and distribution, 
concentrating on delivering background pamphlets, mainly to select recipients.25 
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The RIO managed a complicated blend of IRD, IPD and other output, both positive and 
negative, and did not just exist to service IRD.  Yet in its own words, by 1955 the RIO was 
'increasingly becoming, in one of its capacities, what might be described as a field branch of 
Information Research Department.'  The RIO acted somewhat as a clearing house, with all 
correspondence, despatches and the like relating to Soviet bloc action in the Middle East 
forwarded there from the various posts in the region.  Later, as concern over Arab nationalism 
grew, the RIO would take on similar responsibility for that issue.  RIO Beirut translated and 
adapted IRD pamphlets and articles for distribution, and increasingly wrote its own.  Publishing 
and translation of appropriate foreign books was also part of the office's purview.  In 1954 the 
RIO spent £1,500 on this activity, rising to £2,000 in 1955.  RIO Beirut was a concentration of 
staff for editorial and translation functions, and by April 1956 almost all Arabic written material 
for posts in the Middle East was produced there.26  As the period under study here progressed, 
RIO Beirut – though semi-autonomous – increasingly became IRD's extended arm overseas, and 
indeed from 1960-1964 was headed by an old IRD hand, Norman Reddaway. 
Reddaway had served with the army's GHQ liaison unit ('Phantom') during the Second 
World War, a unit responsible for gathering front-line intelligence for forces on the continent, 
and, pertinently, for the Middle East.  He joined the FO after the war and under Christopher 
Mayhew, with whom he had served in Phantom, had been part of the team that established IRD.  
After postings to Canada and Italy, he returned to IRD in 1955 as Rennie's deputy, taking over 
the running of the department whilst Rennie was otherwise engaged during Suez.  In 1960 he 
was appointed Director of RIO Beirut, and his appointment underscores the ties between the 
RIO and IRD.  Reddaway's previous experience and his subsequent counter-propaganda field 
postings – he left the RIO in 1964, and was active during the Malayan insurgency and the 
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overthrow of Sukarno in Indonesia – lend context to the work he was drafted in to do at the 
RIO.  Chargé d'Affaires to Khartoum until 1970, he returned to London as Assistant Under-
Secretary for Information and Cultural Affairs at the FO between 1970 and 1974 – involved 
once again with IRD – before a final posting as Ambassador to Warsaw until 1978.27 
RIO Beirut served IRD interests in the Middle East, and the department supported it.  
Often it was relied upon to manage IRD material by regional posts.  In the case of Egypt in 
1954, the embassy staff were so busy handling general 'day to day' information work that they 
relied on the RIO almost exclusively 'to adapt or re-write I.R.D. material to suit local needs.'28  It 
was IRD's main, local connection to the region, though it was not the only one.  The other, the 
Counter Subversion Office of the Baghdad Pact, was, if not a 'field branch' of IRD, more akin to 
a franchise. 
 
The Counter Subversion Office of the Baghdad Pact29 
The Egyptian coup of 1952 that ultimately brought Nasser to power would be followed two years 
later by a shift in power in Iraq that would return Nuri as-Said to the premiership.  This return to 
a pro-Western regime paralleled worsening relations with Egypt.  With Britain forced to look at 
alternatives to a regional defensive strategy based around their facilities in the Suez Canal Zone, 
Iraq proved increasingly attractive. As Nasser's Egypt, through nationalist propaganda, nascent 
hegemony, and increasing links with the Eastern Bloc, came by 1956 to stand as pariah to the 
West, the Iraq of dependable pro-Western Nuri as-Said formed the core around which Britain 
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and America sought to build the Baghdad Pact, the alliance that would act as bulwark against the 
Soviet threat to the north, and against Nasser's Egypt to the West.30 
The British saw the pact as vitally important.  Macmillan, the British Foreign Secretary, 
declared to the American Secretary of State in late 1955 that he realised 'the special importance 
of the Pact in relation to Communist propaganda….because it is a real partnership, on a basis of 
equality, between Western countries and Moslem Asian countries.  Moreover since it includes a 
leading Arab State, Iraq, it makes a convenient link with the Arab world, now so important to 
us.'  This concept of a partnership would replace previous bilateral arrangements.31   
The Pact's Counter Subversion Committee (CSC) met on an ad-hoc basis to discuss 
subversive threats faced by members of the pact, or by the pact as a whole.  The Counter 
Subversion Office (CSO)'s remit included propaganda, and was of great interest to both Britain 
and America.  Though America ultimately chose not to commit itself fully to the pact, it was 
fully involved in the workings of the CSC.  The US Embassy in Iran recognised that the CSC's 
objective was an 'integral part [of] US foreign policy'.32 
The pact was set up as a defensive organisation, and so its various organs were not to be 
mobilised for offensive operations of any sort.  The CSO directive was simple: to respond to 
'[a]ny attack on the purposes of the Pact, from whatever quarter and whether directly Communist-
inspired or not' [my emphasis].33  This broad-reaching definition would cause problems later when, 
as discussed in Chapter 7, certain regional member nations tried repeatedly to get the CSO 
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involved in their own regional disputes, something the Western members would not 
countenance.  IRD was Britain's voice at the CSO. 
The CSC was quick to call for IRD material for their use, and optimistic that the CSO 
would aid its distribution.  BBC monitoring reports that detailed broadcasts from the Middle 
East as well as those to the region from Eastern Europe, the Far East and South East Asia, were 
dropped by BBC van to London Airport each morning, ready for the next available dispatch to 
Baghdad.  IRD articles pertaining to the Middle East, IRD Central Research Unit background 
notes, pamphlets, booklets, books and 'Basic Papers' were all provided.  In common with 
arrangements in place within NATO, information could be passed via the pact's secretariat to its 
member countries, bypassing the local information officers.34  Philip Adams, the head of RIO 
Beirut, at this time attended all CSC meetings.  In late 1956 consideration was given to raising 
Britain's profile, with attendance at perhaps under-secretary level – highlighting the significance 
placed upon the CSC – but this was not pursued.35 
Whilst Adams attended the CSC, the main British representative was in fact an IRD 
employee, and the first national representative to begin work there.36  British contributions to the 
CSO were met by the FO, and the committee was initially a function of the general FO mandate.  
IRD representation at the CSO office in Baghdad caused early controversy: the 'material 
activities' of an early IRD representative, A J Speares, were seen much more as IRD work than 
'ordinary F.O. establishment work'.  When he requested an assistant, it was suggested that 
perhaps IRD would like to 'take him back again [and] look after his staff needs'.37  IRD later took 
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over responsibility for funding the British commitment to the CSO, drawn out of departmental 
funds secured through the Secret Vote.38 
The heterogeneous nature of the Baghdad Pact meant that it attracted significant 
negative propaganda along religious/ideological lines, as well as over economic and military 
issues.   Despite this, by mid-1956, with the pact a year old, the British were buoyant regarding 
its progress, and its potential in the cultural sphere. Roger Makins, the British Ambassador in 
Washington, believed that development of the Pact's radio station at Baghdad would overcome 
the advantages in communications enjoyed by those who opposed the Pact, and help generate an 
audience for, and interest in, the Pact's publicity.39  This radio station and facilities, into which 
the British invested heavily, acquired a new significance after the loss of credibility of Britain's 
foremost broadcasting asset in the region, the Near East Broadcasting Station (NEABS) at 
Limassol, Cyprus, as a result of mismanaged government requisitioning during the Suez Crisis. 
 
IRD's product 
Over and above the work for the Baghdad Pact, and paralleled by the work of the RIO, it was 
IRD's function to counter Communism, and later Arab nationalism, across the region.  This 
work forms the basis for later chapters.  Before looking at this however, it is worth a general 
review of the types of material IRD made available at this point, and how it went about its 
business. 
IRD aimed itself at those who formed public opinion, across the political spectrum but 
with extra emphasis placed on the left-wing, for whom Communism was likely to hold greater 
potential appeal.  Indeed, as John Peck, IRD's head between 1951 and 1954, put it, 'We make no 
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emotional appeals to those already converted, and we regard propaganda issued by right-wing 
elements designed only to appeal to other right-wing elements as dangerous to us and helpful to 
the enemy'.40  The vast majority of material that IRD produced during this period in this region 
was printed, although the particular requirements of propaganda in an area of widespread 
illiteracy meant that a proportion of this material was eventually broadcast rather than published. 
IRD material at this point fell into several broad categories.  The first of these were 
'Basic Papers', which were designed for 'serious thinking people' and contained factual 
information drawn as much as possible from Communist sources.  Readers were left to draw 
their own conclusions.  Basic Papers were mainly aimed at government contacts and provided 
that their provenance was not further communicated recipients were made aware of their origin 
to reinforce their authenticity.  'Basic Booklets', written in 'a slightly more popular style', were 
suitable for (unattributable) publication, aimed at journalists, and carried an argument that 
pointed to the moral of the subject at hand.  'Facts About' booklets provided reference material 
on certain subjects, largely for journalists.  IRD aimed to produce one 'Basic Paper' per month, 
and one 'Facts About' booklet every six weeks.41  Through 1955, the department also increased 
the number of illustrated pamphlets it published.42   
IRD produced a number of regular publications.  The Interpreter – available in English, 
French, Italian and Spanish versions and so widely relevant to the Middle East and Africa – was 
designed to be 'one of I.R.D.'s chief weapons in the campaign to expose the threat behind Soviet 
political warfare.'  It was 'a factual analysis of all the agencies of Soviet policy, designed primarily 
for intelligent people'.  The Interpreter often carried a supplement. The Asian Analyst was a 
variation on the Interpreter.  The Digest and Religious Digest were a collection of shorter items, 
designed to be extracted and passed on by IOs as appropriate, the latter for use by religious 
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leaders in church or by the ecclesiastical press.  Trends of Communist Propaganda was a fortnightly, 
and self-explanatory, document produced to mainly inform the FO.  IRD at this stage also 
commissioned around 17 feature articles a month targeted at a specific market, obtained second-
rights for articles that had appeared in the British or foreign press, and provided a spread of 
miscellaneous articles and papers as the need arose.43  This portfolio expanded significantly 
between 1956 and 1963, encompassing greater scope and numerous regional or topical variations 
as discussed throughout this thesis.  IRD also produced briefing material when necessary for 
ministers.  All of these various products were 'open' material, as IRD made clear: 
It should be emphasised that every statement in any of the books or papers 
quoted above is an open statement and can be used by anybody anywhere.  What 
is secret or confidential about them is that there is a department of Her Majesty's 
Government engaged in collecting anti-Communist material, in producing and 
disseminating it.  The conditions under which any of them are given to people 
outside of Government circles are that they shall, as far as possible, not disclose 
the fact that the material was obtained from Her Majesty's Government.44 
IRD was clear that its material was aimed at a 'world-wide market…and we hope to 
attain the highest common factor of usefulness.  Certain types of material are palpably designed 
to interest one part of the world more than another, but much of it…[is] relevant and important 
in all parts of the world.'  (For example, material such as the Interpreter was intended to be 
relevant to all posts.)  'If there is a lack of interest in them locally', the department asserted, 'that 
is an indication of weakness in the face of the Communist threat which it is expected that Her 
Majesty's Missions will do their best ultimately to eradicate.'45  The importance of this statement, 
and the view it encapsulated, cannot be overstressed, for it sets the stage for the single most 
significant and oft-repeated criticism of IRD's work in the Middle East and Africa, one that the 
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department struggled for years to overcome.  The majority of Arabs and Africans, educated or 
not, were not interested in the Cold War except as to how it affected them, as IOs continually 
reported.   
Indeed, the Nicholls Committee of 1952, set up to review the overseas information 
services, had singled out the Middle East and Asia as the areas where the greatest amount of 
material had failed to connect with local audiences.46  This inability to make material topically 
relevant did not just mean that personal contacts might not be interested.  Editors and 
broadcasters, were unlikely to carry material – there was little if any revenue to be made from 
newspapers that did not sell, or radio programmes that did not attract listeners or advertisers.  
IRD would expand rapidly in size as it sought to develop expertise for specific markets.47  
Developing relevant, attractive material – that would be useful, and used by its recipients – was 
the foremost challenge that IRD faced in the Middle East and Africa.  IRD would also be forced 
to develop its expertise beyond Communism to address the threat of Arab nationalism to British 
interests abroad, and the early years of this dual role are examined in the following chapter. 
IRD had initially been directed to target the broad-base of the general population.  
However, the department quickly returned to the existing practice of targeting intellectuals and 
opinion-shapers, as did the FO in general.  Students and graduates, professionals, and the 
English-speaking sections of society would be propagandised: the former, seen as the most 
susceptible to the lure of Communism, should be engaged in Arabic; the latter, with the most to 
lose in any shift to Communism, would be both largely in agreement with, and thus open to, 
IRD propaganda.  Radio, in a region of widespread illiteracy, would be able to reach the broadest 
cross-section of society.  The literate, educated population would be reached through the press, 
with articles placed there by information officers.  Articles could also be placed in the British 
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press, with these either translated and passed on by information officers, or picked up via 
syndication.48 
Despite the obvious importance placed on radio propaganda, Vaughan has shown that 
written material, specifically articles prepared for use in local newspapers or other printed media, 
proved the 'mainstay' of IRD work in the region.49 (This balance would change in the aftermath 
of Suez.)  Articles placed in the Middle Eastern press could be picked up by other Middle 
Eastern publications, which could also access articles published in Britain through a print 
syndication subscription.  These articles could therefore be republished or drawn from many 
times, widening their distribution and obscuring their original source.  IRD could also then 
purchase 'second rights' to these subsequent reprints – of their own material, no less – providing 
it with valuable local attribution to a publication they had never approached.  IRD's John Cloake 
described this as 'place, pick-up and play back', and stressed that this technique 'was a very 
important part of IRD dissemination procedure' in the Middle East and elsewhere.50  
Consequentially, the majority of IRD contacts were with the press and officials.  The department 
had discussed whether it would be possible to diversify contacts, and engage with more 'base' 
entertainment – pulp fiction, popular film, clubs and their associated acts – but to no avail: J V 
Riley concluded that 'I.R.D. could not begin to compete at that level of pornography.'51  In all 
cases, the BMEO was unequivocal: material printed in Arabic was 'worth ten times any material 
in English or French.'52 
It is worth noting at this point that the BBC was not just a receiver of IRD material.  The 
corporation also supplied the department with a significant volume of information: in fact, 
according to Hugh Carless, '[m]uch of the research material… [for IRD] came from the 
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Summary of World Broadcasts produced daily by the BBC at Caversham.'53  Data on Communist 
and nationalist radio propaganda broadcast into and from the Middle East was provided by the 
BBC, who held a reciprocal arrangement with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 
of the CIA, pooling information and dividing resources to ensure the maximum coverage.  The 
responsibility for the output of the Soviet Union and her satellites, and for the Middle East, 
rested with the BBC. The BBC Monitoring Service provided two products: the News Bureau's 
'ticker' of information, which in 1958 provided around 20,000 words of information daily to 
both the BBC and the Foreign Office, and the Reports Department's Summary of World 
Broadcasts noted above.  Both products drew their information from the combined take of the 
BBC and the FBIS.54 
Based at Caversham Park in Reading, the BBC Monitoring Service ostensibly monitored 
broadcast news over much of the world in order to inform the BBC's news and programming, as 
well as that of certain subscribers.  In fact – a rather open secret – Caversham provided 
information on great swathes of broadcasting, both overt and covert, and fed this to various 
government organs as a provider of open intelligence.  As regards the Cold War in Africa and 
the Middle East over the period studied here, BBC monitoring covered the full range of 
broadcasts across the Middle East and Africa.  It provided valuable intelligence on everything 
from clandestine 'black' radio stations during the Suez crisis, to the daily output of Egyptian, 
Soviet and Chinese and local broadcasts.55 
In October of 1956, just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Suez Crisis, the volume 
and growth of propaganda disseminated by the Arab nations, particularly Egypt, was such that 
the gap between what was produced and what the BBC could monitor was wide enough to cause 
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concern.  Radio monitoring was IRD's 'main source of material for immediate use in counter 
propaganda on the Middle East, as well as for background information.'  Printed propaganda 
took time to distribute and taxed IRD's limited translation resources.  Radio propaganda was, in 
IRD's own assessment, 'the most effective propaganda weapon in the Middle East'; 
consequentially it would be hard to overstate how important BBC monitoring was to the 
department.56 
Pressure from IRD therefore began in late 1956 for an expansion in The BBC's 
monitoring of Arabic broadcasts.  The daily Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) produced by 
the BBC's monitoring service was a significant undertaking.  Part IV focussed on the Middle 
East, and would be expanded to report verbatim as much Cairo traffic as possible.  IRD was 
interested in as much of the 'full raw material' as was available.  Any particularly virulent 
propaganda not included in the SWB would be sent to IRD by bag.  There was an uphill climb to 
improve things however: only five Arabic monitors (plus one in training) were available to 
monitor broadcasts – based both in Cyprus and back in Britain – in late 1956, compared with 
some 18 or 19 dedicated to Moscow Radio.57  These monitoring reports allowed the British to 
keep track of (particularly) Cairo Radio broadcasting, and adjust their propaganda output 
accordingly.  It was post-Suez, and with the need to monitor broadcasting in north and east 
Africa – particularly in British colonial territories – that the relationship between IRD and the 
monitoring service became even more crucial to IRD. 
 
Regional propaganda: Al Alaam , Sharq al -Adna  and the Arab News Agency. 
One area of publishing that IRD was involved with that was particularly successful was the 
magazine Al Alaam (The Globe).  Al Alaam was putatively an independent magazine published 
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in Iraq, but was in fact heavily subsidised by both the British oil companies and the Foreign 
Office's Central Office of Information (COI).  By December 1954 the COI was ensuring that 
each issue carried 2 or 3 anti-Communist pieces sourced from the IRD publication The Digest.  
There was a degree of resistance, however, as the editors preferred to emphasise the promotion 
of Britain and avoid too controversial a topic.  The magazine's circulation was significant, and 
rising.  Between 1952 and 1956 it raised its average sales from under 28,000 to over 50,000 per 
issue. 58  It not only supported British counter-Communist efforts; the head of IPD, Robert 
Marett, also considered it to be of particular importance to British interests that the newsstands 
of the Middle East carried a pro-British Arabic publication to mitigate the extreme anti-British 
message of the Egyptian magazines with which it competed.59  Al Alaam certainly attracted 
criticism – to IRD's evident satisfaction - with at least one local Communist incensed enough to 
write in condemning 'a purely parasitic and imperialist magazine.'60  The magazine proved 
resilient, too, and even after Suez Al Alaam (at least as far as the COI was reporting) had the 
highest circulation of any Arabic-language magazine outside Egypt.61 
Both British and American agencies saw the value in using news agencies as cover for 
stories authored by their own national propagandists.  In the British case, this had been going on 
since the First World War, the government having arranged with Reuters for that agency to carry 
certain news items for a fee.  In the Middle East in the 1950s this arrangement had developed, 
with the Arab News Agency (ANA), based in Cairo, obtaining rights to distribute Reuters 
material to certain countries in the region from 1954.  In a way matters had come full-circle: 
ANA, operating under a veneer of independence, was in fact owned and run by the British, with 
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heavy MI6 involvement.  Lashmar and Oliver suggest that a great deal of IRD material was fed 
into ANA, which serviced nearly all Middle Eastern newspapers.62 
Originally installed in Palestine, Sharq al-Adna was a programme of the Near East 
Broadcasting Station (NEABS), that had moved to Cyprus as part of the British withdrawal in 
1948 following the creation of Israel.  By 1955, a new 100,000 watt facility meant that only 
Cairo's radio facilities could compare with its broadcasting power.   Sharq was a government-
funded station, and British government involvement was something of an open secret as far as 
many of its listeners were concerned.  The BBC, with an experience of Arabic broadcasting that 
pre-dated the Second World War, was wary of becoming too involved with the station for fears 
that it may tarnish their reputation for impartiality.  Professional links were maintained, however, 
and at the outbreak of hostilities during the Suez Crisis the station was rebranded and 
requisitioned by the British government as the Voice of Britain, with the intention of placing it 
under BBC control.63  Similar to ANA, Stephen Dorrill notes that Sharq was by managed by MI6, 
and that both were handovers from the wartime Special Operations Executive who had created 
them.64 
Sharq's news was more focussed on the Arab world than the BBC's was.  Peter Partner 
notes that Sharq 
was in effect, the light programme to the BBC's Arabic Home Service, but by 
1955 with the advantage of medium-wave transmission which got it blared out in 
all the taxis of Cairo and Beirut.  All the audience research surveys of the period 
show it enjoying a very high rating indeed in the listening habits of the Middle 
East Area… The news policy of Sharq al-Adna was explicitly pro-Arab and anti-
Zionist in a way that the BBC was not… Its production has sometimes been 
referred to as propagandist… Possibly the distinction is that at times of political 
crisis the BBC consciously strove for objectivity in news reporting, whereas 
Sharq al-Adna was not constitutionally inhibited, as the BBC was, from having to 
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follow a Foreign Office line…Few people who listened to the station were in 
much doubt that there was a British hand in its control… But it should not be 
thought that the station was operated in a cloak and dagger atmosphere: it was 
not.65 
ANA supplied much of Sharq's news material, in a further continuation of the British 
propaganda trail.66  The significance of Sharq to IRD is twofold.  Firstly for the ANA connection, 
and the other trails through which IRD material would have found its way onto the station, but 
secondly, and most importantly, for IRD's central role in the running of the Voice of Britain 
programme from the facility following the requisitioning of the station during the Suez Crisis.  
Omitted from most analyses, Gary Rawnsley makes the IRD connection, noting that it has never 
been admitted, and that the documentary evidence is tangential.67  However, testimony and 
documents do now make the connection clear.  IRD was in control of the station's output 
throughout the crisis and beyond, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Conclusion: IRD in 1954 
Going into the period under study, IRD was well established in the Middle East, and had a 
portfolio of products, which, whilst well developed, was not altogether suitable for the Middle 
East.  As noted above, the department believed that their standard material would be of interest 
across the region, if only information officers could convince recipients of the seriousness of the 
Cold War.  This seems a rather weak argument, transferring the problem from IRD to the IOs, 
and it did not endure.  IRD, following constant requests from posts, began to diversify their 
material and develop it for a Middle Eastern and African audience from this point – the lesson 
was largely learned by the time IRD began its campaign in Africa. 
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The department was highly reliant on the support of information officers both to 
distribute their material and to provide feedback on its suitability and distribution.  It was 
similarly reliant on RIO Beirut.  The RIO would become increasingly important to IRD as it 
diversified and expanded its work in the Middle East, paralleling the work of the department on 
a local level, and providing the greater share of Arabic-language material.  The RIO would also 
later provide material for certain parts of Africa. 
In contrast, the Baghdad Pact CSO was in 1955-6 still very much a work in progress.  
There would be a number of setbacks to its development, not least the revolution of 1958 that 
would result in Iraq's withdrawal from the pact the following year.  Its tentative, early work was 
rather eclipsed by the Suez Crisis, and left British efforts to build up Iraq as an alternative to 
Egypt's centrality to Arab affairs exposed as cynical, self-serving and largely in tatters.  Vaughan 
notes that the CSC 'suffered from an inability to transform ideas into practical policies and a lack 
of dynamism'.68  Even after the rebranding of the pact as the Central Treaty Organisation 
following Iraq's secession in 1959 these issues continued, but there were promising later 
developments in the relationships built up between IRD and the information services of Turkey 
and Iran, even if the pact itself continued to underperform. 
During this period IRD largely aimed its propaganda at individuals – the educated 
opinion-shapers who could then effect change themselves – and largely through printed material 
and personal contacts.  The overarching strategy was to provide truthful information based on 
research, but to obscure its source. IRD was a relatively small organisation at this stage, but grew 
rapidly through the 1960s, largely as a result of diversifying its products to accommodate 'specific 
markets'.69  The 1952 Drogheda report into the information services had concluded that the time 
had come for an expansion of overseas information staff in several key posts, including the 
Middle East, and the creation of information posts in Africa.   There should also be an 
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expansion of domestic technical services to support said, including the London Press Service 
(LPS) of the Central Office of Information.70  All of these developments will be important in the 
chapters that follow.  As to the importance of the information services, the Drogheda Report 
concluded that 
 [A] modern government has to concern itself with public opinion abroad and be 
properly equipped to deal with it…It is the unanimous view of all the Heads of 
Mission, Colonial Governors and Military Commanders…the Foreign Office, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office and the Board of 
Trade…the Federation of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress.  And 
the same view is held by the Chiefs of Staff who regard the Overseas 
Information Services as a weapon no less essential than those employed by the 
fighting forces.71 
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Chapter Two 
The Early Communist Threat in the Middle East, and the 
Rise of Arab Nationalism 
 
What the Russians are really saying…is this: "Your contacts with Western 
thought and influence have brought you nothing but humiliation. They are 
exploiters, colonialists, imperialists, and have no real basis of understanding with 
you".1 
Macmillan to Dulles, November 25, 1955 
 
The competition for cultural and ideological currency in the Middle East diversified considerably 
between 1954 and 1956.  There were several reasons for this.  In Egypt, Nasser supplanted 
Neguib's titular presidency in November 1954, and his adoption of the mantle of leader of the 
pan-Arab movement began from that point.  Britain began her withdrawal from the Suez Canal 
Zone, and to search for alternative arrangements for the regional defence of her national and 
Cold War interests.  The result of this, the Baghdad Pact of 1955, was a defensive coalition of 
Middle Eastern nations that formalised the division of the region's political and rhetorical 
landscape between Egypt and Iraq.  America's (ultimately limited) participation, in a defensive 
organisation that was nonetheless clustered around the USSR's southern flank, raised the profile 
of the region in Cold War terms sufficient to force deeper Soviet involvement.  The Soviets were 
in any case by this point in a position doctrinally – through their post-Stalin reappraisal of 
foreign policy – to see advantages in exacerbating tensions in the Middle East, and agitating 
against the West. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, IRD began this period treating the Middle East – at 
least conceptually – in a similar fashion to their work in Europe.  The emphasis on a 'world-wide 
market', commissioning only a few articles tailored for a local audience, was advocated in the 
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Middle East as much as it was elsewhere.  In a document on 'Combating Communism', revised 
in 1954 and issued to the Iranian government, IRD advised that regional propaganda material 
that embodied 'the general principles of anti-Communist propaganda' should consist of '[f]acts 
about life in the Soviet Union…  about life in Soviet dominated states… [and] about Soviet 
methods and intentions towards the outside world.'2  The reaction from posts in the region made 
it quite clear that what was needed, rather than the above, were facts about how Communism 
and the Soviet Union directly affected the Middle East.  As the Embassy in Benghazi emphasised 
to RIO Beirut in 1956, it was important to maintain a Middle Eastern angle to any propaganda 
that was supplied.3  Little of IRD's product was so tailored, and so by extension little of it was 
suitable for the Middle East. 
It was, however, a deeper problem than simply making material geographically relevant.  
IRD needed to find a style that resonated with audiences in the region: topically, culturally and 
stylistically.  Their normal product was often seen to be too dry, or out of context.  'I am in 
agreement with Cairo that much of what we receive here is very dull', the British Embassy in 
Tripoli reported in 1954; 'generally speaking no one here is interested in whether people behind 
the Iron Curtain enjoy good or bad living conditions.'4 
To rectify these issues would require a shift in IRD's modus operandi.  The department was 
quickly disabused of the notion that material tailored for a 'world-wide market' would carry any 
weight in the Middle East, yet change took time to implement – longer than the time available to 
the department before the Suez Crisis took hold.  The issue in the Middle East was connecting 
material to local issues and getting it distributed locally either in the news or via contacts, and for 
this RIO Beirut would be key.  IRD believed the issue was 'not so much for large news pegs 
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manufactured in London as for a continuing supply of small ones manufactured in the Middle 
East.'5  How IRD saw the Communist threat to British interests in the Middle East naturally 
informed the department's policy- and decision-making.  IRD's assessment of the threat it faced 
is outlined in the first section of this chapter, alongside a number of examples of the scale and 
direction of the department's work therein.  The second and third sections go into further detail 
on IRD work in the two most significant nations (in terms of power, influence and as the 
opposite foci of British strategy) in the Middle East: Egypt and Iraq.  The Sudan was at this time 
administered jointly by Egypt and Britain.  Since it was as a British-administered African territory 
and one that achieved independence before Suez, the Sudan is discussed in the second section to 
illustrate several issues that would be repeated across Africa after 1956.  These sections are all 
concerned with IRD and Communism, and much of this is by way of background. 
The penultimate section of this chapter is concerned with the expansion of IRD's remit 
to include countering Arab nationalism, and the threat that Egypt posed as the centre and 
driving force of its expression.  The emergent issue for IRD in the Middle East from 1954 was 
the rapid development of Egypt's propaganda apparatus.  Egyptian – Nasserite – propaganda 
ideologically shaped opposition to Britain and the West, and politically underpinned and 
legitimised Nasser's leadership of Egypt.  The most substantial development on a technical level 
was the creation, then rapid expansion, of Cairo Radio's Voice of the Arabs programme, an 
examination of which forms the final section of this chapter.  Britain struggled to adequately 
respond to the Voice of the Arabs, even before the Suez Crisis, and the programme's reach and 
influence expanded significantly following the crisis to constitute a major – in many areas the 
major – threat to British interests over much of the period under study.  Whilst there were other 
factors at play, for example the provision of education and cultural exchange between Egypt and 
African nations, it was the Voice of the Arabs that constituted the prime link between the Middle 
East and wider Africa. 
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The Communist propaganda drive in the Middle East 
The timing of, and increase in, Soviet involvement in the Middle East was brought about by a 
combination of factors.  Galia Golan has summarised the reasons for a changed Soviet policy 
'towards Egypt, and towards the Arab cause', as: 
1) The post-Stalin reassessment in Soviet foreign policy 
2) openings within the region itself; and 
3) the need to combat what was perceived as American inroads into the region 
[the Baghdad Pact]6 
 
This new Soviet policy was a direct response to fears about escalation in a nuclear age. 'Peaceful 
coexistence', a tension release-valve that eschewed the Stalinist policy of direct confrontation 
between the superpowers, was matched by the abandonment of the bipolar restrictions of 'two-
camp' politics (essentially, "you are with us, or you are against us").  No longer were partnerships 
with other nations determined by ideology.  Nikita Khrushchev championed anti-imperialism, 
believing that the situation in Europe had stabilised, and that the waning colonial empires of the 
West presented a new opportunity for the Soviets to gain an advantage within the constraints of 
their new foreign policy.  The struggle for Arab leadership that took place in the mid-1950s 
between Egypt and Iraq both facilitated a more active Soviet policy in the region, and allowed 
the USSR to exploit such competition.  It was enough for the Soviets to support nonalignment 
in the Middle East, Golan notes, 'in the interest of removing the West in what was basically a 
political competition', and it was not until the late 1960s that the Soviets sought to consolidate 
true alliances.7  The Soviets held a trump card in their negotiations with Cairo.  Mohamed Heikal, 
editor of the Al-Ahram newspaper and confidante of Nasser, explains that 'the Egyptians saw the 
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Soviet Union as coming to them with clean hands, free of the taint of any imperial past.'8  Soviet 
political policy in the Middle East recognised that the forces of nationalism and Islam made the 
rise to power of any Communist regime therein unlikely, and so the USSR limited its objectives 
towards securing bases and facilities in the region.  Soviet strategists also realised that improved 
relations with an influential nation such as Egypt may further influence other nations in the 
Third World, such as those in Africa.9 
Soviet broadcasting to the Middle East was fledgling at this stage: 14 hours per week in 
1955 rising to 17.5 hours by the middle of 1956.  In this respect the British effort far outstripped 
their Soviet competitors.  By 1956, Communist broadcasting to the region had expanded, with a 
new Bulgarian service wedded to increased Soviet output, and the start of English-language 
broadcasts from China to Egypt, though the sum of these was still below Western efforts.  
Contrastingly, IRD believed that Soviet printed propaganda circulated much more widely than 
that of the British, though admitted that it was difficult to judge the scale of this with any 
accuracy.10  This latter deficiency did not unduly trouble the department.  IRD did not 
necessarily seek to compete directly, and by 1955 the department was concentrating on 'quality 
rather than quantity' in its Arabic pamphlets.11   
Communist techniques and relationships aimed towards influencing the press in the 
Middle East echoed British methods in large part, and IRD research detected a 'standard pattern' 
in how the Soviets went about it.  The suppression of Communism in certain states limited the 
number of newspapers that could openly support it, and the department concluded that to 
compensate the Soviets were insinuating Communists onto the staff of newspapers, and 
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manipulating editorial and journalistic opinion.  Attempts were also made to create and support 
various associations of journalists.12   
The amount spent on propaganda by the Soviets in the Middle East was increasingly 
significant.  In 1954 it was estimated that they had spent the equivalent of £12 million, and gifted 
any revenue generated back to publishers.13 This should not be a surprise.  Throughout this 
period, the Soviets subordinated economic interests to political and strategic ones: it was the start 
of a competition over the provision of economic benefits, rather than their receipt, through which 
political and strategic gains could be obtained.  It was not until the 1970s that economic 
considerations achieved parity.14 
In IRD's assessment, the Communist bloc held two distinct advantages over the British 
when it came to distributing propaganda in the Middle East. On the one hand they could finance 
overt propaganda on a level matched only by the Americans, and they could afford to be 
wasteful; on the other, they could rely on the assistance of local Communists, an 'organised body 
of friends' to which the British had no equivalent.  Yet, with few exceptions, Soviet overt 
propaganda was not offensive and was distributed under imprint.15 
One of the main, early thrusts of Communist propaganda in the region sought to exploit 
the concept of neutralism.  This concept found a sympathetic audience within Egypt.  The 
embassy in Cairo reported that '[t]he neutralist attitude of Mr. Nehru and the Indian Congress 
Party has a marked attraction for most Egyptians.'16  This was a difficult theme to counter 
without appearing to interfere in Arab nations' foreign policy.  British propaganda, and IRD, did 
so by turning the issue into one of hypocrisy, developing the idea of the Soviet Union as an 
imperialist, colonial power.  Nations who sought neutrality laid themselves vulnerable to Soviet 
                                                
12 'Communism and the Middle East Press', July 27, 1955, TNA FO 1110/834/PR1014/93. 
13 Chancery (Beirut) to IRD, July 21, 1954, TNA FO 1110/696/PR1088/3; roughly £280m adjusted for inflation. 
14 Golan, Soviet, p. 18. 
15 Minute, J O Rennie, June 16, 1956; G F N Reddaway, June 26, 1956, TNA FO 1110/942/PR10104/85/G. 
16 'Anti-Communist Propaganda in Egypt', British Embassy (Cairo), July 23, 1954, TNA FO 1110/662/PR1016/17. 
50 
 
imperialism.  The fate of the Baltic States, and of Belgium in the Second World War, were 
highlighted by way of example.17  In Europe, partitioned less than a decade before, the theme of 
Soviet imperialism would have resonated strongly, and this was a core IRD subject.  The Middle 
East, with the exception of Iran, had no experience of Soviet occupation – yet there was ample 
experience of Western imperialism, and any British propaganda campaign that warned of the 
Soviet imperial threat suffered by comparison.  Though this theme of Soviet imperialism was 
popular with a small minority of Middle Eastern posts, the British Embassy in Lebanon assured 
IRD that countries which had never experienced Soviet occupation or dominance simply could 
not countenance that it would be worse than the experience of British imperialism.18   
From September 1955, IRD analysis of Soviet propaganda suggested that it had 
abandoned its emphasis on neutralism, and had begun to push for closer links between the 
countries of the Middle East and the Soviet Bloc.  Particular focus was on Iran and its entry into 
the Baghdad Pact, and on the behaviour of Western oil companies in the region.  Whilst the 
1955 Czech arms deal with Egypt was portrayed by the Soviets as fostering peace and stability, 
Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact prompted the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, to warn 
the Iranian Chargé d'Affairs that such a move worked against the 'good neighbourly relations' 
between their two countries. Pravda wrote about the violation of neutrality, that the Pact was 
directed against the Soviet Union, and that it was supported on the back of Western arms.19 
The Baghdad Pact was increasingly central to Britain's Middle East policy.  The British 
connection generated negative propaganda from both Egypt and the Soviet Union, divided 
public opinion, and increasingly marginalised the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri as-Said, not least by 
association with a British regime that had colluded with Israel over Suez.  Even amongst her 
allies, Britain's membership was divisive.  US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that 
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Britain's colonial past tainted the pact to the degree that it was impossible for America to fully 
associate herself with the organisation.20  Ultimately, it would all be for nought, with Nuri 
deposed, and murdered, and the new Iraqi regime severing its relationship with the Pact soon 
afterwards. 
By the beginning of 1956, anti-colonialism was recognised by the FO as 'the dominant 
theme in Communist propaganda towards "under-developed" areas'. (One would assume nations 
chafing under colonial rule and those with a comparative lack of development from a Western 
perspective would likely be one and the same.)  Against this, British posts were to 'take every 
opportunity' to publicise the positive achievements of British Colonial policy, and the 'facts' 
about Communist treatment of satellites and colonies.  In the case of the latter, IRD publications 
such as "Communism and National Rights", "Facts about Communism" (a staple), and "The 
Economics of Soviet Penetration" were to be drawn upon.21 
IRD had to tread carefully lest their propaganda raised the profile of Communism in 
places in which it was largely insignificant, something the British deemed the Americans to be 
guilty of.22 Ronald Fay in Tripoli put the point bluntly, but less than eloquently: overtly anti-
Communist material could only serve to 'tell people something about a thing about which they 
knew practically nothing.'  Targeting an intellectual audience, as IRD largely did, the charge was 
even levelled by the Governor in Tripoli that at least one of their pamphlets was essentially pro-
Communist, since it fully explained all the tenets of Communism, and only criticised them 
afterwards (the implication being that most Libyans would not bother to read to the end).23 
The perception and reality of Communism was not equal across the region.  Indeed in 
some countries, most notably Yemen, there was little or nothing for IRD to do.  A patriarchal, 
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Islamic, traditional state, it had little interest in foreign affairs and the Soviet Union appeared to 
show little interest in return.  Local newspapers were similarly ambivalent, the population by and 
large poorly educated, and these factors combined with a poor relationship with Britain to 
effectively remove it from IRD's concern.24  
Yemen was, of course, at the extreme of one end of the scale, but IRD had to bear in 
mind – in fact was made to by local British officials – that there was often little in the way of 
Communist activity in many Middle Eastern states.  At this stage the department often had no 
role, warned away lest its propaganda served to educate about Communism rather than against 
it.25  In Libya the fear was that too much anti-Communist propaganda could only serve to raise 
its profile, in a country seen as 'not yet fertile ground' for the growth of Communism.26  Despite 
interest in Communism at the intellectual level in Bahrain and Kuwait, no party organisation was 
sufficiently developed to attract sympathisers into an organised body.  In Kuwait, the lack of job 
opportunities, and the inefficiency of the ruling family, appeared to provide openings for 
Communist propaganda.  The Bahrain embassy believed that IRD material had some promise, 
but any overtly anti-Soviet propaganda was tainted by being so evidently Western, and 
particularly British, in origin that there was a degree of 'sales resistance' no matter what the 
content.27 
The situation in Saudi Arabia was clear-cut, according to the British Embassy: 
Communism had made no inroads into what was dismissed as 'a country without party politics, 
where the illiterate masses accept without questioning the inefficient but adequate rule of the 
Royal Household round which a handful of sycophants jostle for favour and power'.28  Getting 
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material distributed and into print was anything but easy, with only one newspaper and one radio 
station, and access to both vetted by the Foreign Ministry.  To compound the issue there was 
little public interest in IRD pamphlets, even those specially tailored for the Middle East.  There 
was, the embassy admitted in 1955, 'nothing to be gained by our launching a deliberate I.R.D. 
campaign'.29  In Ethiopia, the information infrastructure, and so attendant opportunities for IRD 
work, was even less developed.  Ethiopia was reported to be 'practically in the Stone Age as 
regards information media'.  Tightly argued IRD material had little relevance, perhaps was barely 
understood, and though it was assiduously distributed by the embassy in Addis Ababa, the view 
there was that it was 'dishonest...to pretend to believe that it has any real effect.'30 
In Iran, IRD would find its most outspoken and senior critic in the Middle East, in the 
form of the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Stevens.  In 1954, IRD were tasked with advising the 
Iranian authorities on their future anti-Communist strategy.  As part of this, IRD provided 
advice to the Iranian Foreign Minister in July 1954, accompanied by a supply of pamphlets.  
These were cut back to just one – 'International Organisations' – on the back of Stevens' 
vituperative reaction to both this, and IRD work in general :31  
I must confess that I can never see the arrival of I.R.D. material and the 
voluminous correspondence which so often accompanies it...without a sinking of 
the heart...this reaction is shared by all members of my staff...[the Iranians] are 
willing to indulge in anti-Communist propaganda, but they wish to keep it in their 
own hands...I am convinced we are wise to follow them in their policy...I have 
never yet met a member of the senior branch of the service here or elsewhere 
who found that the bulk of I.R.D. material was anything but indigestible 
jargon...most of the I.R.D. material which has come my way seems wildly 
unsuitable for this, or any other under-developed country, or indeed any 
community that I can visualize...in short, we are getting too much anti-
communist material, most of it quite useless.32 
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Stevens' views on IRD material do of course represent the extreme, but the department had 
difficulties elsewhere.  One particular challenge they faced was the varied status of Communism 
and Communist parties across the region. 
In the Lebanon, the generalisation of poor literacy rates in the Middle East did not hold 
true, with 80% of the population able to read and newspapers 'avidly read'.  Although the 
Communist party was illegal, the Beirut embassy reported that it was 'well organised and active', 
attracting intellectuals, fellow travellers, and successfully penetrating a number of nationalist 
organisations.  Getting IRD material published was reliant on the 'connivance' of members of 
the government, and few were prepared to openly oppose Communism.  IRD material was 
considered too impersonal, and too negative (rather than comparative).33  By 1954 links had been 
established with the chief of the Security Police,34 though one could argue that this association 
was hardly with the sort of opinion shapers that IRD would want to cultivate.35 
In Jordan, too, the local Communist party was illegal yet active.  One large- and two 
small-scale newspapers published IRD material, but only 'on payment'.  RIO Beirut was the main 
conduit of IRD material into Jordan.  In December 1953 a record number of 61 anti-Communist 
items were placed in the Jordanian press, and by August 1955 this had significantly increased, 
passing 100 in September of that year.36  These items were not all sourced from IRD, but in six 
months prior to May 1955 136 articles supplied by RIO Beirut and based on IRD material were 
published; of the 18 articles placed by RIO Beirut in the Jordanian press between March 10 and 
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March 20 1956, 15 were of an anti-Communist nature, and of those 12 were based on IRD 
source material.37 
Communism was not illegal everywhere.  Even so, Arab Communists, even where their 
political predilections were legal, suffered by association with the Soviet Union, and were thus 
seen as foreign in outlook and sympathy.38 In a comparatively more democratic nation such as 
Syria, Communists were afforded greater freedom.39  This advantage was counterbalanced by a 
greater freedom for Western agencies to distribute anti-Communist propaganda.  
Consequentially, British officials were busy with IRD material.  Some 1,700 professionals and 
personalities were in receipt of anti-Communist material, although the Information Department 
in Damascus was keen to balance this with factual and positive information.  The Central Office 
of Information's London Press Service (LPS) distributed news and commentary bulletins to 
1,000 people per day by April 1954.40  By March 1955 Damascus had more than doubled the 
amount of LPS material published.41  The significance of the LPS to IRD is discussed in Chapter 
5.  In six months preceding May 1955, 172 anti-Communist articles sourced by RIO Beirut were 
published, along with 13 IRD and 8 IRD 'second right' articles.42  Given the proportions noted, 
it would be difficult to overstate how important RIO Beirut had become, even as early as 1955. 
Publishing was not the only means by which IRD sought to get its message heard.  The 
department sought to mobilise faith against Communism in both the Middle East and Africa.  In 
the light of Khrushchev's crackdown on religion in the late 1950s and 1960s, religion certainly 
appeared to be a worthwhile avenue of attack against the Communists, but information on IRD's 
involvement is sparse.  What is notable is that in the Middle East Islam was not seen by IRD to 
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be as effective a tool against atheistic Communism as it would have appeared at first blush.  In 
Egypt, despite the strong, cohesive nature of nationalism, and the Muslim faith, these factors 
were not believed to be necessarily antithetical to Communism.43  Yet, as with other factors, the 
outlook varied.  Bahrain held a contrary view; as far as propaganda there was concerned, 
emphasising the 'anti-religious nature of Communist theory and practice' was seen as important, 
and a much more effective approach than highlighting other issues in Russia or her satellites.44  
Given the almost inseparable association between Islam and the Middle East, it is easy to 
forget that the Muslim faith was not all-pervasive.  In the Lebanon, for example, the Greek 
Orthodox and Maronite45 churches held great sway.  Religion, the Beirut Embassy reported, was 
'not necessarily an antidote to Communism, because to many Moslems Soviet Russia is the 
champion of the peoples in their struggles for independence, while an important section of the 
Greek Orthodox Church...accepts Communism as not incompatible with its own doctrine.'46 
There were a number of religious avenues through which IRD sought to promulgate its 
message.  Direct comparisons were drawn between atheistic Communism and Islamic Middle 
Eastern society in a number of pamphlets, and attempts were made to mobilise religious leaders, 
Islamic centres of learning, and to get the message across via Friday sermons.47  IRD pamphlets 
on atheism and Communism were also distributed to Jordanian religious leaders.48  The 
department obviously made efforts in other areas, arranging for Italian translations of the 
monthly religious edition of its Digest so this could be distributed in Libya.49  Predominantly, 
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British propaganda sought to highlight the incompatibility of Islam and Communism, rather than 
draw straight comparisons between Islam and Western religion.50 
It is worth noting here that the Arab-Israeli dispute, described by Vaughan as 'perhaps 
the single greatest political obstacle to the successful pursuit of British and American 
psychological objectives in the Middle East' scarcely registered on IRD's radar.  This may well be 
because the policy of neutrality meant a hands-off approach to the issue, the West having little to 
compete with the fiery rhetoric from either the Arabs or the Israelis.  The (stillborn) Anglo-
American ALPHA plan of 1954/55 proposed ceding or transferring differing parcels of land 
between Israel and Jordan – mostly concessions from the former to the latter – transfer of 
refugees, the division of demilitarised zones, and distribution of Jerusalem and Jordanian waters, 
all supported by the cessation of Western economic sanctions, the provision of financial 
assistance, and Western guarantees of the outcome.51  Even those elements of ALPHA that were 
designed to broker a start of Egyptian-Israeli talks on the matter were off-limits as far as 
propaganda was concerned, as the issue was so potentially toxic for Britain.52 
 
Egypt and the Sudan 
IRD waged a comparatively successful campaign in Egypt before the Suez crisis severed 
diplomatic ties.  Indeed, the coup of 1952 had ushered in a period of improved relations with 
Egyptian intelligence, and there was evidence that this increased the amount of regular IRD 
material distributed through both government and civilian circles.53  Propaganda between Egypt 
and Britain was toned-down in 1953, whilst the British and the new Egyptian regime 
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negotiated.54  There were other obstacles, however: 'Anti-British feeling, neutralism, parochialism 
and nationalism' all worked against the effectiveness of British propaganda.55 
Communism was outlawed, though in any case the Cairo Embassy felt that Communism 
was not widely understood outside of intellectual circles.  There were still areas of concern, 
however.  Alongside religion, IRD saw Egyptian students, always a potent political force, and 
increasingly powerful trade unions with links to the government, as both at risk from 
Communist influence.56  
The Embassy in Cairo was unhappy about their success rate in placing anti-Communist 
material.  The material they received in 1954 was, they argued, 'too dull' for the Egyptian press.  
There was a need for material to be relevant to an Egyptian audience, and diversity was not 
necessarily an issue over which IRD should concern itself unduly.  Such themes as the Egyptians 
were prepared to publish spoke 'to the interests of Egyptians as Moslems and Arabs...those 
themes can be used over and over again and we feel that the material we receive suffers from an 
undue anxiety for novelty.'  Too-literal translations of English-language material, and a slavish 
adherence to the truth, made placing material difficult.57  Any material IRD could supply that 
exposed the persecution of Muslims, or Soviet untruths, was seen as most effective.58 
The main avenue for IRD propaganda outside of contacts within the Egyptian 
government was the provision of printed propaganda, predominantly pamphlets.  Contacts 
outside of government or journalist circles were difficult to make, since there was a fear amongst 
Egyptians that they would 'be accused of sedition' if they associated with Embassy staff.  
Material was therefore distributed to them by mail, and there was evidence that this was 'proving 
effective and is in some instances preventing the spread of Communism', according to the 
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British Embassy in Cairo – a bold assertion.  Prepared by IRD in London, material was 
subsequently translated by RIO Beirut into Arabic.59  These distribution methods were 
undoubtedly successful, with the Embassy passing information to 1,700 contacts by the end of 
1953.  In 1954 Ralph Murray, the ex-head of IRD, was attached to the British Embassy and had 
an immediate effect on an already improving situation: by the first quarter of 1955 the Embassy 
had sent 3,659 pamphlets, of which 2,148 had been passed on by the Egyptian government, who 
had taken over distribution.  RIO Beirut successfully published an average of 9 anti-Communist 
items per month in the local press, all translated and sourced from IRD material.60 
Yet through 1955 the Press Office in Cairo found it harder to get its material published, 
and asked IRD for help and for fresh content.  IRD was less concerned than the Embassy over 
their problems, as increasing links between the Press Office and the Egyptian government were 
seen to outweigh decreasing press output.  IRD viewed the press as 'only one outlet and not 
necessarily the most important'.  Material moved by other channels was seen as 'heartening'.  By 
mid-1955, the Embassy in Cairo was increasingly concerned with the greater freedom afforded 
to left-wing organisations. Communism remained outlawed, and the Egyptian Ministry of the 
Interior declared that it kept the left wing under control, but the Embassy believed that the 
Egyptians were less competent than they believed themselves to be.61 
A major source of division between Egypt and Britain was over the 'condominium' of 
the Sudan, under their shared administration since 1899.  Britain had perpetuated this 
arrangement since the Second World War, shaping the country for independence rather than let 
it fall under Egyptian jurisdiction. Vaughan has shown how following the 1952 coup in Egypt, the 
British were forced into an 'essentially reactive' propaganda campaign; the positive nature of 
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Egyptian propaganda, aimed as it was towards unity, leant the Egyptians the advantage, at least 
initially.  Vaughan has described the propaganda campaign waged by the British as 'one of the 
more sophisticated British responses to the challenge of Egyptian and Arab nationalism in this 
period.'  From 1955, with the Sudanese having opted for independence, British propaganda 
became somewhat more triumphalist.62  Whilst the Colonial Office excluded IRD from operating 
in Africa at this stage, the Sudan represents the one sub-Saharan (at least in part) nation that the 
department was actively working in prior to 1957-8.  This was because of its special status – it 
was not a true colony – and the FO, not the CO, recruited officials.  It was also at this stage the 
one nation in which Egyptian propaganda was fully active outside of the Middle East, and 
directed at Britain.  In essence both a British and an Egyptian colonial territory, and with a 
developing interest from the Soviet bloc, the Sudan is significant as a precursor to the later 
decolonisation process, and contained many of the same elements: tripartite interest, information 
work aimed at post-independence organisations, and increasing IRD involvement accompanied 
by local resistance. 
Prior to 1954, the Public Relations Office of the Sudanese government had blocked 
distribution of British anti-Communist material because of its political nature.  Despite a delicate 
constitutional position whilst the Sudan transitioned to independence, Leslie Glass at the BMEO 
saw an opportunity to exploit the UK Trade Commission for political means, and to foster links 
with the new Sudanese government.  'The Sudanese Government', noted Glass, 'will above all 
wish to be reassured by precedents – they will ask "what is the practice of the Egyptian and Iraq 
Governments in this matter? What do other Arab countries do?"'  Via a pamphlet campaign, 
regular papers, media links and 'unobtrusive' links with the Sudanese police, it is clear that IRD 
were keen to shape Sudanese practice more along the lines of British requirements rather than 
Arab precedent, before independence removed the British government's unique position of 
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influence.63  Having outmanoeuvred the Egyptians, the British now had other competitors.  The 
Communists were also courting the Sudanese, and the opening of Russian and Eastern Bloc 
liaison offices in the Sudan were a cause for concern to the Trade Commission, and they wrote 
to IRD for advice.  A report on 'Soviet External Propaganda Media and Techniques' – detailing 
print propaganda, 'propaganda imparted in the guise of culture' and the use of local nationals – 
was dispatched by IRD, and, though this was seen by Khartoum as 'most useful', they were 
obviously already well briefed: the methods detailed were seen as 'relatively orthodox'.64 
IRD also suggested making contacts with left-wing associations, and forging contacts 
between Sudanese and British left-wing organisations.  The department believed these could be 
made by Trade Commission officials; cautiously, and conscious of both the potential unreliability 
of such individuals, and the potential impact on relations with the Sudanese government.  IRD, it 
would appear, were not averse to making these suggestions without consulting the Governor 
General.  Perhaps they should have been more circumspect: the letter carrying these suggestions 
was sent in error to the Governor General rather than to the Trade Commission.  The Governor 
General was unequivocal that 'under present conditions I seriously question [the] desirability of 
[the Trade Commissioner] being involved in such matters'.  Given the situation, and such a 
response, IRD were forced to agree.65 
 
Iraq 
IRD found it difficult to get material published in Iraq.  Lack of editorial appeal, remoteness of 
subject matter, and imperialist taint were all contributing factors.  The Baghdad Information 
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Department reported that there was, however, widespread interest in the subject of 
Communism: 
The lower classes…are interested in any system which appears to offer some 
alleviation of their material miseries…students and minor professionals led by a 
small but devoted nucleus of indoctrinated communists tend to see in 
communism, a way out of their present frustrations, and to imagine themselves 
as a managerial elite in some future Soviet Iraq.66 
 The Information Department in Baghdad believed it would be an uphill struggle, and without 
'exploiting every local situation and current of feeling' even material that was published would 
not be read.  As a last resort, even bribery should be considered.67  In contrast to British travails, 
the Embassy felt that Communist propaganda only needed to improve on conditions that already 
existed in the country – stalled land reforms and economic recovery exacerbated ill-feeling, and 
prepared fertile ground for Communism.  IRD propaganda, again, needed to be made relevant to 
a local audience, and Baghdad doubted 'whether the results of a desk study in London could be 
sufficiently "angled" to the local scene to effective'.  There was faith that the existing regime had 
sufficient grasp on local Communist activity, though it could be better informed on where Iraq 
fitted in to wider Soviet aims.68 
The long-term answer to the grievances of the left-wing in Iraq (and the right-wing, too) 
was economic and social reform, and this had stalled.  In the short term, and conscious of the 
delicacy of the situation, IRD suggested to Baghdad that tentative steps should be made to foster 
discrete contacts with the non-Communist left, and for contacts to be encouraged between 
reliable Iraqi organisations and left-wing political parties and organisations in Britain and 
elsewhere,69 no doubt to keep them away from fellow-travelling.  But leveraging the non-
Communist left in Iraq was problematic; the administration branded all on the left as 
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Communists, and this drove all such groups underground and left them diffuse.  Maintaining 
contacts with such groups left the British open to criticism from the Iraqi regime.  Left wing 
trade unions did not exist, and the British Ambassador dismissed other trade unions as 'creatures 
of the Government'.70  Distributing supporting material to those in Iraq who were already anti-
Communist was no problem – to that end the embassy in Iraq could make use of as much 
quality product as IRD could send – it was propaganda aimed at 'progressive' elements that 
proved much more problematic.  The Ambassador in Baghdad argued that: 
The target here is not a small and sympathetic minority but a much larger class of 
left wing politicians, intellectuals, students and other politically conscious 
members of the middle and lower middle classes.  By virtue of a combination of 
bitter nationalism and profound dissatisfaction with the existing order, these 
people are wide open to Communist propaganda and already deeply suspicious of 
the Western Powers...Much of the material the Information Research 
Department send is, moreover, is written from a Western point of view, and the 
implicit comparison of conditions in Communist countries is with conditions in 
Western Europe and the United States.  Stories of corrupt officials, inefficient 
public services, rural poverty and suppression of free speech make little impact in 
the Middle East.71 
Despite these difficulties, by mid-1955 IRD were getting around 8,000 words sourced 
from IRD material into the Baghdadi Arabic press per month.   In the eight months preceding 
May 1955, '11 I.R.D. articles; 3 I.R.D. second right articles; and 30 articles from R.I.O. Beirut 
based on I.R.D. material' were successfully placed.  Political and professional contacts included 
the 'Minister of Interior [sic], the Director-General of Propaganda...and the Prime Minister 
himself', among others.  Proactive and widespread distribution – 'evangelism' – proved difficult, 
and the Embassy argued that this sort of 'salesmanship' would only serve to work against good 
relations.  In addition, no matter how hard the Embassy protested that IRD material was 'factual 
intelligence' rather than propaganda, they had to report that 'the independent Iraqi is quite 
frankly not prepared to believe it.'  Compounding the situation, it was self-evidently easier for the 
Iraqis to verify Communist propaganda about British activities in the Middle East, than it was to 
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check British propaganda regarding Communism in the Soviet Union or Europe.  The Embassy 
still believed IRD material to be 'excellent of its kind'; the problem was getting it distributed 
without attracting negative consequences, and getting people to believe it.72 
In 1954, the British had brokered a deal with Iraq to set up an Iraqi Broadcasting service, 
supported by the FO.  The station was recognised as vulnerable to local issues, and alongside 
other projects outlined below were 'regarded as hostages to fortune'.  In comparison, Egyptian 
state broadcasting was powerful, long range and expanding.  Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia had 
all placed orders for large transmitters that would expand their broadcasting capability.73  Whilst 
British propagandists were involved in a number of local stations, and Sharq al-Adna, their most 
significant investment for the future was in Iraqi (and Baghadad Pact) broadcasting. 
It is significant, therefore, that given the importance of Iraq to the West, British 
policymakers fatally misread the local political situation.  In 1953 the JIC assessed Communism 
in Iraq to be a problem of security, rather than of politics; in a report the previous year 
Communism was seen to be of little concern.74  However the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) made 
significant strides in linking domestic, Iraqi Communism with resistance to imperialism and the 
Western bias in ruling politics.  The popularity of this message forced their political opponents to 
adopt the policies of radical anti-Imperialism and land reform lest they lose ground, and these 
twin issues soon became the leading issues for debate, with all the significance that this would 
hold for events in 1958.  Johan Franzén lays the blame for this squarely at the feet of IRD as the 
lead agency of anti-Communism in Iraq.  The failure to engage head-on with local Communism, 
and IRD's focus on Soviet issues which held less local significance than information officers 
believed, alienated potential supporters of the British (or Communist gainsayers).  The perennial 
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problem of centrally distributed IRD material lacking editorial appeal and not being tailored for 
local audiences made getting articles published difficult: because of this, the ground was left open 
for the ICP to associate Communism with anti-imperialism, and consequentially taint what anti-
Communist articles were published with an imperialist agenda.75  
The inevitable corollary of anti-imperialism – nationalism – was also mishandled in 
Franzén's analysis.  The more Britain tried to shape Iraq, the greater the anti-imperialist 
sentiments were likely to be, and continuing to support Nuri as-Said only exacerbated tensions.  
A failure to appreciate the rise of mass politics in Iraq, the agency of local political actors, and a 
firm belief in the 'politics of personalities' would endure led to an almost blind faith that 
supporting Nuri was the best policy, and increasingly limited British options and influence as 
Iraq headed towards revolution.76 
 
From anti-Communism to Arab nationalism 
In 1956, Russian overtures towards better relations with the West stood in stark contrast to 
increased British concern over rising Arab nationalism, and this effected a sea-change in the 
work of IRD.  By April, Eden, alive to the improving situation with the Soviets, was mindful of 
IRD's actions, conscious that there might 'be a need for some adjustment of the directive on 
which I.R.D. is working' and that some efforts might need to be curtailed.77  In its counter-
propaganda role IRD maintained comprehensive files on extremely diverse subjects sufficient to 
support their output across a wide range of media; this information was supplied by, or gleaned 
from, both overt and covert sources.  As the perceived nationalist threat from Egypt developed, 
these research skills and methods were turned towards localised issues in the Middle East, with 
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the department's Middle East and Africa desks set to monitoring and studying both Arab 
nationalism and Egyptian affairs in general, alongside their usual work:78 
A close watch is kept on Egyptian attempts to influence the rest of the Arab 
world and in Africa.  Card indices are kept of M.E. and African personalities 
linked with extreme nationalist (right or left) as well as Communist or left wing 
activities.  Information is culled from all available overt and covert sources, and 
written up in various ways for use by F.O. Depts and selected persons outside 
who have access to regular IRD material, as well as by our usual propaganda 
media.79 
Threats to British and Western interests in the Middle East were driven in significant part 
by the groundswell of anti-imperialist/anti-colonial sentiments throughout the region.  This was 
recognised by all sides in the propaganda conflict.  Defusing and countering anti-Colonial 
rhetoric was a central part of propaganda work directed at Arab nationalism.  Communist 
propaganda agencies were in turn quick to leverage colonial themes in propaganda directed at 
both the Middle East and Africa.  By 1956 the volume of Communist propaganda directed at 
colonialism was on the increase, leading IRD to declare in February that '[u]nless more is done to 
counter this propaganda and to expose the hypocrisy of the Communist position, there is a 
danger of the Western case going by default.'80  The United States Information Agency (USIA), 
too, recognised that the Soviets had 'adopted increasingly flexible tactics…[including] blatant 
resort to anti-colonial propaganda.'81   
A meeting of information officers at RIO Beirut in March 1956, chaired by the head of 
IRD, set out to fundamentally reassess and expand propaganda work in the Middle East directed 
at both Communism and anti-British activities on the part of Egypt and the Saudis.  Despite 
IRD's anti-Communist campaign being relatively successful in Egypt, Communist propaganda 
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far outstripped British distribution, which remained relatively modest in comparison.  Limited 
printed material was being supplied to certain individuals, but this could do nothing to counter 
the populist, mass-appeal of widely distributed Communist propaganda.  Further channels of 
distribution would be required.82  A number of posts continued to raise concerns that existing 
IRD material was difficult to place.  Baghdad in particular 'criticised IRD articles on the score of 
length and diffuseness, and lack of local twist'.  Calls for illustrations in IRD articles, cartoons 
(with jokes) and 'translation[s] of anti-Communist thrillers and detective stories' – immediate, 
simplified, accessible and somewhat disposable propaganda in other words – shows the type of 
material information officers felt they could use to broaden both distribution and appeal.  Often 
a degree of quid pro quo was required to get an article published: Khartoum, Damascus and Beirut 
stressed the relationship between British advertising in local newspapers and success in placing 
articles.  In Beirut 50% of published material was supported by such revenue.  In all areas, the 
closest cooperation with American counterparts was to be encouraged.83 
IRD's involvement with the Baghdad Pact's Counter Subversion Office was also proving 
less fruitful than initially hoped.  IPD were aware that any publicity supporting the Pact that 
came from one of its regional members would have been of far greater value than any British 
contribution.  Yet IPD had 'never been under any illusion that the Information services of these 
countries would show much initiative or efficiency in this direction.'84  The Pact was at this stage 
contributing little in support of Britain's position or the West's Cold War objectives.  Later, once 
Iraq had ceded from the pact, a degree of regional defensive cohesion was lost, as well as the 
potency of Iraq's regional standing as counterbalance to the regional aspirations of Egypt.  Yet, 
as shown in Chapter 7, IRD still forged useful relationships with Turkey and Iran, the former of 
particular significance to the department. 
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The formation of the pact had far reaching consequences.  As already noted, its creation 
helped draw the Soviet Union into greater involvement in the region.  Adeed Dawisha cites the 
formation of the Baghdad Pact as the point at which Egypt, too, fully committed to a place in 
regional politics.85  It was, for Egypt, an intraregional issue that demanded a regional presence to 
counter – although it was of course not the only reason Egypt became so involved.  Egypt's 
engagement with the Baghdad Pact may have been driven more by the head than the heart:  In 
the analysis of Hermann Frederick Eilts, a US Diplomat to the Near East, it was difficult not to 
conclude that 'Nasser deliberately chose to make the Baghdad Pact, and Iraq's membership of it, 
a contrived source of tension and division in the Middle East.  He deliberately misrepresented its 
purposes in order to further his Arab objectives.'86  It was significant in respect of the challenge 
faced by IRD for another reason: Dawisha argues that the severance of diplomatic channels after 
the creation of the Baghdad Pact meant that propaganda was elevated by necessity to the major 
instrument of Egyptian foreign policy.87 
An assessment on the state of British information work in the Middle East, conducted in 
April 1956, identified a number of further areas for improvement, and recruitment of better 
quality information office staff at key posts was foremost on the agenda.  Expansion of the 
BBC's transcription service – a function of the BBC's monitoring service that would later prove 
central to IRD work in both the Middle East and Africa – was also considered.  Better 
cooperation between British information officers and their American counterparts, and 
development of the Iraqi government's own information activities, were to be encouraged.  
Work directed at the newly-formed and expanding trade unions in the Middle East needed to be 
expanded, as did support for the considerable overt work of the British Council.  In all aspects, 
the uneven playing field of information work vis-a-vis Egypt, and the policy of leaving Egyptian 
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negative propaganda towards the British largely unchallenged because of policy considerations, 
was under significant review.88  Each of these requirements, identified before the Suez Crisis, 
would have to wait until after it before they could be implemented.  Seeking to improve Britain's 
image, IRD placed particular emphasis on information officers establishing contacts with 'key 
personalities of the small broadcast stations in their countries so as to ensure that through such 
friendly contacts, anti-British criticism is reduced and a little more space is given to objective 
news about Britain.'89  This move would ensure that contacts were in place when, having lost the 
facility for widespread direct broadcasting to the Middle East (outside of the BBC) with the loss 
of Sharq al-Adna, IRD's emphasis shifted to rebuttal of Cairo Radio propaganda which relied on 
friendly editors to publish and broadcast its material. 
This emphasis on radio was key.  Nasser was quite clear that radio was the only means by 
which he could reach his power base of 'the Arab masses.'  In 1958, when Dag Hammarskjöld, 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, asked Nasser to tone down the amount and tone of 
propaganda flowing from Cairo Radio, Nasser refused.  'Disarming the radio', Nasser replied, 
'would for me mean complete disarmament.'90  It was not simply a case of poor literacy levels 
across the region.  Radio was preeminent because traditional Arab social values meant that 
Western social pastimes such as clubs, theatres, dance halls and the like did not exist.  It was a 
cultural medium, and Cairo Radio's broadcasting exploited the cultural centrality of Egypt to the 
Arab world to full effect.91  It was a potent combination of medium and message. 
By 1954, the Voice of the Arabs was proclaiming independence from imperialist influence 
for the Arab world was a central tenet of Egyptian foreign policy, and the service itself as 
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speaking for Arab, rather than solely Egyptian, voices.92  The Voice of the Arabs served a dual 
purpose.  It progressed Nasser's pan-Arab and, later, pan-African political agenda, but it also 
legitimised his own, elite, regime and the control it exercised.93 
Alongside the development of Baghdad Radio, FO projects in the Persian Gulf, 
Benghazi and Tripoli, and a CO project in Aden, formed the backbone of a concerted effort to 
diversify and expand British broadcasting in the Middle East.  When the projects had stalled by 
early 1956, Eden wrote 
It is sad and disappointing that, although it is eighteen months since I was in 
Bagdad, when we agreed to give first priority to a broadcasting station for Iraq, 
this station is still not operating. 
Meanwhile the voice of Egypt [sic] continues unchecked and pours out its 
propaganda into the area of our oil fields.  We have simply got to take action as 
quickly as possible to establish a broadcasting station of our own to compete 
with the Egyptians…even when the Iraqi station comes into operation, we 
cannot rely on them to do our propaganda for us.94 
Plans were drawn up for a chain of six low power VHF transmitters, to be located in 
Aden, Muscat, Kuwait, Sharhjah, Qatar and Bahrain.  This alternative was given the go ahead by 
Eden, but the project was delayed due to the Suez Crisis and financial constraints.  When these 
plans were dusted off in 1957, IRD was the lead agency, though the problem continued to be 
one of finance.  IRD could afford to pay for three of the transmitters, and for 1,000 subsidised 
receivers to be distributed (these would have had the advantage of expanding the audience whilst 
preventing owners from listening to competing medium- or long-wave broadcasts).  But the 
department could not afford to pay for or supply the necessary staff, and plans were finally 
scrapped in March 1958.95   
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By April 1956 the perceived threat from Egyptian nationalism, driven in large part by the 
Voice of the Arabs, had increased to the point that IRD's anti-Communist campaign was 
subordinated to the need to deal with Nasserism.  In that month, Philip Adams, the newly 
appointed Regional Information Officer in Beirut, wrote to Paul Grey of the Foreign Office 
raising concerns.  The propaganda machinery in the Middle East was, he wrote, 'fairly good', but 
there was very little material to support it: 'we have the means of making H.M.G.'s policy known 
but...we are ourselves largely in the dark as to what it is...I have the feeling our publicity directed 
to the Middle East will tend to drift again…unless we can give it a new sense of direction'.96  
Adams was certainly in a position to know: almost all Arabic written material for posts in the 
Middle East was produced in RIO Beirut by April 1956; it was a concentration of staff for 
editorial and translation functions.97 
Grey's reply set out the immediate position for IRD, and Foreign Office fears of what 
Nasser could achieve if given propaganda ammunition – ammunition that Suez ultimately 
provided: 
It is...clearly recognised that direct propaganda by British agencies against the 
Egyptian [sic] and Saudis can only be...counter-productive, and that we must 
avoid giving any occasion for Nasser to burst out in fury against us.  He can at 
present do us grave damage, and nothing would be worse than to have to live 
with him after he had scored another victory over us...This means that our main 
and continuing effort must be on the clandestine and unattributable side.  To this 
end, Information Research Department have been given a new charter to include 
anti-subversive work in general in the field of propaganda and publicity, and as 
an immediate objective, this work in the Middle East will, in I.R.D., take priority 
over anti-Communism.98 
Grey's decision to avoid going head-to-head with Egyptian propaganda went partially 
against the advice of IPD's Sidney Hebblethwaite, who had placed the policy of leaving Egyptian 
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polemic towards the British largely unchallenged under review the month before.99  Critically, the 
largely successful and well-developed anti-Communist effort in Egypt came to an abrupt halt as 
the Suez Crisis gained momentum.  The campaign directed at Nasser was by this point directly 
undermining IRD's anti-Communist campaign:   
In view of the current situation as a whole and the recent allegations that "a 
foreign embassy" has been circulating a subversive bogus Egyptian pamphlet, we 
have decided to suspend for the moment our issuing of anti-Communist material.  
Moreover, as it is not material of the kind we would want to leave in the 
Embassy, if by any chance we had to close down, and it is bulky to destroy, we 
have decided to ship all our anti-Communist material away.  You will 
consequently be receiving under separate cover the remaining stocks we have of 
material deriving from Information Research Department.100 
 
Cairo Radio and the Voice of the Arabs, the Voice of Cairo and the Voice of Free 
Africa.101 
First broadcast on July 4, 1953, Egypt's, and subsequently the United Arab Republic's, main 
device for spreading pan-Arabic propaganda – specifically, the Nasserite view of pan-Arabism – 
was Cairo Radio's Voice of the Arabs.  Initially a half-hour radio programme, it swiftly developed 
into a service broadcasting for 105 hours a week by 1961, second only to Cairo Radio's Home 
Service.  The station was a direct challenge to British interests.  Whilst anti-imperialist rhetoric 
railed against the British and the French, Arab leaders who found themselves in opposition to 
Nasser would also find themselves targeted by the Voice of the Arabs.  The station was a source of 
grave concern to IRD, who in 1961 summarised its activities thus: 
It constantly extols President Nasser's concept of Arab nationalism, and adroitly 
exploits and intensifies points of difference between the West and the countries 
to which it is directed...Its violent abuse and incitement has been directed against 
Nuri-as-Said, General Qasim, President Bourguiba, and – most consistently – 
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King Hussein.  To Aden and the Gulf, it offers a continuous stream of 'anti-
imperialist' rhetoric which includes vicious personal attacks on British officials 
and gives currency to totally false reports on the situation in Muscat and 
Oman.102  
Sustained rhetorical campaigns by the Voice of the Arabs were in part responsible for the dismissal 
of the (British) head of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb, by King Hussein in 1956, and for 
the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy and Nuri as-Said's government in Iraq in 1958, as 
well as pushing Nasser to the forefront of the Arab nationalist cause even before the events at 
Suez.  Although these successes would not be matched subsequently, the potential and threat of 
Cairo Radio was clear.  The central voice of the Voice of the Arabs, both as announcer and 
director, was Ahmed Said, who guided the service throughout its numerous successes and to its 
ignominious failure in 1967.103 
It is a measure of how seriously Britain saw the threat from Cairo Radio that Brigadier 
Fergusson, Director of Psychological Warfare during the Suez Crisis later recalled that '[i]t had 
been agreed in London, and there was no shadow of a doubt about this part of the plan, that the 
very first stick of bombs to be dropped…would be on Cairo Radio.'  Despite this, a change of 
plans meant that Cairo Radio operated for three days before it was finally knocked off the air, 
albeit temporarily.  The bombing of Egypt's broadcast infrastructure during Suez forced Egypt 
to increase the number and dispersal of transmitters as a security measure, to keep Cairo Radio 
on the air in the event of any further bombing.  As a consequence, Cairo Radio's broadcast reach 
was extended deep into East and North Africa.  In 1958, when the United Arab Republic (UAR) 
was formed between Egypt and Syria, the transmission power of Damascus Radio bolstered 
Cairo Radio's reach still further.104 
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In February 1957, IRD were still firmly behind the plan to expand British VHF/FM 
broadcasting capabilities to provide a counter to Cairo Radio, as well as attempting to bolster 
Baghdad Radio.  In the case of the latter, efforts were hampered by the disparity between the 
'mechanical potential of the station' and the quality of local expertise.  Though providing some 
material, aiding with staff, and intending to provide an advisor, IRD were concerned to not 
'force the pace…in the present state of local feeling.'  Adams of RIO Beirut was at this point 
either unconvinced of, or prepared to underplay, the continuing threat from Cairo Radio, 
believing that 'vituperation and disregard for truth' was working against it (in the Levant at least), 
and it should be noted that his views largely aligned with those of IPD at this point.  It is clear, 
however, that the broadcasting station at Limassol (the old NEABS/Voice of Britain facilities) was 
still seen as the main British regional asset (once it was back under 'professional' control).  None 
of these factors – the VHF scheme, Baghdad Radio or a resurgent NEABS – would develop as 
hoped.  In any case, Adams was realistic in his assessment of British potential to compete on 
equal terms with Arab broadcasting: 
If we had been given money, staff and facilities five years ago, the contribution 
we could now be making would be very different…radio in the Arab world is far 
better fitted for starting fires than putting them out.  However many transmitters 
we have, and however resourceful our staff, we shall always be hard put to it to 
sell the virtues and attraction of hard work, peaceable behaviour and 
unquestioning respect for the authority of the British or the established and often 
reactionary rulers.105 
Away from the centres of British power in the Middle East, reliance on local support to 
protect British interests meant that the Voice of the Arabs broadcasts could directly threaten 
British security:  the British Military advisor in Bahrain – a British protectorate in all but name – 
wrote to the Foreign Office in early 1958 to outline his concerns regarding the possible effect of 
broadcasts on the morale and loyalties of the Trucial Oman Scouts, the British trained security 
force responsible for internal security in the British Trucial States (now the United Arab 
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Emirates).106  Further afield, eventually broadcasting in Amharic, Arabic, Hausa, Somali, Swahili, 
English and French, Cairo Radio supported 'extremist movements and policies, and 
exacerbate[d] anti-Western tensions by misrepresentations of British French and US policy in 
Africa.'107 
Starting in July 1954, the Voice of Cairo [Sauti ya Cairo] broadcast in Swahili, and is 
described by James Brennan as '[t]he seminal development of Egyptian propaganda to East 
Africa...[its] first Swahili broadcast encapsulated the radicalism and paternalism of Egypt's 
African policy'.  The service, prefaced by readings from the Qur'an, would increase its 
programme length from an initial 40 minutes to an hour and a half by 1961.108 
In April 1957 the Voice of Free Africa – purportedly broadcasting from 'the heart of Africa' 
though in fact from Cairo – was an even more vituperative thorn in Britain's side.  Eschewing 
the Voice of Cairo's religious tenor, it was 'violently abusive of the remaining white administrators 
and residents in the Continent, whom it [described] as "pigs" and "dogs" who must be driven out 
by force.'109  By 1961 the Voice of Africa from Cairo was broadcasting 68 ¼ hours per week in 
English, French and at least 7 African languages.  Cairo Radio remained, in IRD's opinion, the 
most significant broadcast threat to Western interests in Africa despite the increased involvement 
of both Moscow and Peking.110  This is despite the fact that, in Brennan's analysis, Cairo Radio 
programming to Africa 'was becoming rather stale and hackneyed by 1961', having lost its 
monopoly on anti-Colonial broadcasting and failing to an extent to adapt to changing local 
issues.111 
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The intelligence community shared IRD's concern over the Voice of the Arabs.  In 1958, 
the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) identified the Egyptian State Broadcasting Service 
as the 'most effective instrument of Egyptian propaganda'.  Radio Cairo had, in their assessment, 
'played a large part in fomenting almost every recent crisis in the Middle East'.  In Africa, the 
expectation was that Cairo Radio would increase its coverage, and that while (to the JIC at least) 
it was not a given that Cairo Radio would achieve the same sort of success in Africa as it had in 
the Middle East, the committee concluded that 'in the absence of really effective counter-
measures, its influence will increase progressively in the Colonial territories of East and Central 
Africa, until it becomes a serious threat to British interests there.  In West Africa, especially in 
those countries which have already achieved or are about to achieve independence, its prospects 
of success are more problematic.'  This threat was seen as exclusively a Nasserite one – no 
evidence could be found that Moscow exerted any influence on the content of Cairo Radio 
broadcasts, but this was seen as largely irrelevant: the rather grim observation was that whilst 
Soviet involvement might become a factor in the future, at the close of 1958 it was hard to see 
how that involvement could make UAR radio propaganda any more effective than it already 
was.112 
This obviously raises two important questions: firstly, why was Cairo Radio so effective, 
and secondly, how did it remain so when it was broadcasting to two distinctly separate 
audiences?  That Cairo Radio stood paramount in the Arab world in terms of popular 
entertainment was key.  There was 'no comparable alternative' in the region, and no other 
broadcaster able to provide the same calibre of film and radio personalities.  The service was 
seen as an 'unrivalled vehicle for propaganda throughout the Middle East and North Africa.'113  
This meant that even those for whom the any message would appear to have had little relevance 
would tune in to Cairo Radio for its entertainment value.  As noted previously, the formation of 
                                                
112 The Activities and Influence of Cairo Radio, December 11, 1958, TNA CAB/134/2342/JIC (58) 63. 
113 The Activities and Influence of Cairo Radio (annex), December 11, 1958, TNA CAB/134/2342/JIC (58) 63. 
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the UAR added Damascus Radio's transmitters to Egypt's already significant broadcasting 
power, and so both in reach and quality the service was without parallel.  Nasser's regime also 
exerted influence over neighbouring countries' radio output through force of presence, and 
provision of technical personnel and expertise.  In this sense, Cairo Radio was in direct 
competition with the technical services that Britain offered to the Middle East.  Douglas Boyd 
has argued that since the station broadcast in Arabic, a language that Boyd argues 'especially 
lends itself to an emotional rather than a logical appeal', a programme such as the Voice of the 
Arabs was, if one accepts his premise, particularly blessed as a medium of agitation and 
incitement.114 
Whilst IRD struggled to provide locally targeted, appropriate propaganda in the Middle 
East and East Africa, Cairo Radio succeeded in producing varied, topical and regionally attractive 
programming.  Abdel-Kader Hatem, Egypt's information minister, notes that regional scope but 
local appeal was part of the Voice of the Arabs remit from the beginning.115  Although the majority 
of radio sets in sub-Saharan Africa were of insufficient power to receive Egyptian broadcasts, 
Cairo Radio could still be listened to in the hotels and coffee shops of the region, in an 
atmosphere of political discussion, and passed on from there by word of mouth.  [T]he better 
the propaganda, the more likely it is to be passed on' noted the JIC, '[its] effect cannot be gauged 
with any accuracy from estimates of listeners...a single item of news broadcast may eventually, 
perhaps in an even more distorted form, reach an almost unlimited public'.  In the British East 
African territories, the fact that the Voice of Free Africa appeared to be being broadcast from 
within central or eastern Africa leant it additional weight, and, by targeting the issue of anti-
colonialism, engaged a unifying issue beyond the Middle Eastern messages of religion, pan-
Arabism and opposition to Israel which would have found little resonance.116  Although Africans 
were just as likely to listen to locally broadcast material, political commentary from these sources 
                                                
114 Boyd, Broadcasting, p. 27. 
115 M. Abdel-Kater Hatem, Information and the Arab cause (London, 1974), pp. 166-7. 
116 The Activities and Influence of Cairo Radio (annex), December 11, 1958, TNA CAB/134/2342/JIC (58) 63. 
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was less likely to be trusted as that from the Voice of Free Africa, as the local stations may well 
have been seen as espousing the local government line.  The strength and vitriol of the 
broadcasts stood them in good stead: 'Only two or three reports have been received of Africans 
showing disgust at the violent tirades poured out by Sauti ya Cairo and Sauti ya Africa Huru', 
noted the post in Tanganyika. 'The vast majority of African listeners thoroughly approve of 
them, for this is what they want to hear.'117 
 
Conclusion: the state of play before Suez 
The situation that faced IRD in the Middle East in mid-1956 was slightly artificial – in the sense 
that the fallout from the Suez Crisis would fundamentally alter the landscape for propaganda in 
the Middle East within a few short months.  As it stood, however, IRD found itself diversifying 
to meet the challenge of Arab nationalism to British interests whilst struggling somewhat to find 
its rhythm against Communism in the region.  In essence this situation would not change – in 
fact it would become more problematic – after Suez.  IRD had been comparatively active and 
successful in placing anti-Communist material in Egypt prior to 1956, and the Crisis would 
immediately halt their improving campaign there.  IRD (and British propagandists in general) 
would be excluded from a position of influence with Egypt, a position that the Communist 
nations subsequently used to further their own agendas.  Increasing emphasis would have to be 
placed on the Baghdad Pact, and the withdrawal of Iraq following the Iraqi coup of 1958 recast 
the pact on altogether more modest lines (see Chapter 7). 
Soviet propagandists had a somewhat easier time of it than those of the British, in that 
they had at that point no interests to protect, and stood largely at the beginning of their cultural 
relationship with the Middle East.  Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were key themes in 
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both Soviet and Arab nationalist propaganda.  Tied to the history of British policy in the region, 
this was a powerful narrative.  Excepting Iran's experience of Soviet occupation, the region had 
no context for IRD to exploit such as the department had in Europe, and casting the Soviets in 
the role of imperialist oppressor was a combination of naiveté and hypocrisy that was patchily 
received, at best.  The two real issues in the region for the local population were Western 
Imperialism and the Arab-Israeli dispute.  In the case of the former, Britain sought to emphasise 
its role as benevolent – as educator, benefactor, protector and partner.  The greater share of this 
task fell to other departments and organisations.  In the case of the latter, the issue was so 
poisonous that IRD stayed well away. 
The reaction to the perceived threat of Arab Nationalism should rightly be seen within a 
Cold War context.  Fears of regional destabilisation and of the influence of Communism on 
countries asserting their independence from the West played heavily on the minds of Western 
nations.  Policymakers and propagandists found it hard in the mid-1950s to deal with the issues 
in isolation.  When, in the aftermath of the Czech arms deal, Nasser stressed to the British that 
he was hardly likely to trade British domination of his country for Soviet, the British failed to 
take him at face value.118  Nasser, Heikal notes, 'insisted he was importing arms, not ideologies.'119  
Whilst Western fears largely failed to play out between the mid-1950s and early 1960s – as 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis, Soviet-Egyptian relations and rhetoric blew hot and cold 
throughout this period – a rapprochement in 1964 resulted in air and naval rights being granted 
to the Soviets in 1966 in Egyptian airfields and ports.  Western fears were far from 
ungrounded.120 
Cairo Radio – in particular its Voice of the Arabs programme – was seen by many in 
Foreign Office and defence circles as the preeminent propaganda threat to British interests in the 
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region.  The propaganda coup of withstanding Britain, and the concomitant damage to British 
prestige wrought by the Crisis, extended Nasser's popularity beyond already supportive areas 
within the Middle East to British colonial territories in North and East Africa.121  Paul Grey's 
fears of Nasser 'bursting out in fury' at the British were well realised after Suez, and, as the 
following chapter shows, Britain succeeded in wholly devaluing the one propaganda asset in the 
region with which they could have even potentially addressed the vitriol of Cairo Radio on 
anywhere approaching equal terms.  To have any effect after Suez, therefore, IRD would have to 
adapt. 
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Chapter Three 
Suez 
 
information work [is] the hand-maiden of policy 
Sidney Hebblethwaite (IPD), April 5, 1956 1 
 
IRD was significantly involved in the propaganda effort that aimed to support and legitimise 
British military action over Suez.  That effort was a failure, and by extension so were the 
department's efforts.  Yet IRD's two major contributions – the coordination and support of the 
British information campaign, and the supply of material to the requisitioned Sharq al-Adna – 
were undermined, respectively, by the separation of policy from planning, and by poor decision 
making born of desperation and limited options.  Neither of these factors were the fault of the 
department. 
The aim of this short chapter is to examine the two contributions noted above, and why 
they failed.  Both failures had significant repercussions for IRD's future work against both 
Nasserism and Communism, as they did for British information policy over the Middle East as a 
whole.  Because of the crucial decision to requisition Sharq to broadcast the Voice of Britain 
programme, Sharq was fully exposed as British-run, and wholly devalued.  As a consequence, 
Britain was left without a viable broadcast capability in the region under direct government 
control.2  From this point IRD would have to compete with an increasingly dominant Cairo 
Radio on an unequal footing and court local broadcasters instead.  Prior to the crisis, plans for an 
invasion of Egypt were confined to an ever-decreasing inner-circle surrounding Eden.  Eden 
concealed his intentions from the information services.  This fatally undermined the efforts of 
                                                
1 'Publicity in the Middle East', S Hebblethwaite (IPD), April 5, 1956, FO 1110/942/PR10104/52/G. 
2 Whatever the relationship was between the BBC and the Government, the corporation was not under its control. 
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the propagandists, and was a crucial lesson, but as we will see, IRD and IPD were already fully 
aware of the implications well in advance. 
 
Psychological and Political Warfare: The Information Coordination Executive3 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the RIO in Beirut had previously operated under the umbrella of the 
British Middle East Office.  When BMEO supervision was withdrawn in 1955, the military lost 
its direct link with the main propaganda agency in the Middle East, and it would have to be re-
forged in the event of any future military action that required a psychological warfare dimension.  
When plans for coordinating psychological warfare across British forces and NATO were 
developed in 1956 (prior to the Suez Crisis), current and ex-IRD personalities such as Jack 
Rennie, Ralph Murray, Norman Reddaway and Hugh Cortazzi were involved at the highest 
levels.  IRD would assume significant responsibility for peacetime propaganda and wartime 
psychological warfare operations.   As part of this process, the question of linking in the RIO to 
British forces in the Middle East once again became pertinent.4  This fledgling planning process 
would soon be superseded by real-world planning, as the department assumed a lead role in the 
Information Coordination Executive (ICE) as Suez approached.5 
Alongside overt propaganda methods such as the LPS, BBC, and feature articles 
commissioned for circulation in the Middle East, Suez Crisis propaganda was also dispersed via 
covert circulation by RIO Beirut and the Embassy in Cairo and via the ANA.  ICE would 
coordinate it all.6  In August 1956 John Rennie, Head of IRD since December 1953, was 
                                                
3 For a detailed look at the plans for psywar in the Middle East in 1957 see FO 1110/986 passim. 
4 This process is outlined through a succession of drafts and IRD objections to them in FO 1110/874, FO1110/875 
and FO 1110/876. 
5 IRD did in fact carve a place for itself in future planning for psychological warfare outside the Middle East on both 
a limited and general scale, and forged links with both NATO and the US, but these future efforts, whilst deserving 
of attention, fall outside the scope of this thesis.  See for example 'Psychological Warfare', J O Rennie, February 1, 
1957, TNA FO 1110/981/PR10112/2/G.  See also Risso, "NATO", though Risso does not draw from the 
documents cited in this or the preceding notes. 
6 'ICE Progress Report', undated but either late-September or early-October 1956, BBCWAC R34/1580/1. 
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appointed chief executive officer of ICE at its inception.  ICE would consist of CRO, CO, 
MOD, CoS, SIS, BBC and COI representatives, and would feed an advisory committee, thence 
on to the Egypt Committee itself.  Norman Reddaway would replace Rennie as the department's 
head.7  James Vaughan has argued that these moves are illustrative of the Eden administration's 
desire to use force against Nasser, and to use the Suez Crisis as an opportunity to do so.8  
Murray, IRD's first head, had been minister at the Cairo Embassy from April 1954, before 
returning to Britain to co-ordinate the OMEGA plan from London.  OMEGA, the successor to 
ALPHA, signalled intensification both of covert propaganda, and of efforts to encourage 
political opposition to Nasser.  The plan also called for 'economic warfare' aimed at Egypt, and 
bolstering of pro-Western regimes alongside efforts to overthrow those that were pro-Nasser.9  
As the crisis developed, Murray helped to organise invasion plans, before being appointed as 
political advisor during the military operation.10 Murray was originally put forward as the ICE 
liaison with the BBC, although ultimately he would find himself attached to General Keightley's 
unit in Cyprus.11 
IRD staff would form the 'hard core' of ICE,12 and the committee itself would form part 
of IRD, at least as regards 'cover and administration'.13  Under direction from Rennie, much had 
already been done to shift the emphasis of the department's work towards Nasser before the first 
ICE meeting on 24 August.14  Scott Lucas notes that as early as May, Reddaway and Rennie were 
                                                
7 Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Political Warfare, August 13, 1956, TNA FO 
1110/876/PR10112/46/G. 
8 Vaughan, Failure, pp. 206-207. 
9 Scott Lucas and Ray Takeyh, "Alliance and Balance: The Anglo-American Relationship and Egyptian Nationalism, 
1950-1957", Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1996), p. 644. 
10 Michael T. Thornhill, 'Murray, Sir (Francis) Ralph Hay (1908–1983)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64928, accessed 11 
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11 'Organisation for Political Warfare', J O Rennie (IRD), August 8, 1956, TNA FO 1110/880/PR10131/1/G. 
12 'Organisation for Political Warfare', J O Rennie (IRD), August 8, 1956, TNA FO 1110/880/PR10131/1/G. 
13 Memorandum, 'Information Coordination Executive', Ivone Kirkpatrick, August 23, 1956, TNA FO 
1110/880/PR10131/1/G. 
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actively agitating for more black propaganda to be directed at Egypt.15  Encouragement for this 
tactic came from many sides.  John Bagot Glubb, recently dismissed by King Hussein as the 
head of the Jordanian army, was deeply concerned at the amount and success of Egyptian 
propaganda in the Middle East.  Glubb wrote to Evelyn Shuckburgh at the FO to argue that 
Britain would do better to reduce 'expenditure on useful purposes which actually help the 
development of the countries concerned...and spend the money, as the Egyptians do, on 
subversive action and propaganda.'16 
ICE was an active organisation, and a useful bridge between disparate government and 
non-government bodies.  For example, Rennie passed a secret Treasury paper on Egypt's 
economic position to the BBC outlining various factors that led to her straightened economic 
position.17  ICE was in fact explicitly 'an organisation for political warfare', according to the 
Egypt Committee;18 it was also largely a failure.  As Stephen Dorril points out, ICE turned out to 
be largely ineffective because it was kept in the dark over British actions and vital intelligence, 
and about the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion.19  Without proper guidance, the committee was 
basing its decisions on flawed assumptions. 
An ICE/IRD paper prepared for the Egypt Committee makes this clear.  The most 
significant assumption was that there would be prolonged negotiations or a long period of 
pressure applied to Nasser.  That this paper was prepared for a mid-October meeting – Israel 
invaded the Sinai on October 29 – shows how flawed that assumption was.   ICE/IRD could 
not have been clearer: '[W]here there is a change or reversal of policy…it is important that all the 
organs of propaganda should have as long notice as possible...to prepare the ground for any such 
                                                
15 Lucas, Divided, p. 132 
16 C A E Shuckburgh (Foreign Office) to P Dean and E Grey, April 6, 1956, TNA FO 1110/941/PR10112/18/G. 
17 The slightly shaky conclusion was that these difficulties stemmed 'mainly from the inherent problems of an under-
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the United Kingdom on July 27'. 'Secret: Weaknesses in Egypt's Economic Position' enclosure from J O Rennie, 
October 24, 1956, BBCWAC R34/1580/1. 
18 Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Political Warfare, August 13, 1956, TNA FO 
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change, and incidentally be prevented from being left too far out on a limb'.  The main themes 
for British propaganda focussed on Egypt's economy and the interests of other Arab nations, 
and played on Nasser's relationship with Communist states.  The latter theme required some 
delicacy, it was noted, lest the message appear to be that Communism was going to succeed in 
Egypt, therefore 'encouraging a tendency to get on what appears to be the winning side.'  Of 
overriding concern was that whatever settlement arose from the crisis it had to be shown that 
Britain had won, Nasser had lost, and to ensure the acceptance of that fact throughout the 
Middle East.20 
The Foreign Secretary set out British propaganda themes in late October 1956.  They 
were: Egypt's economy, the 'sanctity of contracts', the interests of other Arab states, to play on 
fears of Communism, and to constantly reinforce that Britain's proposals were 'fair and 
reasonable' to all parties.  These were the themes to which ICE would bend their effort, and at 
no point were they informed that they should be preparing for an imminent invasion.  There 
were two main long-term aims identified by ICE: 'to weaken Nasser and to strengthen our 
standing in the Arab world.'  It is abundantly clear that British propaganda was unable to achieve 
either aim.  In the short term, the aim was 'to strengthen our hand in negotiation and help the 
prospects of an agreed settlement satisfactory to us.'  In this, ICE was wholly undermined, as this 
was not what the Egypt Committee were aiming for at all.21  Given the above, it is not surprising 
that the propaganda campaign in support of military action was less than effective.  Yet the 
situation was made worse still by a decision that smacked somewhat of desperation: the 
requisitioning of Sharq al-Adna. 
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Radio Broadcasting and Sharq al -Adna  
As the Suez Crisis progressed, it became obvious that Sharq al-Adna (a programme of the Near 
East Broadcasting Station at Limassol, Cyprus) was the only British-controlled programme of 
sufficient reach and influence to support Britain's propaganda offensive.22  Sharq was ostensibly 
an Arab station; this cover would be comprehensively blown by the British requisitioning of the 
station during Suez, though as early as June 1956 the Embassy in Tripoli were reporting that 
Sharq's coverage of the situation in Algeria had already marked it out as 'imperialistic'.23 
There were a number of British clandestine radio stations operating in the Middle East.  
However, whilst the IRD files illustrate the technical aspects of setting up these radio stations – 
and the amount of paperwork such things can generate – they are dark on the actual use of these 
for propaganda purposes at least as far as the department's involvement is concerned.  It is the 
case that Britain covered the full gamut of broadcasting, from the white, attributable propaganda 
of the BBC, through the murkier, grey programmes of Sharq and the Voice of Britain, to the black 
propaganda that Scott Lucas asserts Britain and France began broadcasting into Egypt from 
Aden, Cyprus and Libya on 28 July 1956.24  Britain was operating two secret radio stations, 
perhaps more.  One of these was called Scant.25  Gary Rawnsley cites personal IRD sources that 
connect IRD to Scant.  The department provided information on the effect Nasser's actions over 
Suez would have for the Egyptian economy.  Rawnsley's source asserts that, given that British 
policy was 'to denounce Nasser by all means, all government agencies – MOD, FO, CRO and 
the Security Services would be expected to provide what they could'.26  (The possibility remains, 
therefore, that despite being involved with black propaganda, IRD did not actually generate it 
itself.)  Scant covered a wide area, but only directed an hour of programming at Egypt, Iraq, 
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Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and part of the Gulf.27  Much beyond this, the extent and 
specifics of any IRD involvement with covert radio are at this point unclear, and any conclusions 
speculative.  This is not, however, the case with Sharq.  
Arab staff provided authenticity, and a degree of separation from Britain.  It was also 
true that their position vis-a-vis the Middle East would have been rendered untenable by too pro-
British, or anti-Egyptian, a stance.  As early as 1953, there had been increasing pressure from the 
Foreign Office on the BBC to respond to anti-British propaganda from Cairo in kind.  The BBC 
resisted, in no small part due to the response of their Arab staff, which made it clear to the head 
of the BBC's Eastern Service that continued employment was conditional on the BBC remaining 
objective and impartial in its reporting.28  Similarly, the FO knew that the Arab staff of Sharq 
would likely desert if it were used 'to put over the British point of view in a big way'.29 
On October 30, as Israel continued its attack on Egypt through the Sinai, the British 
government requisitioned Sharq and began broadcasting a new programme, the Voice of Britain. 
As Douglas Boyd notes, 'almost everything that could go wrong did.'  The station, toeing the 
government line, often directly contradicted BBC broadcasts, undermining further a station that 
was quite obviously a British tool and roundly accused of being so by Cairo Radio.30  Mohamed 
Heikal was less than complimentary about the service.  As Heikal later described, the Voice of 
Britain's broadcasts 'displayed a surprising ignorance of Egyptian affairs and thinking.'  On one 
occasion, when a broadcast suggested a list of eight Egyptians who could replace Nasser in 
government, two were already dead.  'These broadcasts', Heikal notes, 'only served to increase 
Nasser's popularity.'31 
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Though BBC Arabic Service material was to have been relayed through Sharq following 
its requisitioning, technical difficulties meant that this was impossible at that time.  The majority 
of the spoken material output by the station between 30 October and 5pm on 7 November was 
in fact provided by IRD from London, as well as from Cyprus, where IPD's Sidney 
Hebblethwaite was likely the source.32  IRD was, in the words of H H Tucker, 'the London end 
of the Voice of Britain...it was our job to provide scripts in Arabic and English to the relay 
station in Cyprus...We were heavily involved in this for, I suppose, about six months, even after 
the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez [sic].  We still ran Voice of Britain providing 
general information, general talks to whoever was in fact listening (I suspect not all that many 
people).'  IRD, a report noted, provided 'dozens of scripts' over the period of the ground 
offensive. 33 
IPD's Sidney Hebblethwaite was made director of the Voice of Britain on December 3, 
1956, and tasked with 'submitting recommendations on the future of the station, on programme 
presentation and content, and composition of the future staff.'34  Plans were subsequently 
developed to move the Voice of Britain to London in order to tighten political control of the 
programme, and improve efficiency and economy.  With Hebblethwaite in charge, and either 
two or three, out of a proposed total of four, scriptwriters to be provided by IRD, it seems 
plausible that it would have been a IRD-run affair had such plans matured.   
                                                
32 Fergusson, the Director of Psychological Warfare during the Suez Crisis – in his own words, his 'qualifications 
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1110/855/PR139/2. 
34 'Future of the Voice of Britain', S Hebblethwaite (IPD), December 20, 1956, TNA FO 1110/971/PR139/124. 
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There was a political dimension to the Voice of Britain.  The Labour opposition had 
mounted increasing pressure throughout November for an inquiry into Suez.  This was ruled out 
on 22 November 1956 by Deputy Prime Minister Rab Butler, on the rather tenuous basis that 
the Suez Crisis had been 'primarily the responsibility of Government',35 yet before this questions 
in the Commons threatened to expose IRD involvement.  A call via question in the House for 
the MoD to publish scripts of broadcasts by the Voice of Britain required some subtle political 
manoeuvring to avoid – the publication of such voluminous material, largely of only ephemeral 
interest, would, it was argued, be too costly.  The fear was that if these 'dozens' of scripts were to 
be published, IRD would 'become the subject of debate...and [this would] provide a basis for 
further criticism' of British propaganda policy.36 
The switch to the Voice of Britain was doubly ruinous because Sharq, now fatally 
undermined, had been of genuine worth to British propagandists.  For instance, in the case of 
the Czech arms deal – all too aware of how popular it was in the Arab world – the British 
initially downplayed the issue, before framing it as an act of irresponsibility and focussing on 
Russian motives rather than Egyptian.  Sharq at least meant that the British had another avenue 
through which they could be more vituperative.37  Paul Grey of the FO summed up the Voice of 
Britain debacle very well: 'Sharq was very popular and drew a great many listeners away from the 
Egyptian broadcasts.  It failed because, although it was supposed to be secretly under control, 
the secret got out while the control became ineffective.'38  It also upset the BBC.  As noted 
above, the Voice of Britain often contradicted the BBC, an organisation that was anyway smarting 
from FO interference:  J B Clarke, Director of External Broadcasting at the BBC, was clear that 
                                                
35 R A Butler, 22 November 1956, HC Deb (1955-56), vol 560, cols 1932-5, cited in Charlotte Peevers, The Politics of 
Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War, and International Law (Oxford, 2013), p. 123. 
36 'Future of the Voice of Britain' and Annex, S Hebblethwaite (IPD), December 20, 1956, TNA FO 
1110/971/PR139/124; P. McKearney (Voice of Britain, Limassol) to H K Matthews (POMEF), December 16, 
1956; McKearney to Hebblethwaite, December 17, 1956; TNA FO 1110/855/PR139/14/G Answer and Note for 
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he felt 'that the Foreign Office seemed to be calling for a distortion or suppression of news in a 
manner which had never been called for even during the war'.39  Even the name could be 
construed as a slight.  If the new service called itself the Voice of Britain, asked Ian Jacob, the 
corporation's Director-General, what was the BBC?40 
In the weeks after the invasion, the VOB broadcast a composite service of 
'entertainment records from Cyprus and news and talks originated by the Foreign Office in 
London [specifically IRD], both supplementing the relay of the whole of the BBC's Arabic 
Service.'41  Rennie, alongside Donald Stephenson of the BBC, organised a committee on the 
future of the VOB in December 1956.42 Paul Grey made the FO's position extremely clear:  
'[T]he Foreign Office never wanted to operate a Government broadcasting service.  We did so 
on instructions and in view of the breakdown of everything else.  We are certainly advocating the 
"liquidation" of the Voice at the earliest possible moment.'43 
By February 1957 the decision had been taken to phase the Voice of Britain out, and to 
replace it with BBC programming, with the station initially rented out to the BBC for a period of 
6 months.44  Progressively, but fairly rapidly through 1957, the BBC Arabic Service increased its 
programming to 9 1/2 hours a day, began to transmit on medium wave, and rebalanced itself as 
more of a light programme, filling in the gap left by Sharq somewhat.  This transformation was 
an attempt to provide a viable alternative to the Voice of the Arabs for Arab listeners, much as 
Sharq had before.  Many of the new BBC staff that supported this expansion of the Arabic 
Service came from Sharq.45 
                                                
39 J B Clarke to Director General, BBC, November 2, 1956, BBCWAC R34/1580/2. 
40 'Note of a Meeting with the Postmaster General' (Charles Hill), Ian Jacob (BBC), January 8, 1957, BBCWAC 
R34/1580/3. 
41 'Report by Director of External Broadcasting, 1st September to 30th November 1956', BBCWAC R34/1580/2. 
42 'Record of a Meeting of Mr Dodds-Parker's Advisory Committee held at the Foreign Office at noon, December 7, 
1956', BBCWAC R34/1580/2. 
43 P F Grey (FO) to Sir Alexander Johnston (Treasury), January 10, 1957, TNA FO 1110/971/PR139/48/G. 
44 Telegram, FO to Beirut, February 5, 1957, TNA FO 1110/971/PR139/93/G. 
45 Partner, Arab, pp. 122, 124. 
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Conclusion: lessons learned. 
There were many lessons to be learned in the wake of the Suez Crisis.  Keeping the focus on 
IRD, a significant effect of the crisis was the severing of diplomatic relations with Egypt, which 
cut IRD's route for material into the country.  The Egyptian press would therefore be beyond 
their reach.  As if to underscore the shift in balance, the Americans reported that by December 
use of the Soviet TASS news agency was on the increase in Cairo.46  The loss of Sharq as an asset 
left Cairo Radio unchallenged in reach and audience.  This, when combined with the collapse of 
the VHF projects noted in the previous chapter, left IRD unable to respond in kind to the threat 
of the Voice of the Arabs programme, even if the department had wanted to. 
Planning for damage-limitation propaganda had swung into full effect by mid-
November.  The aim was to repeatedly 'plug' certain themes: that British action was a 'limited 
intervention', that Nasser's aim for hegemony had been shattered by British action, and that the 
Soviets intended to use Nasser as a 'cat's paw' by which Russia would secure domination of the 
Middle East were all proposed.  Additionally, covertly, via Scant and other channels, themes such 
as that of Egyptian military weakness, or assertions that the Soviet Union's vocal complaints over 
Suez were simply self-serving – to cover up their atrocities in Hungary – were more carefully 
distributed.47  IRD and IPD cast their nets across posts worldwide for any foreign press 
comment favourable to British action, but understanding was difficult to come by.48 
The Suez Crisis drove home the point that without unity of message between Parliament 
and the press, political direction of all aspects of propaganda and psychological warfare, and the 
broad support of the country, psychological warfare would be largely doomed to failure.  'The 
basic lesson to be learned from our experience in the Suez Crisis', wrote Rennie, 'is the need for 
                                                
46 D A Marston (RIO Beirut) to IPD, December 21, 1956, TNA FO 953/1616/P10118/220. 
47 Paper submitted November 15, 1956 to Egypt Committee.  BBCWAC R34/1580/2. 
48 See throughout TNA FO 953/1606/P10118/40. 
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a coherent policy with some appeal to the target audience.  Psychological warfare will have to 
make the best of whatever the policy is, but it cannot transform a bad case into a good one.'  The 
purpose of ICE was precisely this sort of coordination, but it was working under a 
misapprehension of the true direction of British policy.49  IPD's Sidney Hebblethwaite had made 
Rennie's point as early as April 1956.  Discussing the shortcomings of British information work 
in the Middle East, he argued that there was   
room for improvement, no doubt, but...criticisms are less than fair when they 
mix up policy and information work, the hand-maiden of policy.  If our policy is 
not liked by the Egyptians, no amount of disguise will make our information 
policy palatable to the Egyptians and their friends.50 
In the aftermath of the Crisis, the FO assessed existing propaganda themes as out of 
date.   The lack of a 'master theme' crippled any overt propaganda.51  At least one post in South 
East Asia was already highlighting a perceived lack of direction and forward planning in British 
information policy for the Middle East.52  One theme that remained constant was full support of 
the Baghdad Pact, but it was recognised that care had to be taken not to embarrass the Iraqis by 
being too blatant about it.53  British actions at Suez had not just severed IRD's access to Egypt 
and dramatically increased Nasser's standing in the region, but had also made the British 
connection to the Baghdad Pact and the CSO a cause for concern. 
Paul Grey of the FO summed up the British publicity failure in the Middle East.  There 
were, of course, difficulties and limitations, but there were two main issues that went wrong at 
the outset.  The first was the lack of warning of action for the information services, which Grey 
blamed squarely for the 'shock' to the staff of both Sharq and the BBC Arabic services, and led to 
strike action in the case of the former.  This resulted in a programming deficit at a crucial time 
                                                
49 'Psychological Warfare', J O Rennie, February 1, 1957, TNA FO 1110/981/PR10112/2/G. 
50 'Publicity in the Middle East', S Hebblethwaite, April 5, 1956, FO 1110/942/PR10104/52/G. 
51 'Propaganda in the Middle East.', Alec Kirkbride, January 11, 1957, BBCWAC, R34/1580/3. 
52 Commissioner General (South East Asia) to FO, November 10, 1956; FO to Singapore, 23 November, 1956, 
TNA FO 953/1608/P10118/72. 
53 'Record of a Meeting of Mr. Dodds-Parker's Advisory Committee held at the Foreign Office at noon, January 11, 
1957, BBCWAC R34/1580/3. 
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(though IRD helped to fill the gap).  Secondly, the RAF decided to reverse the FO's request to 
take out the transmitters for Cairo Radio.  By the time the Crisis was in full swing, there was 
insufficient time between the FO's discovery of the omission and the cease-fire to rectify the 
issue.54  The Voice of the Arabs broadcast throughout this period.  General Keightley also 
identified the short notice period before hostilities as especially damaging to public relations – 
'We had no time to organise our press representatives, to study the conflicting claims of would 
be accredited correspondents, or to try out press communications in the light of the length of 
reports correspondents insisted on sending.'55  The Foreign Office, like the US State 
Department, had seen OMEGA as part of a longer game aimed at rehabilitating Nasser.  Eden, 
however, saw in it the opportunity to immediately engage in political – and actual – warfare.  The 
FO information services therefore found themselves marginalised, and fatally asynchronous to 
the real direction of Eden's strategy.56 
The Foreign Office thus reached the same conclusion as Vaughan: that the failure of 
British propaganda in the Middle East was due to a 'policy miscalculation', a fundamental 
disconnect between the perceived aims of the propagandists and the actual direction of British 
policy.57  Vaughan makes further conclusions that require some qualification in light of the 
following chapters (into a period beyond the scope of his research). Vaughan argues that 'after 
Suez…an intriguing experiment in the way Britain fought its Middle Eastern propaganda war 
had been cut short at an early stage…Suez served to undermine IRD's more flexible approach 
towards the relationship between communism and nationalism in the region.'  The result was 
that '[t]he collapse of Britain's Suez policy during October and November 1956 returned British 
propaganda strategy to more conventional anti-Communist terrain.'58  Vaughan concludes that 
                                                
54 Confidential, P F Grey (FO)November 29, 1958, TNA FO 953/1613/P10118/65. 
55 'Extract from General Keighley's Despatch on Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean Nov/Dec 1956 Part 2', 
October 11, 1957, TNA FO 1110/982/PR10112/14/G. 
56 Vaughan, Failure, p. 206. 
57 Vaughan, Failure, p. 239. 
58 Vaughan, "Cloak", pp. 78, 76. 
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'[t]he reordering of the Middle Eastern political landscape after Suez thus produced a 
reorientation of IRD's priorities towards a narrower focus upon the Soviet Union.'59 
IRD stepped away from direct confrontation with Nasserism in the Middle East because 
of policy considerations, over and above any failure at Suez.  Britain, largely for financial reasons, 
wanted to normalise relations with Nasser as quickly as possible.  With the above policy 
consideration in mind, IRD's primary broadcast strategy in the Middle East after Suez aimed to 
influence local broadcasters, via material carried by the London Press Service and the 
Transmission 'X' news commentary service.  The examination of the Transmission 'X' service in 
Chapter 5 will show that IRD built on the flexibility it had developed in the years before Suez, 
and continued to deal with both Nasser and Communism.  Whilst an accommodation with Arab 
nationalism in the Middle East was quickly seen to be desirable, IRD continued to address the 
preeminent Nasserite propaganda vehicle – Cairo Radio – on a daily basis.  Indeed, given that 
the threat from Cairo extended after Suez to include British interests in North and East Africa, 
IRD's counter-Nasserite work expanded, rather than reduced, after Suez. 
The involvement of ex-IRD personalities in the campaign, and the campaign 
infrastructure on the ground, were of short-lived duration, and of limited value outside of the 
crisis.  For example, it would be wrong to view the psychological warfare unit under Ralph 
Murray as anything other than small and task-specific.  Suggestions that the unit could become 
involved in the wider propaganda effort were swiftly rebuffed by Murray: 
As you know, I am warmest advocate of intensification of propaganda, but I 
cannot (repeat not) advise C-in-C to undertake responsibilities in a matter for 
which this H.Q. has no organic connexion and for which it is by function and 
situation totally unfitted.  It is quite misleading to imagine that existence of a 
skeleton Allied psychological warfare section here is relevant to the problem of 
                                                
59 Vaughan, "Cloak", p. 78. 
95 
 
British propaganda to combat Nasser's influence in the Middle East or, in the 
absence of active operations, even in Egypt.60 
Almost immediately after Anglo-French military action was brought to heel in Egypt, the 
MoD proposed the creation of a 'covert political warfare group', to be based in Cyprus.  
Egyptian Radio had only suffered a temporary setback at the hands of allied bombing, and 
following the cease-fire the ad-hoc psychological warfare unit found itself without a mandate.  
The MoD encouraged Sefton Delmer to try and reprise his Second World War PWE black 
propaganda radio activities, this time sowing seeds of distrust between the Arab nations.  The 
FO, Rennie and Murray moved quickly against this idea; the latter was 'extremely doubtful about 
the wisdom of attempting large scale black propaganda from Cyprus and hoped that it would not 
be pursued.'  Domestic political considerations also played their part: 'The opposition attacks on 
V.O.B.', wrote Paul Grey of the FO, 'are likely to be nothing compared with what they could do 
if concentrated on our black activities'; to defuse potential MoD complaints of 'obstruction', 
Delmer was to be encouraged to make the case against the plan himself, and demur.61 
Eden was quick to appoint Charles Hill, the Postmaster General, to head a review of the 
British Information Services following Suez, a post confirmed by Macmillan in January 1957 
when he made Hill Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, with a seat in Cabinet, but no 
ministerial responsibilities.  Whilst Jenks has viewed Hill as a de facto Minister of Information,62 
Tony Shaw argues that, without 'control functions', he was nothing of the sort.  The effect of 
Hill's appointment 'was to upgrade the role of propaganda at home and overseas whilst ensuring 
that ministers and officials spoke with one voice.'  Hill would ensure integration of propaganda 
with policy, and secure increased funding.63  Hill's actions largely followed the recommendations 
of the 1953 Drogheda Committee report, which had still not been put into place, and in which, 
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61 'Covert Propaganda to the Middle East', P F Grey, November 12, 1956, TNA FO 1110/948/PR10104/245/G. 
62 Jenks, Propaganda, p.149. 
63 Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez, and the mass media: propaganda and persuasion during the Suez crisis (London, 1996), pp.195, 196. 
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as noted previously, particular importance was placed on increased staffing and funding for the 
Middle East and Africa.64  
There is no doubt that Nasser had won a propaganda victory over the British but, given 
the ubiquity of anti-imperialist rhetoric to anti-British propaganda, Cairo Radio was quick to 
emphasise that whilst the British and French withdrawal was a victory for Egypt, imperialism had 
not been beaten: 
'My Arab brother, do not say that the conspiracies of the colonialists have 
ended…Do not succumb to those who say that the aggression of colonialism is 
dead and buried.  If the aggression of colonialism against Egypt has met with 
utter failure, it still thinks of plotting another aggression by which to secure 
victory…'65 
The vituperate outpourings from Cairo Radio on this theme would provide IRD with a 
continued role in countering Arab nationalist propaganda in the Middle East.  Cairo Radio 
propaganda would extend from this point down into Africa, leveraging anti-Imperialist and pan-
African sentiments.  It would be paralleled by a surge in interest from the Soviet Union and 
China.  How IRD handled these new commitments, and the department's existing ones in a 
region where British prestige had been rocked by the Suez Crisis, are discussed over the 
remaining chapters. 
 
 
                                                
64 A junior minister, Dennis Vosper, replaced Hill in October 1961.  Vosper was not a member of Cabinet, and his 
appointment signalled a further change in political direction regarding the information services.  From 1964 no 
single minister would have responsibility for the information services.  Lee, "Cultural", pp.130-131. 
65 Ahmed Said, broadcasting on the Voice of the Arabs, December 9, 1956, SWB IV, 120, December 11, 1956. 
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Chapter Four 
Into Africa 
 
Goodness knows we are shorn enough of African gambits.1 
Norman Reddaway (IRD), January 1958 
 
One of the core assertions of this thesis is that IRD expanded its work against the Nasserite 
brand of Arab nationalism following the Suez Crisis.  ICE may have been disbanded, alongside 
the Egypt Committee that it served, but IRD continued to combat the threat that Arab 
nationalism posed to British interests in the Middle East and Africa.  This threat was considered 
to be greater than that posed by Communism over much of North and North-East Africa.  
Whilst IRD's campaign was waged less aggressively, and was narrower in scope than it had been 
during Suez, it was nonetheless significant.  It was predominantly aimed at rebutting the worst 
excesses of Cairo Radio propaganda, as British policymakers desired a rapprochement with 
Egypt as quickly as possible.  However, as shown in Chapter 7, there are indications that British 
resolve stiffened towards the end of the period under study, with a partial return to 
unattributable propaganda directed at Egypt and formulated by IRD.  This chapter illustrates 
IRD's continuing flexibility and development post-Suez in the face of the diverse and fresh 
challenge presented by Africa. 
An examination of IRD's efforts to combat Nasserite propaganda post-Suez makes it 
clear that the Middle East is only half the picture, and perhaps less than half: Egyptian 
propaganda targeted Africa as well, and the Communist nations used their influence and 
association with Egypt to support their own foreign policy drive into Africa.  As this thesis seeks 
to incorporate both regions, it is necessary to provide some background to IRD's early campaign 
                                                
1 Minute, N Reddaway, January 28, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1167/PR10109/6/G. 
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in Africa, which paralleled their work over Suez in 1956.  Firstly, therefore, this chapter seeks to 
lay the background for IRD's initial years of direct involvement in Africa and how the 
department saw the Communist threat to the continent.  It will also examine the role of BBC 
monitoring in Africa. Resisted by the Colonial Office, but reliant on them for information, IRD 
was denied much of the intelligence and information that supported their research.  The 
department was therefore even more dependent on the BBC's monitoring service than it was in 
the Middle East – almost wholly so.  Monitoring coverage across Africa was far less 
comprehensive however, and so IRD and the BBC worked in tandem to expand the latter's 
capability to cover both Soviet and Egyptian broadcasts.  Both of these issues have only 
previously been examined tangentially, if at all.2 
Preceding Suez, 1956 was the year that the major Communist powers took renewed 
interest in Africa. As noted in Chapter 2, Soviet foreign policy towards Egypt hoped to exploit 
that relationship to extend Communist influence into Africa.  An unclassified brief authored by 
IRD in February 1956 on the 'Soviet penetration of Africa' argued that Egypt and the Sudan 
formed the 'axis' of a new drive into the continent by the Soviets, and that French North Africa 
was being targeted as a bridgehead from which to spread influence south.3 
As many African countries headed towards independence, the fear of Communist-
supported or -inspired nationalist movements, and the fear of Communist or Communist-
leaning governments rising to lead newly independent countries, exercised the Western nations 
mightily.  Africa had by and large existed on the periphery of the Cold War in its early stages.  By 
the late 1950s a number of factors conspired to change this.  The increasing industrial capacity 
and economic muscle of both China and Russia, fuelled by their deteriorating relationship 
towards each other, enabled the expansion of each both politically and economically via 
                                                
2 See Brennan, "Poison and Dope: Radio and the art of political invective in East Africa, 1940-1965". 
3 'Soviet Penetration of Africa', February 1956, enclosure with H A H Cortazzi (IRD) to W T A Cox (CO), February 
9, 1956, TNA CO 1035/17/ISD61/01. 
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programs of 'trade and aid', cultural exchange, and radio propaganda.  How IRD saw this threat 
forms the second part of this chapter. 
IRD's efforts to take a direct role in combatting Communism in Africa were complicated 
by a continued British imperial presence.  The issue was not just the anti-imperialist sentiments 
caused by occupation.  Colonial territories were administered by the Colonial Office and local 
colonial governments, and at this stage these were anything but convinced of the worth, or 
relevance, of IRD work towards the nations they controlled.  Before 1956, IRD was a client of 
the CO, providing material on request and working to CO requirements.  From 1956 onwards, 
IRD aimed to take a proactive rather than responsive role.  These efforts brought the 
department into conflict with the CO, who did not agree with IRD's assessment of the 
Communist threat to the colonies.  Thirdly, therefore, this chapter will examine IRD's efforts to 
establish its own brand of counter-Communist propaganda on the continent, in the face of CO 
resistance.  This resistance undeniably delayed and slowed the commencement of IRD's 
campaign in Africa.  A tentative conclusion is that this delay – across the whole of 1956 and into 
1957 – squandered some of the initiative the British held as a colonial power when measured 
against the Communists' minimal presence on the continent at that time.  
The collapse of Britain's reputation following Suez was matched by the dramatic growth 
of Nasser's prestige.  For the nations of Africa, under colonial rule or approaching 
independence, there were a number of implications.  Themes of resistance to colonialism, British 
fallibility, and nationalism found a ready audience in Africa.  Buoyed by the propaganda capital 
of his victory over Suez, Nasser's expansionist policy began to drive into Africa beyond the 
Middle East, for the security and political reasons outlined below.  That this was possible was 
due to the broadcast reach of Cairo Radio.  The threat from Cairo Radio has been examined in 
Chapter 2; IRD's response to it is detailed in the following chapter.  The final section of this 
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chapter sets aims to set out the background for Egypt's interest and actions in Africa 
immediately following Suez 
 
IRD and the Communist threat to Africa 
In 1956, as IRD was accelerating considerable resources towards the Middle East, 
comparatively little was being directed at Africa.  In the information field Africa was, by and 
large, not a Foreign Office concern.  Indeed, of the portfolio of regular IRD productions such as 
the Interpreter, 'Facts About' series and others that was distributed across the FO, the FO's 
African department received just one copy of IRD's 'Developments in the Middle East', and 
nothing else, in January 1956.4  This was hardly comprehensive, nor topically relevant.  
Information work in the African colonies was a CO responsibility. 
IRD had to overcome resistance within the CO to their output that bordered on the 
wilful.  Part of the problem was that the CO held most of the cards.  Since the CO controlled 
the information and intelligence apparatus within the colonies, IRD were reliant on them as a 
source of information, as well as a distributer.  IRD work in general was extremely reliant on the 
compliance of posts to gather information and to assess both the quality and, to what extent this 
was possible, the impact of IRD material.  As the department's Tommy Tucker admitted, 
'reaction from posts is the only effective market research we have.'5  Next to nothing was 
forthcoming from CO posts in Africa in 1956.  Partly this was due to the lack of IRD's usual 
source of information: at this time there were only two IOs in colonial territories in Africa, and 
only one – an ex-IRD man – to whom the department looked with any enthusiasm.6  With a 
resistant administration, and an absence of IOs and their networks of personal contacts, IRD's 
                                                
4 'Circular reviewing distribution of I.R.D. material to Foreign Office departments', H V W Staff, January 27, 1956, 
TNA FO 1110/8708PR10111/13/G. 
5 H H Tucker (IRD) to D Roberts (Dakar), June 13, 1960, TNA FO 1110/1303/PR1069/5. 
6 Minute, Hugh Cortazzi, May 31, 1956, FO 1110/958/PR10109/55. 
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options were limited.  Information could not simply be sent to journalists or news offices.  
Notwithstanding the security implications of forwarding information direct, the recipient editor 
was hardly likely to print or handle something that had come from an anonymous source.7 
Though their numbers, and their freedom to operate, expanded over the next few years, 
IOs in Africa operated on a very uneven playing field, as British officials, writing in 1961, 
appreciated: 
The effectiveness of Information Services must depend to a large extent on the 
acceptability of the policies which they promulgate and defend, and Information 
Officers are likely to be inhibited, in varying degrees according to the country in 
which they are operating, by the need to explain and justify to the public certain 
positions which are liable to be unpopular.  In view of the very different stages of 
advancement reached by the various countries in Africa, attention has to be paid 
also to differences in timing, so that policies warmly advocated in one part of 
Africa must be more cautiously upheld in others.8 
Comparatively poorly educated, the concerns of the majority of Africans were with 
Africa first and foremost.  The Cold War was not at this point of significance outside of 
intellectual circles, and casting any propaganda in the wrong light would only seek to alienate 
populations for whom different priorities mattered far more.  A British paper on information 
policy in Africa argued that: 'Both on the international scene and in our individual dealings with 
them, we must make it clear that we approach the peoples of Africa as friends and equals and in 
no spirit of superiority or condescension; that our partnership with them is important in itself 
and not merely a weapon in the Cold War'.  A failure to manage this distinction was seen by 
certain British analysts to be a fundamental 'defect' in America's information strategy.9  Africa 
was geographically removed from the Soviet Union, thus shorn of the proximity that lent a 
certain context to anti-Communist propaganda directed at Middle Eastern nations.  Portraying 
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the 'threat' from Communism to Africa in the same terms would arguably add weight to the 
belief that the Cold War was someone else's problem. 
These issues were of serious cause for concern in territories either heading for or 
achieving independence. It is perhaps stating the obvious to point out that IRD's work was 
shaped by British policy in Africa, but also in a wider, global context.  There was perhaps a 
tension between how the FO and CO interpreted or validated aspects of this policy, yet there 
was harmony in the overarching aims.  Information Officers in East Africa saw that policy in so-
called 'emergent nations' thus, and the same applies for the west of the continent: 
All post-war U.K. thinking on information policy has accepted as a major 
premise that "information" has no validity in its own right but 
reflects…Government policies.  If this has nowhere been explicitly stated, it is 
implicit in the structure of the government information services…the long-term 
purposes of the U.K. information effort in East Africa are the same as those of 
Government policies: 
(a) To keep East Africa in the Western and out of the Communist camp; 
(b) To encourage the new governments to continue to look to Britain for moral 
and material support; 
(c) To maintain and expand markets for British goods.10 
IRD, and the other practitioners of British information and intelligence work, 
concentrated their limited resources in Africa on elites.11  The audience for British propaganda 
and information work in in the continent was divided by IRD into 3 categories: leaders, the 'up-
and-coming [é]volués',12 and the masses.  The first group were the responsibility of diplomatic 
representatives and their staffs, the second of information officers, and the last group were 
                                                
10 This is the original wording.  Pencil notes amalgamate (a) and (b) to read '(a) to encourage the new governments 
to continue to look to Britain for moral and material support, and to keep them out of the Communist camp;', 
'Information Officers' Conference, Nairobi, 1961.  'Information Work in Emergent African Countries.'  Note by 
British Information Services, Kenya.', TNA FO 1110/ 1578/PR10585/3. 
11 MI5 trained special branches in colonial territories; M16 trod a complementary path in other territories.  Both 
targeted elite opinion and relationships where possible. Aldrich, Hidden Hand, p. 603. 
12 The term évolué (literally 'evolved') was used in a broad sense to describe Africans who had adopted European 
language, behaviour, norms, etc., particularly as part of the French drive to assimilate colonial Africans into their 
citizenry. 
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considered far less important, except with regards to trade unions, for example.13  American 
propaganda also prioritised local elites over the wider population, termed 'leadership groups' by 
the USIA.14  USIA, it is worth noting, eschewed mass propaganda, focussing on students, 
intellectuals, educators and the military – much as IRD did – but also paralleled the British 
Council in providing English-language education.  US policy was undoubtedly complicated by 
the colonial situation.  As Kenneth Osgood has written, '[n]owhere were the pitfalls of 
promoting an anticolonial message while supporting a colonial power more evident than North 
Africa.' This contradictive position would bedevil American propaganda policy and actions 
across the continent.  America was forced to thread its policy between African suspicion of the 
USA's support of colonialism, and European suspicion of American support for nationalist 
movements.  The key for American planners was to ensure that nationalism did not turn to 
extremism or Communism for its realisation, and to do so without alienating their Western 
allies.15  Up to 1960, US policy towards sub-Saharan Africa was built around denial of the region 
to Communist control, 'orderly political evolution', and the continued provision of African 
supply and markets to Western Europe.  It was acknowledged that the tension between 
nationalism and colonialism was the most significant issue in the region.  As a US National 
Security Council report noted, '[o]ur policies in any field will be of little or no value if we ignore 
this issue.  The problem is enormously complicated and no pat answers are possible.'16 
IRD recognised 1956 as a tipping point for Communist interest in Africa.  There were, 
the department believed, three pillars of soviet expansionism: economic, political and intellectual.  
The Soviet economic offensive was now in IRD's opinion 'being carried out on such a scale that 
they cannot be ignored any longer…The Soviet move into some strategically situated under-
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developed countries is all the more significant as it is clearly the result of a revision of policy'.  
Increased extension of credit, 'trade-for-aid' programmes, technical assistance and bilateral trade 
were motivated by politics, not economics.  In the case of Egypt, even if Nasser remained tough 
on domestic Egyptian Communism, trade links provided ample propaganda benefit to the 
Soviets.  On a more straightforward political front, IRD saw the Soviets also increasingly 
targeting personalities over parties in Africa – the department agreed that 'leaders rather than 
creeds' would prove a more effective influence – and the provision of training, education and 
support to African nationals was increasing to support this.  Across Africa, as colonies moved 
towards independence, there were opportunities for increased diplomatic representation and 
support of growing trade unions.  Alongside the education of African nationals there was a 
concerted move to generate a discipline of African studies in Soviet academia, and so co-opt the 
narrative of African history within a Marxist context.  This revisionist history would be 
positioned against the opposing Western narrative of colonialism and occupation in the contest 
for the alignment of newly independent states across the continent.17 
The general FO view of the matter was one of concern, and very much in line with that 
of IRD.  The FO reported that the CIA believed that Russia and her satellites were increasingly 
laying the foundations for a penetration of Africa, but the agency was 'short of direct evidence'.  
The FO too lacked anything like a smoking gun, and this proved problematic in efforts to 
convince the CO, who believed they had the right assessment of the situation.18  From a likely 
combination of truculent defence of interests considered their sole purview, especially in the 
climate of decolonisation, and a degree of inexperience in dealing with a fully-fledged 
Communist propaganda and cultural campaign, the CO stood alone in their analysis. 
                                                
17 'African Studies in the USSR'; 'Communist Organisations and Communist Parties in Africa (Independent 
Territories and Foreign Colonial Territories)'; 'Economic Penetration: An Analysis of Soviet Economic Diplomacy 
(in Particular in Underdeveloped Countries)'; enclosures with L C W Figg (FO) to W T A Cox (CO), August 16, 
1956, TNA CO 1035/17/ISD61/01. 
18 The Interpreter, February 1956; 'Soviet Penetration of Africa', February 1956;, enclosure with H A H Cortazzi 
(IRD) to W T A Cox (CO), February 9, 1956; J H A Watson (FO) to C Y A Carstairs (CO), March 23, 1956; Sir 
Patrick Dean (FO) to C Y Carstairs (CO), June 28, 1956; TNA CO 1035/17/ISD61/01. 
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The efforts and involvement noted above make it clear that broadcasting constituted a 
major investment from all sides of the Cold War.  Beyond Soviet efforts, Chinese, domestic 
African and Egyptian broadcasts also presented a danger to Western interests.  Prior to 1961, 
Egyptian broadcasting directed at the countries of North and West Africa, and particularly to the 
nearby nations of the North East, was of greater concern to the West than that from Communist 
nations.  A US regional conference on Africa, held in Nicosia in August 1961, concluded that 
[w]hile the countries concerned, many with authoritarian regimes and most with 
low standards of living, were admittedly highly vulnerable to Communist 
penetration, the consensus of the ambassadors was that the bloc had not 
registered significant success. The danger was an increasing one, however. The 
ambassadors from the countries surrounding the UAR (Sudan, Libya, and 
Somalia in particular) felt that Egyptian propaganda at the present time was more 
effective and therefore more dangerous to the West than that from the 
Communists.19 
Communist cultural and information work in Africa was multi-faceted. It had to be: the 
cultural penetration of Africa that the French and British had achieved via colonialism – a 
positive as well as a considerable negative – had no equal for the Communists, and so a 
concerted cultural drive was necessary.  From 1956 the USSR and China stepped up their (largely 
independent) involvement in the continent markedly.  It was also something that on the Soviet 
side was often executed by proxy, through the cultural and information programmes of East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 
In 1956 Mao declared China's support for 'all the national and independent liberation 
movements not only in Asia but also in Africa and Latin America.'20  That year, Chinese radio 
broadcasts to Africa began at a modest 7 hours per week, to Egypt and Central Africa.  After a 
brief hiatus in 1958, these resumed in 1959, and their reach expanded into East, West and South 
Africa.  By 1961, broadcasting in English, French, Arabic and Portuguese, Radio Peking's output 
                                                
19 Memorandum, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Fredericks) to Secretary of State Rusk, 
August 11, 1961, FRUS XXI (1961-63), Document 2, p. 4. 
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had swelled to 105 hours a week, by this point equalling total Soviet output of 102 hours.21  It is 
clear from these figures why IRD appreciated that China posed such an equivalent threat to 
Africa as that of the Soviet Union. 
Broadcasting was an easy and effective way to reach into Africa, but would not carry the 
propaganda battle by itself.  By the end of 1957, the Soviets had embarked on a programme of 
aid to under-developed nations, including those in Africa, encompassing both technical and 
economic assistance.  As part of a joint US/UK working group, IRD and the USIA worked to 
expose for propaganda purposes instances where this aid had proven problematic for the 
receiving country.  Dr Werner Klatt, IRD's economic advisor, noted that the Soviet Union was 
only preparing the ground for 'economic and political penetration' into Africa.  Any issues were 
therefore rare, and at that stage any examples were often obtained from such sources as made 
their use for propaganda purposes impractical, or impossible (intelligence assets, for example).  
The USSR had only recently, and for the first time, achieved a surplus of industrial goods that 
could be traded to developing countries.  This industrial growth fed demand for raw materials, in 
which developing countries in Africa often found themselves in surplus.  The trade born of this 
situation was likely to increase and diversify, involving such ancillary sectors as processing, 
banking and insurance.  'In all these fields', noted Klatt, 'the Soviet Union is as inexperienced as 
its partners, and cases of disappointments are therefore likely to multiply for some time to come.'  
Klatt caveated that the Soviets had proven to be fast learners in other spheres, however.  Ralph 
Murray's advice was that both Britain and America should 'be careful not to overstate Soviet 
deficiencies but aim unobtrusively and indirectly to put about the news of the established failures 
of which we obtain reasonable evidence; in fact we regard this as a job for which it would 
perhaps be better to use C.I.A. and I.R.D. channels rather than officially issued material.'22  In 
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contrast, China's aid and trade with Africa was limited by her commercial infrastructure, 
geographical remoteness and comparatively limited economic development.23 
IRD kept a 'memorandum in general terms' regarding the above, kept under constant 
review, which was from 1958 made available to the Americans.  IRD offered the – perhaps 
obvious – assessment that the Soviet 'bloc's trade with underdeveloped countries has by no 
means been dictated by commercial considerations only.  Political motives have been strong if 
not overriding.'  The timing of trade links, and the selection of partners, all supported this 
conclusion.24   
In 1950, China did not merit 'desk' rank at IRD, and was considered only as part of the 
South/South East Asia and Far East region, which – perhaps surprisingly - was at that time the 
responsibility of just one officer.  A decade later, with the department 'only too aware of the 
effectiveness of the appeal of Chinese Communism to the uncommitted and underdeveloped 
areas, especially…Africa', the China desk was in full swing.  During the 1950s, IRD noted, the 
Chinese had achieved a great deal towards industrialising, educating and uniting the country.  
These efforts and achievements would, it was believed, have great appeal by example to the 
developing nations of Africa.  By late 1960, the growing rift between China and the Soviet Union 
meant that China, and the threat from Chinese Communism, increasingly became an issue to be 
addressed separately from the Soviet threat.  J V Riley (the IRD officer responsible for the 
'Transmission 'X'' news commentary service during its early stages) summed the situation up: 
IRD 'should train effective fire on Communist Chinese infiltration into Africa.  In fact', he 
asserted, 'we have already begun to do so although we have suffered so far from inadequate 
                                                                                                                                                  
are mentioned together in such a way certainly speaks to the view that IRD work often stepped beyond the 
boundaries of information work. 
23 Prybyla, "Communist", p. 1136. 
24 Ralph Murray to W Barker (Washington), January 7, 1958; 'Difficulties and Disappointments encountered in 
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(though accumulating)…knowledge, and the development of variety of weapons and muzzle 
velocities in the barrage [sic].'25 
The head of the China Desk at IRD outlined two further difficulties in addressing 
Chinese cultural propaganda.  Firstly, the Chinese invited as many representatives as they could 
from developing countries to view their achievements first-hand.  The effect on an African 
visitor must be 'staggering' he thought – and it probably was.  Secondly, the precarious status of 
the British mission in China, complicated by continued British relations with Taipei and a 
delicate relationship with China at the UN, meant that the department was 'forced to be 
exceedingly careful in the nature of our propaganda on China and Chinese Communism.'  With 
these restrictions in place, the main thrust of IRD's counter to Chinese propaganda was to 
expose as much as possible the 'human costs' to the Chinese under Communism, and to link this 
to the inexperience, short-sightedness and authoritarianism of the regime.  By the end of 1960 
IRD were looking to increase the amount and topicality of output on China for Africa.26  
Contemporary academic analysis noted that 'China's strident denunciations of "imperialism" find 
a ready response in many African countries as does her appeal to Africa's quest for cultural 
identity.'  'China's forte', it was noted, was 'her revolutionary theory, and the zeal with which it is 
preached tends to make the Russians look in African eyes like incipient bourgeois.'27 
 
BBC Monitoring 
Given that all sides invested heavily in broadcasting to Africa, IRD needed a way to keep track of 
as much of it as they could so that they could adequately respond.  The BBC had a highly 
significant role to play, both as supplier and consumer/transmitter of information.  Whilst 
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attempting to build contacts and operations in Africa, IRD were largely forced to make do with 
the CO's monthly Colonial Intelligence Summary as the major source of information and 
intelligence for the department, and this was less than satisfactory, as noted below.  To 
supplement the summary, IRD had to rely on 'British periodicals, the journals of the 
[Communist] front organisations and monitoring summaries'.28 
In Africa, the monitoring situation was far less favourable than in it was in the Middle 
East.  Across both regions, a BBC survey concluded that the official Arabic broadcasts of the 
major regional players – Moscow, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan – were reasonably well 
covered, as were a number of clandestine broadcasts.  Less well covered were the broadcasts of 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Morocco and Tunisia.  Those of the Sudan, Libya, the Gulf States and 
Albania, Communist China, and Eastern European broadcasts from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia 
and East Germany were not monitored at all. Regarding broadcasts into Africa, there was a 
particular cause for concern, with Cairo-based broadcasts in Swahili and the Voice of Free Africa in 
Swahili inadequately covered, and Cairo broadcasts in Somali, Amharic and Sudanese dialects, 
and all African stations of interest not monitored.29 
To address this issue, staffing levels at the BBC's monitoring service at Caversham were 
increased in 1958 by the addition of three Arabs and one part-time Somali.  This was only 
intended as a stop-gap solution, and the BBC's J G T Sheringham and a team from BBC 
monitoring set out for Africa to survey for a site on which to erect a supplementary monitoring 
station to fill in the gaps in Caversham's coverage.30  All of the East African territories that were 
surveyed were keen to construct a monitoring station within their borders – all the better to get a 
quick line on broadcasts to their region.  It was in Kenya that the final go-ahead was given for 
                                                
28 Hugh Cortazzi, Minute, February 20, 1956, TNA FO 1110/956/PR10109/22/G. 
29 J T G Sheringham (BBC) report  (JTGS/SMV), August 14, 1958, in response to questions posed by S J L Oliver 
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construction of the receiving station at Karen, near Nairobi, in December 1959.31  It should be 
noted that IRD's relationship with BBC monitoring cut both ways, and IRD would alert the 
service of possible trends to be aware of, as well as simply receiving their take.32 
The local monitoring service in Africa was a vital source of material for IRD, local IOs 
and other organisations, but later developed another use, built on the neutrality and veracity both 
of the BBC and of the nature of monitoring as a service.  The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation 
received 'a courtesy copy of the local service direct'.  In 1963, preliminary efforts were made to 
provide the same service to Kenya's Special Branch – and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 
all three cases this was with a view to independence and the continuation of these institutions 
under post-colonial governance.  'Africans are more likely to accept the indisputable black-and-
white of monitoring than any unattributed brief from a Western political service', wrote the BIS 
in Kenya, 'and if we could accustom the trainees [of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] to make 
proper research use of the complete service between now and independence, there is a good 
chance after independence they would not only accept, but expect, the service…[providing] at 
least one link between them and the High Commission.'33 
The BBC would also be used to research for IRD in other ways.  Walter Kolarz, Head of 
the BBC Central Research Unit, was despatched by the corporation to North and West Africa in 
April 1961 to study African nationalism.  His aim was to 'try to find out as much as possible 
about the ideological content of the principle political movements in the countries which I am 
visiting, and also something about the organisational structure of the leading parties' as well as a 
few side projects.  Bearing in mind his tour was arranged by, for, and financed by the BBC, the 
fact that he contacted Hugh Carless of IRD to make the arrangements for contact with local 
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embassies, and presented IRD with a comprehensive report on his findings (of some 40 pages), 
clearly illustrates the close links – if not a degree of integration – between the BBC and IRD.34 
The BBC could also be used as cover. In 1961, IRD worked hard to insinuate a 
representative into Mali Radio.  The idea was to fund a visit by Evelyn Gibbs, a French-speaker 
with considerable broadcasting experience, to Mali for a fortnight, under the auspices of the 
BBC.  Ostensibly, she was there to collect material for the corporation.  Her real objective, 
however, was to try and obtain a contract as a technical advisor with Radio Mali.  She was to 
'exercise a constructive influence in a sphere…the Communists are trying to control.'  This was, 
as the department appreciated, a 'long shot'.  Despite considerable efforts over 8 months, with 
arrangements made for funds to be rerouted through a front organisation, and the co-option of 
the BBC in the initial effort, the position with Mali Radio never emerged.  This was not the only 
such attempt.  There were concurrent efforts to subsidise Swiss journalists to set up a Mali Press 
Agency, but the records of this remain closed.35 
The IRD-BBC relationship was not all encompassing, and IRD had no direct access to, 
or contact with, the BBC's General Overseas Service (GOS), which covered all of English-
speaking Africa and much of Francophone Africa.  The GOS addressed itself to territories that 
fell under the jurisdiction of either the CO or the CRO – neither of whose information sections 
had access to the GOS, whether through omission or precedent.  Roberts of IRD was keen to 
get IRD material into a service that covered the majority of the population of sub-Saharan 
Africa.  There is a sense of Roberts' feelings on the matter when he describes the 'content of the 
G.O.S. programmes…[as] still designed for nostalgic expatriates of slightly lower than average 
intelligence.'  Roberts conceded that such émigrés were 'as much entitled to a radio programme 
as anybody else', but given the weight of resources the Communists were directing on Africa, it 
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was worth debating whether IRD should perhaps 'seek to inject at least some of our thinking on 
African political and economic matters into the General Overseas Service.'36 
 
Colonialism and the Colonial Office 
With no comparable department within the CO to the FO's IRD, up to 1956 the CO had drawn 
such material as it required from the department.  However, the CO believed that IRD had 
consistently pushed for increased use of their material to an extent that was quite inappropriate.  
It was, complained Carstairs of the CO,  
no business of theirs, since we and not the Foreign Office are responsible for 
counter-communist policy and its execution in respect of the Colonies: but I.R.D. 
conceive themselves as in some sense the keeper of H.M.G's conscience in the 
matter and have never taken kindly the [CO's] doctrine…We cannot allow either 
that the Foreign Office should be determinants of our counter-Communist 
activities…or that the extent and efficacy of our counter-Communist efforts are 
to be simply measured by the amount of I.R.D. material that we manage to 
dispose of.' 37 
Paralleling the push into Africa by the Communist powers, IRD made plain their desire 
for direct involvement in countering this move.  The department laid out to the CO their 
assessments noted earlier.  There were differences of opinion within the Colonial Office as to 
how seriously to view IRD's pronouncements.  The negative extreme was exemplified by the 
CO's Dixon Barton, who saw no evidence of the 'new Soviet drive on Africa' announced by 
IRD, and wanted to see the evidence on which IRD was basing its analysis.  Barton's view of the 
department was hardly complimentary; this was, to him, another chapter in what appears to have 
been a contretemps of some long standing.  Barton reported that there had been difficulties '[a] 
year or two ago…with that department of the Foreign Office which literally saw a Communist 
behind every gooseberry bush, and the paper now sent to us is another instance of crying "wolf". 
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(Indeed, I regard it as perilously near a fake).'  Barton did not believe that he was being 
complacent: for him, the evidence was that in 1955 there was a reduction in the threat from 
Communism in Britain's African colonies, and the evidence deployed by IRD was simply a 
misreading of perfectly understandable and regular diplomatic moves by the Soviets.  It was only 
after considerable insistence by both the FO and the JIC that Barton was prepared to contact 
posts regarding their concerns.38  
The Foreign Office had raised Colonial Office hackles by discussing the matter, on a 
consensus arrived at by the FO/JIC, and without CO consultation, with the governments of the 
other African colonial powers and with the US.  Chafing at possible departmental 
'embarrassment', convinced that the JIC – who broadly agreed with IRD – could not see the 
issue in 'a detached and rational way', and frustrated with the FO's analysis and actions, N D 
Watson of the CO saw that the department needed 'to put our foot down quite flatly on all this 
nonsense'.  The CO should warn colonial governors to keep their eyes open, and consider that a 
wholly sufficient stance to take.39  The CO subsequently met with the FO, MI5 and MI6, and a 
combined decision was made to draft a memorandum restating Communist doctrine, detailing 
the changes in techniques and methods of Communist expansion and subversion, explaining the 
establishment of a Communist 'bridgehead' on the continent in North Africa and the Congo, and 
exploring how the Communist effort was likely to intensify.  This was a moderate concession 
however.  It should be noted that this did not tie the CO or colonial governments to taking any 
action.  C Y Carstairs, the CO representative at the meeting believed that there had been 'little 
concrete evidence to support the Foreign Office thesis of a new drive on Africa'.40 
IRD had much more success in achieving a meeting of minds over the threat from Cairo. 
IRD work had been seen already by the CO as 'very valuable' in tracking the Indian 
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government's activities towards British colonial territories.  As early as 1954 the CO had decided 
that IRD should open a file on Egyptian influence in Colonial territories, and that it was 
'essential that all the depts. concerned should keep IRD informed of every gobbet of information 
that comes their way.'41  It was the Communist threat that was the source of the tension between 
the CO and IRD. 
 In 1956, IRD's efforts to involve the CO in counter-Communist work, and requests for 
information and intelligence, had been met with the bureaucratic equivalent of a blank stare.  
The CO had its own Information Department, and its head, W T A Cox, had clear views on 
IRD's anti-Communist work.  The populations of the Colonies, he believed, had little interest in 
Communism, or in free material on the subject.  It would be, he asserted, 'practically impossible' 
to get material published. Cox resisted IRD on a practical level, too.  He argued that the CO did 
not have the resources to produce intelligence for IRD, or monitor to what use, if any, the 
department's material was put.  IRD's editorial advisor was moved to conclude that 
…what Mr Cox says confirms what we have long believed, but without definite 
evidence: the Colonial Office, or at any rate such reaches of it as Mr. Cox 
penetrates, has no intention of carrying on anti-Communist work; few facilities 
for doing it if it wanted to; and little intention of creating any.  It therefore seems 
to me that the Foreign Office has either to tackle the matter at a much higher 
level, or abandon any attempt to do substantial and effective anti-Communist 
work in the Colonies.42 
 
Hugh Cortazzi concluded, not unsurprisingly, that given 'the increasing Soviet emphasis on the 
anti-Colonial theme', the editorial team's conclusions were 'disturbing.'43 
In February 1956, Douglas Dodds-Parker, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs at the FO, wrote to David (Lord) Lloyd, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, to 
urge him to consider further use of IRD material.  Dodds-Parker stressed that the effect of IRD 
                                                
41 Minute, June 25, 1954; Minute, September 7, 1954; TNA CO 1035/20/S811 (signatures unclear). 
42 Secret Minute, Editorial Advisor (IRD) to Hugh Cortazzi, March 5, 1956, TNA FO 1110/956/PR1019/31. 
43 Secret Minute ' I.R.D. Material and the Colonies', Hugh Cortazzi (IRD), March 7, 1956, TNA FO 
1110/956/PR10109/31. 
115 
 
material abroad would be enhanced if it was supported by a similar campaign across the 
Colonies, and noted the Prime Minister's particular emphasis on the utility of counter-subversion 
measures in less developed countries.   There was a need to get a comprehensive strategy in place 
before independence was granted.44  This final point was essentially the policy that informed 
IRD work in pre-independence nations.  Lloyd replied that much IRD material was already used 
and that in his opinion current arrangements between the CO and IRD were satisfactory. IRD 
material was distributed where and when the CO deemed it appropriate, Lloyd said, but the 
department's material was 'naturally not often aligned to the situation which presents itself in 
individual territories.'  Norman Reddaway found this response 'exculpatory'; Lloyd's letter would 
have been encouraging 'if the picture it paints of cooperation between the Colonial Office and 
the Foreign Office in the field of anti-Communist propaganda squared with the facts…their 
attitude remains both dilatory and complacent.'  It was in his view hardly surprising that IRD 
material failed to align with the needs of CO posts, when they were so unwilling to share 
intelligence or engage with the perceived Communist threat.  It was Reddaway's opinion that 
Ministerial action would be needed to improve the situation.45 
Information work cuts both ways, and CO constraints meant that IRD were forced to 
rely on the CO's monthly Colonial Intelligence Summary as their main source of information.  
'The more I read of these reports the more I am impressed by their inadequacy', noted Cortazzi, 
drily.  Extending over 26 pages by the time Cortazzi made this observation, the report was only 
of limited interest to IRD.  As if to illustrate its inadequacy, one piece contained within was in 
fact drawn from IRD's own information material.46   
The CO was even obstructive towards projects they appeared to sanction, as the 
protracted process of approving IRD's Handbook on Communism makes clear.  IRD, with the CO's 
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agreement, worked to produce the handbook for distribution to officials in colonial 
governments, and submitted the final draft for approval on February 4, 1955.  The CO returned 
this draft 'with a request for further amendments' over ten months later, on December 22.  IRD 
resubmitted the handbook on January 24, 1956.  It was not until after a further ten months, on 
October 1956, that the draft was accepted, some 20 months after its original submission.47 
Having only two information officers in Africa as of mid-1956 – and Colonial Office 
ones to boot – was a constraint on IRD.  Of the two, McMillan, based in the Gold Coast, had by 
this point produced only one report, and that, in the view of IRD, was 'disappointing to say the 
least'.  Colin MacLaren, the IO in Nigeria, was ex-IRD – one of two contracted officers that 
made up the editorial section in the late 1940s48 – and accordingly held in much higher esteem.  
MacLaren was 'doing well', but suffered from a paucity of local information from which to draw 
– and a dearth of British sourced information on Communism in Nigeria.  This latter fact 
Cortazzi found 'really astounding.'  MacLaren used the majority of IRD material to inform the 
local information office – he did not believe it was suitable for distribution.  To clarify the point 
here, MacLaren was largely on IRD's side, and so there was clearly some issue with the material 
he was being sent.  Where MacLaren disagreed with the general CO line was over whether any 
threat existed at all.  Even so, MacLaren believed Communism was a future, rather than current, 
danger.  Cortazzi saw this as underplaying the facts.49  MacLaren's views were much more 
positive than some at the CO, however.  The CO's Barton was unequivocal: 'I wonder whether 
there are in Nigeria 300 Communists in the 32 million population.'  Barton feared that 
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MacLaren's assessment of the Communist threat in Nigeria would 'lead to a logomachy with the 
IRD' and that his view was 'not authoritative.'50 
By mid-1956, requests for intelligence and specimen propaganda continued to elicit 'an 
almost complete lack of interest' from the CO.  The CO refused to let its Public Relations 
Officers (who performed work analogous to IOs) become involved in anti-Communist work,51 
and the department obstructed the work of MacLaren and McMillan.  Both IOs stressed the 
need for up-to-date information, information that IRD were making available to the CO but that 
was still not being distributed to the IOs. IRD raised concerns at the lack of interest in anti-
Communist books reported by the CO; the IOs replied that there was plenty of interest.  Both 
stated that they 'reported in detail' their use of IRD material to the CO.  These reports did not 
make it back to IRD – and were reports that in any case the CO had not asked the IOs to make.    
Despite the CO's assertions to the contrary, it was the opinion of MacLaren in Nigeria that 
political immaturity and the delight of a dependent people in seeing the British countered left the 
country open to the influence of Communist propaganda.  In the Gold Coast, McMillan saw the 
pre-independence situation in the country as the 'calm before the storm'.52 
In spite of the above, MacLaren at least began to make headway.  By October 1956 he 
was forwarding such IRD material as had been provided through the CO to 'key chaps', with 
what seems a highly positive reception. He had also forwarded to select recipients a variety of 
Background books and imprintless booklets, and there had been 'a good response.'  IRD's book 
series had been sent, where the subject was departmentally relevant, to various regional and 
federal ministers.  School principals were also targeted, alongside editors and other opinion-
formers.  MacLaren broadcast a weekly 15-minute world-affairs commentary, which always 
contained at least one anti-Communist segment, and he was getting RIO and IRD material 
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placed in the printed news.  On a small scale, it was clear that MacLaren was pressing forward 
with IRD material through the department's traditional channels.53 
In Nigeria, and the Gold Coast before independence, IRD viewed its relationship with 
MacLaren and McMillan as 'fairly satisfactory'.  The same was not the case with the other 
colonial territories in Africa and the Middle East.  Some Colonial Governors, it was reported, 
held 'rather old fashioned pro-Consular ideals.'54  The relatively autonomous nature of many 
Colonial governments, tied to the PROs' responsibility to local governors or ministers, was a 
clear barrier to the acceptance, let alone distribution, of IRD material.  Some PROs were locally 
born, and so could not be trusted (on a security basis) with sensitive work.  The trick, then, was 
to get some additional, compliant, IOs in place.  This was unlikely to happen while Cox 
remained in charge of the CO's information department, and so it must have been with some 
relief that IRD greeted his departure as the year came to a close.   
By October 1956, Tucker in particular was convinced that further meetings with the CO 
would serve no purpose.55  But then the following month Cox was posted to Somaliland, and 
replaced by J W Stacpoole, with whom Cortazzi had been to school.  'I am sure there will be 
great improvements', declared Cortazzi,56 and his faith was well placed; Stacpoole was a breath of 
fresh air as far as IRD was concerned.  Interested in IRD work, and cooperative, Stacpoole 
arranged for all IRD material to be forwarded to IOs as soon as it was received – and 
(cautiously) distributed elsewhere. The gathering and supply of information to IRD was a 
function of the Political Departments of the CO, yet Stacpoole was at least able provide copies 
of Colonial newspapers and certain annual reports.  However, this fragmentation of 
responsibility, and the significant independence of Colonial Governments from the CO 
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continued to be issues, as did the attitude of local governors and PROs.57  There remained 
fundamental disagreements over method, too.  For example the CO and colonial governors 
would not accept any material that criticised British policy – something that IRD believed would 
lend balance to propaganda and thus help to win African confidence. 58   
In the East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Nyasaland, the resistance to 
publishing anti-Communist propaganda – on the basis that it may inform rather than warn – 
disappeared under Stacpoole, and anti-Communist articles were carried in local newspapers from 
that point.  In West African Nigeria, March 1957 was a 'record month' for the information 
office, with 100 articles published, of which 17 were anti-Communist in content.59  Cooperation 
with America was also increasing.  Whilst the USIA, Stacpoole reported, had 'acquired a 
reputation for insistent and unskilful anti-communist propaganda' in Nigeria, this meant British 
information work was welcomed as a useful 'counterweight' to that of the Americans.  Stacpoole 
was firm on the need for cooperation.  '[T]he hunger for reading matter and the curiosity of 
Nigerians about the outside world is increasing faster than we can hope to satisfy it with the 
resources which are likely to be available to us', he noted.  Coordinating resources with the 
Americans seemed the only way to meet such demand.60 
By mid-1957, though intelligence gathering remained an issue, the outlook for IRD was 
generally positive.  From this point IRD began to contribute to CO publications, provide more 
material through RIO Beirut to African territories, and to assist the CO in clearing and 
purchasing book rights.61 
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At the same time the CO outlined plans to create UK information posts in Tanganyika, 
Kenya and Uganda by the start of 1958, and several regions of Nigeria would receive posts 
within 2 years with MacLaren in a general supervisory role. 62  The first of these, Hugh Young, 
began work at the UKIO in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, in November 1957; he struck Cortazzi 
as 'both intelligent and keen.' 63  With more IOs in place, increased output on Africa was reliant 
on IRD streamlining their communications to the CO.  In Norman Reddaway's words, IRD 
output would 'not be very topical if we have to rely on the forgetful charity of four different 
departments of the Foreign Office'.  However, use of the Foreign Office's Permanent Under-
Secretary's Department as a point of contact was seen as workable.64 
By August 1957, the CO was sending copies of all relevant CO printed material to 
Rennie at IRD.  By October, Stacpoole was forwarding copies of inward and outward telegrams 
he thought would be of interest.65  By January 1958, IRD's relationship with Stacpoole was 
considered to be sufficiently strong that the department could rely on him 'to do what he can for 
our material.'  However, the situation was not wholly resolved in IRD's favour going forward.  
There remained in the CO the prevalent view that dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda 
might arouse interest in Communism.  This was, to Cortazzi and IRD 
a dangerous misconception.  In Colonial territories discontented intellectuals, for 
instance, even though unsympathetic to Communism may well become tools of 
the Communists without even realising the fact.  To deal with this kind of 
situation the earliest possible education in the realities of international affairs is 
essential.  We have frequently stressed this point to the Colonial Office but we 
have had little success in getting it accepted.66 
IRD began pressing for direct involvement in Africa from the beginning of 1956.  It was 
not until the replacement of Cox by Stacpoole at the end of that year that there was any sign that 
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they would get their way – even the involvement of one of the FO's parliamentary under-
secretaries, Dodds-Parker, had not elicited any shift in CO policy.  It was not until early 1957 
that significant progress was made in the volume of IRD material being used by CO posts, not 
until the end of 1957 that the number of IOs began to increase, not until 1958 that IRD began 
to be wholly satisfied with the cooperation they received.  Given that the British enjoyed an 
unparalleled position in Colonial nations by default, CO resistance meant that IRD could not 
leverage that position to gain an early advantage over the Communists.  It is impossible to be 
certain whether this had any long-term implications, but it seems reasonable to draw the 
conclusion that at some level it did.  IRD's increasing agitation with the situation illustrates that 
they at least were convinced they could have turned in profitable work during this period.  Given 
the limited timescale IRD were operating on during this stage of their campaign – preparing the 
ground before independence – the delay of almost two years constitutes a significant portion of 
the time available to achieve the department's aims. 
 
Egypt in Africa 
In the climate of the Cold War and Europe's withdrawal from empire, the role of the Arabs in 
Africa had, in a certain sense, turned full-circle.   Just as culpable as Western states in the African 
slave trade, by the 1950s and 1960s they were thrown into stark contrast with the nations of the 
West, recast as supporters and enablers of African liberation, independence and unity.  
European, Christian influence had somewhat checked the spread of Islam in East Africa; in the 
West, it spread much more widely.  Arabic language, too, heavily influenced the most 
widespread, non-European languages of Swahili and Hausa.67 
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Trade and religion guaranteed Arab involvement in Africa.  Egypt, so dependent on the 
Nile throughout its history, focussed herself primarily on the Sudan – the river's source – until 
Sudanese independence in 1956.  This in any case drove Egyptian interest down into the African 
continent nearly to the equator.  Freed from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, under which it 
had been co-administered since the turn of the century, Sudan retained its strategic importance in 
developing Egyptian strategy, which saw in Africa a direct correlation between decreasing 
Western influence and increased Egyptian security.68  'The Nile is the artery of life of our 
country', wrote Nasser.  '[Sudan's] boundaries extend deep into Africa…We cannot stand aside 
in face of what is taking place in Africa on the assumption that it does not concern or affect us.'69   
Indeed, the centrality of the Nile to the fortunes of Egypt had been recognised by the 
British during the Suez Crisis. Scant 'black' radio broadcasts on 25 September 1956 observed that 
if Britain set aside Egypt's rights to the waters of the Nile, assured under international agreement, 
Egyptian cotton – and food – crops would fail, leaving Egypt 'ruined' and her people starved.70 
The British flirted briefly with the idea of leveraging the 'hydropolitical' potential of the river to 
bolster the British position vis-à-vis the canal, by diverting or reducing the river's flow through 
Uganda (a British territory), or by increasing upstream usage in the Sudan.  These were both 
long-term plans that stalled in relative infancy once the interests of other Nile basin nations were 
fully taken into account, but were seriously considered by elements of both the FO and the 
CO.71   
As Western-Egyptian relations deteriorated, Egyptian strategists saw the African nations 
surrounding Sudan as 'bases of influence', as one historian has put it, from which to bring 
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pressure against Western colonial interests.72  Simply put, if the Africans could eject the Western 
powers from Africa, good for them – but all to the good for Egypt, too.  Mohamed Heikal, 
editor of the Egyptian, Nasserite newspaper Al-Ahram, was convinced that the fate of Egypt was 
linked to that of the African nations moving towards independence.  Egypt 'should be associated 
with the anti-imperialist movement', he wrote.  'In Africa itself this existing and necessary 
association is not only a matter of principle but is a matter of security and protection.'  1955 and 
1956 would prove to be catalysts for Nasser's push for influence in Africa: the Bandung 
Conference of 1955 would inspire Nasser's role as a spokesman for African nationalism, 
Sudanese independence would provide the imperative for involvement, and Suez would grant 
Nasser the status to make his voice heard.73  'Nasser', contemporary comment noted, 'was quick 
to become Africa's herald of neutralism.'74 
In 1956 the Egyptians set up an African Affairs section within their Foreign Office, 
tasked with developing strategy for the continent.  African bureaus, each associated with the 
nationalist movements of individual African nations, were later created to foster nationalist, anti-
Western sentiment – in large part through their use of Cairo Radio facilities.  At the end of 1957, 
an African Association was established to coordinate the bureaus and develop relationships with 
nationalist movements that would continue past independence, with the hope of shaping the 
future direction of those nations.  These moves were paralleled by a political drive into Africa 
that saw Egyptian embassies in ten African states by 1960 (up from 2 in 1952); in 1965 this had 
grown to 22.75  A concerted effort to develop influence through education meant that, at a time 
when Egypt was limiting university places for its own citizens, their doors were thrown open to 
students from African nations.76 
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As Tareq Ismael has argued, the de facto alliance in foreign policy between the Soviet 
Union and Egypt allowed the former to offer support and aid to African nations on the back of 
Cairo's connections, and to involve itself directly in the continent.  Via the African Association, 
the Soviets could establish relationships with nationalist movements, and so provide aid, issue 
propaganda and offer scholarships.  Nasser could use the weight of Soviet support to 'give 
potency' to Egyptian African policy.77 
Nasser and the UAR courted African opinion on three fronts.  The first leveraged the 
concept of Pan-Africanism, fuelled by Cairo Radio rhetoric, which sought to locate Egypt within 
an African continent viewed as a whole, defined and united entity.  This paralleled views such as 
that of Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, who saw Algerians (for example) as fellow Africans.  The 
second played to concepts of Afro-Asianism, seeking again to foster links between the Arab 
Middle East and Africa.  Finally, UAR propaganda extolled the history of the struggle and 
successes of Egypt and the Arabs 'in the vanguard of anti-Imperialism in the Third World'.78  M 
Abdel-Kader Hatem, Egypt's information minister, sums the situation up well: 'President Nasser 
and the Egyptian People did all they could to foster the cause of African freedom, which was 
ably championed by the Egyptian information media.'79 
There were two distinct Afro-Asian influences on Africa.  The first was (in IRD's words) 
the 'relatively respectable neutralist Bandung philosophy, which manifests itself mainly through 
the activities of the "Afro-Asian Group" at the United Nations'.  The second, of almost infinitely 
more concern to IRD, was the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee (AAPSC).  The 
AAPSC was a vehicle for the UAR to extend its influence in Africa, both politically and 
culturally.  Its Permanent Secretariat was based in Cairo, and funded by both China and the 
Soviet Union as its anti-colonial stance and rhetoric served all sides equally.  Though in 1959 
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links between the AAPSC and the pan-Africanist movement were tenuous, IRD was concerned 
that the AAPSC would make 'persistent efforts to influence the development of pan-Africanism' 
and take advantage of the anti-Colonialist sentiment which was a genuine point of agreement 
between the two movements.  Cairo was a 'rallying point for African extremist politicians and 
exiles', and was widely believed to be 'a sounding-board for propaganda and political action in 
Africa'.  Fearing that the AAPSC would work to blur the distinction between Afro-Asian and 
pan-African movements, IRD argued that exposing the AAPSC for what it was whilst promoting 
those areas of pan-Africanism that did not harm the West was necessary to provide an effective 
counter.80 
IRD's conclusions regarding pan-Africanism were more thoughtful – it could not be 
prevented in any case, and was 'not basically hostile to the West, save on the colonial issue.'  
Britain and the other colonial powers would need to be as sympathetic as possible to the 
movement.  If pan-Africanism could be cultivated, it could provide 'an internal defence' against 
influence from both Communism and from Egypt; if the colonial powers failed to cultivate the 
movement and alienated it instead, it 'could become a vehicle for Soviet subversion instead of 
providing a barrier against it.'81  American information services also believed that one of the most 
effective tools against Communist penetration in Africa was development of a 'sense of national 
interest' amongst Africans.82  It goes without saying that this accommodation with the movement 
did not mean that the sustained rhetoric from Cairo did not need to be addressed. 
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Conclusion: The first years of IRD in Africa 
Though there was both Soviet and Chinese involvement in Cairo's domestic and foreign 
policy, and (as Tareq Ismael noted above) an apparent harmony in policy aims towards Africa, 
this was no cosy relationship, and in the propaganda sphere much depended on the UAR's aims 
at the time.  As historian Jacques Baulin wrote in 1962, '[p]raise and criticism of the U.S.S.R. 
have followed each other with bewildering suddenness ever since 1959.'83 
Indeed, by mid-1959 Nasser and Khrushchev's relationship had deteriorated markedly.  
Cracks had begun to appear with the division of support along nationalist and Communist lines 
in post-revolutionary Iraq.  One early source of tension was the refusal of Nasser to hand over to 
the Soviets documents liberated from the Baghdad Pact offices following the Iraqi revolution.  
Khrushchev had attacked Nasser during the Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party in 
January-February 1959 for a failure to appreciate the inevitable progression of Egyptian socialism 
towards Communism.  Regular public sniping between the two leaders preceded an exchange of 
letters beginning in April 1959 that brought things to a head.  Khrushchev condemned Nasser's 
interference in the affairs of the other Arab nations, and decried Egyptian nationalist rhetoric 
that argued against Soviet aid. Khrushchev offered to withdraw Soviet aid if it was no longer 
required.  For his part, Nasser argued that the disparate Communist parties across the Arab 
states were actively working against Arab nationalism, and so had to be countered, even if this 
meant Soviet approbation.84 
The issue of colonialism was such a potent theme to use against the British, that 
propaganda from both Communist and Arabic sources exploited it.  A broadcast from Radio 
Moscow in 1959 conflated every issue by asserting that, '[i]mperialism is not only military 
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conquest and economic enslavement, it is also strangulation of culture'.85  That the issue was so 
clearly divisive meant that Egypt, too, could make propaganda hay even to the benefit of the 
Communists: 
'Tell me, my dear listeners: the hardships, difficulties, oppression and distress we 
experience in our countries, who is causing them to us…Who are dominating 
East, Central, Western and South Africa…Who are oppressing, persecuting and 
killing the peoples of these parts of Africa, are they the Communists or the 
democratic States?'86 
 
Contrastingly, the British Consulate General in Somalia noted in 1959 'the strident cries 
emanating recently from Cairo Radio and Egyptian newsreels denouncing Communism', and 
with a degree of irony noted as a consequence that the Consulate found itself 'Egypt's 
collaborators in this matter'.87  Through Cairo Radio's semi-clandestine Voice of Free Africa, 
broadcast in Swahili, the distinction between imperialism and Communism often fell away (in, it 
has to be said, a mildly confusing fashion) to the point that both issues were dealt with hand-in-
hand, as in the following message, broadcast in 1961: 
What we hate is to see communism in East Africa.  We are against this in our 
countries.  If this happens, then the imperialists will have a very good chance to 
destroy us and all that we have been struggling for for many years… We should 
all unite to fight against the imperialists and stooges.  We should also fight against 
those who want to bring communism to our countries.  We don't want to be 
ruled by the pigs, the Americans, the British, the Belgians and others…We hate a 
government controlled by the stooges and don't want to be ruled by one.  We 
don't want to have a government which will serve the communists.  We want our 
countries to form good governments by and for Africans themselves.  We want 
to be free.88 
As Cairo Radio's reach spread across the Middle East and Africa, Egyptian, and later 
UAR, propaganda leveraged Islam and concepts of pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism and Afro-
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Asian solidarity deep into Africa, in an effort to erode both Western and Communist influence.  
Britain was unable to counter it in kind.  The ubiquity of Cairo Radio in North and East Africa 
meant it had to be addressed, despite the fact that British realpolitik required a rapid normalisation 
of relations with Nasser, and a hands-off policy towards UAR propaganda.  IRD was forced to 
adapt, and the result was the Transmission 'X' news commentary service detailed in the following 
chapter.  This proved so successful it would be adopted as IRD's foremost anti-Communist tool 
in Africa, once developed.  What Cairo propaganda espoused – ad nauseum – was anti-
colonialism, as did the Communist powers to what by sheer force of presence had to be a lesser 
extent.  What is surprising, then, is that IRD had to fight hard to bring the colonial 
administration on side to counter it. 
1956 was a significant year across the Middle East and Africa within the context of the 
Cold War.  The Soviet Union took a renewed interest in Africa, and Egypt, too, began culturally 
and politically to penetrate far deeper into the continent than before.  For IRD, 1956 was the 
year that the department expanded its remit to counter Arab nationalism, and IRD pushed hard 
against the Colonial Office for a direct role in the colonies.  A limited information infrastructure 
meant that IRD draw heavily on, and helped develop, the BBC's expanded monitoring service 
across Africa.  The following chapter will again consider the threat to British interests from Cairo 
Radio, this time in more detail, and examine IRD's use of the London Press Service, the utility of 
which provided the infrastructure and inspiration for the development of Transmission 'X'. 
As noted above, the recalcitrance of WTA Cox, even in the face of sustained and high-
level FO pressure, must have frittered away at least some of the advantage that IRD would have 
had over the department's Communist contemporaries, when conducting business in British 
Colonial territories with little history of Communist penetration.  One should be cautious of 
leveling such an accusation based largely on the evidence of the aggrieved party – IRD – yet it 
can be said with certainty that IRD saw Cox as the spoke in the wheel.  Once Stacpoole replaced 
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Cox, the situation improved immeasurably, but with enough resistance on the part of Stacpoole 
to suggest a genuine relationship rather than a capitulation. 
If one needed further convincing of the above, the contrast between colonial territories 
and the Congo may prove illustrative.  As far back as 1956, IRD already dispatched what could 
probably be termed their 'standard package' to the Belgian colony of the Congo – the Interpreter 
and Asian Analyst periodicals (both in French and English), the 'Background Books', Basic 
Papers and Booklets, 'Facts About' series, and the Digest.  In territories that were the sovereign 
possession of the British government, IRD was wholly blocked from operating by their 
colleagues in the Colonial Office89 
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Chapter Five 
Cairo Radio, IRD and the Transmission 'X' News 
Commentary Service. 
 
The Voice of the Arabs did not merely irritate: it intimidated1 
Peter Partner, Arab Voices 
 
This chapter will examine IRD's Transmission 'X' ('X') news commentary service.  Originally 
devised as a rebuttal service directed at Cairo Radio propaganda in the Middle East and Africa, 
the service quickly expanded across Africa and into Asia, and assumed an anti-Communist 
function.  The threat that the Voice of the Arabs presented to British interests in the Middle East 
has been covered in Chapter 2.  'X' is significant as it speaks to the flexibility IRD displayed post-
Suez, the responsiveness of IRD to the disparate needs of posts in both regions under study, and 
the combined approach IRD maintained towards combatting nationalism and Communism.  'X' 
confirms the connections between the regions of the Middle East and Africa, and clearly shows 
that IRD did not immediately turn away from engaging Arab nationalism in the aftermath of the 
Suez Crisis. 
Egyptian propaganda and influence, primarily via radio, expanded into Africa after Suez, 
and, as discussed in Chapter 4, IRD increasingly took a direct role in combatting both Egyptian 
and Communist propaganda across Africa.  By 1958, the Hill Committee's investigations into the 
information services had emphasised the need to address Cairo Radio propaganda, within the 
constraints of British policy seeking a rapprochement with Nasser.  IRD, then established in 
Africa alongside its role in the Middle East, was tasked with coming up with, if not a solution to, 
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then at least a means of limiting the effectiveness of, Cairo Radio broadcasting.  Ralph Murray 
believed there were two criteria to which any response had to adhere: 
a) It must be intrinsically clever and attractive enough to secure an audience and 
to be effective in countering hostile propaganda 
b) It must avoid prejudicing our relations, actual or potential, with Arab states in 
the area.2 
In Murray's opinion, these criteria were best met by an attempt to undermine 'the credibility of 
Cairo Radio and other hostile stations, rather than by attacking direct the governments and their 
policies.'3  IRD would largely restrain itself from attacking Egypt either overtly or unattributably, 
but the department would nonetheless continue to counter Egyptian polemic. 
The only other option, given policy constraints, was to jam Cairo Radio broadcasts, but 
this was no option at all.  Jamming – illegal in any case – was prohibitively expensive: by 1959, 
jamming the Voice of the Arabs, just within the confines of the Gulf and Aden, would have cost an 
estimated £800,000 a year to set up, and another £250,000 a year to run.  Any increase in Cairo 
Radio's broadcast strength would have needed to be met with a commensurate increase in the 
strength of jamming, and in expenditure.4  Pressure to instigate a rebuttal service of the sort 
Murray had in mind was already present in the region, particularly in Bahrain and Aden.  
However, there was some disagreement within the Information Services as to whether this was 
the right idea, and there were available alternatives:  Radio Aden was being built up by the 
Information Section in Bahrain in an effort to counter Voice of the Arabs broadcasts, and there 
were requests by both the Political Agency, and the Residency in Bahrain, relayed through IPD, 
for the BBC and Aden Radio to refute information carried on the Voice of the Arabs.  
                                                
2 Confidential Memo Ralph Murray to Sir Roger Stevens (Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office), 
December 2, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1097/PR1125/5. 
3 Confidential Memo Ralph Murray to Sir Roger Stevens (Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office), 
December 2, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1097/PR1125/5. 
4 Zanzibar Monitoring of Radio Cairo Kiswahili broadcasts for week ending 4 August 1956, enclosed in British 
Resident to Lennox-Boyd, 9 August 1956, FO 371/19223/E1433/82, cited in Brennan, "Poison and Dope: Radio 
and the art of political invective in East Africa, 1940-1965", p.30 
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The Foreign Office's Information Policy Department (IPD), and – almost inevitably – 
the Colonial Office, were unconvinced that a rebuttal service was workable.  The CO advocated 
that local needs proscribed a centralised service, arguing that '[t]he wisdom of rebuttal must 
depend on local circumstances; it would not do to draw attention to broadcasts from Cairo 
which would otherwise command few listeners'.  This was the stock argument of the CO, as we 
have seen previously, and not one to which IRD attached much merit.  The CO was alive to the 
benefit of better monitoring of foreign broadcasts, but not to rebuttal.5  IPD objected from a 
technical standpoint, and believed in any case that the style and substance of Cairo Radio's 
broadcasts meant that the station would soon discredit itself without any outside interference.  
Any attempt to engage directly with the Voice of the Arabs would, asserted IPD, involve 'a running 
propaganda battle in which Cairo would always have the initiative.  Our denials coming at least 
several days after the original rumour could hardly fail to sound feeble and unconvincing and 
would probably do more harm than good.'  There would also need to be enough material 
produced to support an extended campaign, as in IPD's opinion starting and then being forced 
to stop would be worse than simply letting things go by default.6 
IRD, though, already had solutions to both of the issues raised by IPD.  The expansion 
of the BBC Monitoring Service discussed in Chapter 4 meant that IRD would have access to 
timely information, and a wealth of it, on which to base any rebuttal.  The Central Office of 
Information (COI)'s London Press Service (LPS) had from 1946 provided a variety of news and 
news commentary services – some sent daily, others slightly less frequently – to overseas posts 
by telegraph, airmail, bag and, later, Hellschreiber.7  The service had been established to keep press 
attaches abreast of current commentary on the news.8  IRD already used the LPS to distribute 
                                                
5 'Brief for the Secretary of State', Colonial Office, October 21, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1067/PR136/48/G. 
6 J P Tripp to E F Given, January 25, 1958; Information Section Bahrain to IPD, January 30, 1958; IPD to 
Information Section Bahrain, February 18, 1958; Minute, Saunders, February 13, 1958; TNA FO 
953/1924/PE1912/6. 
7 The Hellschreiber was a form of teleprinter, an early form of facsimile designed to operate by cable, or radio, at very 
low levels of fidelity. 
8 Minute, R H K Marett , February 22, 1962, TNA FO 953/2095/PE1004/38. 
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anti-Communist articles and news items, and a significant amount of anti-Communist material 
picked up by Middle Eastern new outlets was drawn from the service.  The infrastructure of the 
LPS, which made same-day distribution of material to large numbers of posts possible, was the 
logical choice for IRD to use for the distribution of 'X'.  IRD's use of the LPS has not been 
properly explored to date, and so the first section of this chapter examines the LPS both as a 
conduit for IRD material, and as a basis for 'X'.  The second part of this chapter will look at how 
'X' was developed, and how the service was turned towards anti-Communism.  The third part 
examines how the service was viewed in different regions and by the different foreign 
departments of the British government, before finally forming some conclusions regarding its 
importance. 
 
IRD and the London Press Service 
Following the post-war closure of the Ministry of Information in 1946, responsibility for British 
information policy was decentralised, and divided between various government departments.  
The Central Office of Information (COI) was created to provide centralised production and 
distribution services, and, acting as facilitator and advisor, provide the technical means by which 
information departments could distribute their product.  The COI was responsible for producing 
and despatching overseas all manner of printed material.   
Andrew Defty notes Ralph Murray's early recognition of the LPS as a potential outlet for 
IRD work.  As an attributable and recognisable arm of the British Government's information 
services, and following the COI mandate of a positive projection of Britain overseas, the LPS 
would seem to have been of limited worth to IRD.  Yet, as Defty explains, by 1949 the initial 
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resistance within the COI to a (relatively mild) co-option of the service by IRD had been 
overcome, and IRD was involved on a daily basis with LPS content and output.9 
The LPS, as IRD recognised, was in place to 'tell the story of this country and the British 
Commonwealth in its relation thereto'.  IRD's thus limited remit included use of the service to 
promote speeches and statements by ministers and opinion leaders, and by the occasional 
inclusion of the department's own commentary under the cover of the by-line of 'informed 
opinions'.  These constraints did not devalue the service in IRD's eyes: the LPS and its associated 
services were worth 'serious consideration as regular vehicles for IRD material.'10  Attendance at 
the daily meetings on LPS output was at a senior level, so that the IRD officer attending could 
cover the diverse requirements of the various IRD desks, and be able to answer questions on 
IRD policy.  (It was noted, however, that the decentralised nature of IRD organisation made it 
extremely difficult to do so.)  Initially, IRD was not directly responsible for the content of LPS 
bulletins; rather, they sought to 'inspire' anti-Communist comment within the LPS, within the 
constraints of the service's aims.  By 1954, IRD occasionally placed articles that were wholly 
authored by the department, again using the device of 'informed opinions', and by this stage 
influenced other content in such a way as to ensure that – in their view – enough anti-
Communist comment from the British press was included.11 
Attendance at LPS meeting benefitted IRD in other ways.  It enabled the department, as 
one officer noted, to make an incursion into 'the precincts of the main Foreign Office [picking 
up] a certain amount of peripheral office gossip...which might otherwise escape one'.  By 1954, 
the need to be alive to current trends within the Information Policy Department (IPD) and the 
wider Foreign Office was well recognised by the department.  This engendered a need for closer 
                                                
9 Murray was head of IRD at this point.  Defty returns to the LPS in his conclusion, noting the emphasis placed on 
it in the Drogheda Report of 1953; Defty, Britain, pp. 84-85, 236. 
10 'LPS as an outlet for IRD material', B Ching (IPD), March 4, 1954, TNA FO 1110/715/PR10111/15. 
11 'LPS as an outlet for IRD material', B Ching (IPD), March 4, 1954; Confidential Memo, F C Stacey (IRD), March 
5, 1954, TNA FO 1110/715/PR10111/15. 
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interdepartmental contact, particularly between the regional desks of IRD and IPD.12  Despite 
this closer contact, the department still encountered resistance in the meetings as late as 1958, 
with IRD's Hugh Cortazzi noting that attendees needed to 'be prepared to argue against timidity 
from IPD, or dislike of anti-Communist propaganda from the COI', and subsequently to 
'[e]nsure by careful checking that the agreed items are in fact sent'.13   
A January 1958 report from the Information Department of the British Embassy in 
Beirut shows the extent to which information officers used LPS material.  Whilst ten anti-
Communist articles sourced from Regional Information Office (RIO) material were placed in 
local papers that month, the number sourced from the LPS stood at 15, with most of the latter 
reported by more than one newspaper, so that the number of actual appearances of the articles 
stood at 46.14 
As part of the organisational changes that took part throughout the British information 
services following Suez, the COI was relocated to new offices in closer proximity to the 
Overseas Departments.  Changes within the LPS also came into effect in May 1958 following the 
move, and were primarily aimed at strengthening the region-specific output of the service.  By 
this time the LPS, as Ralph Murray told Information Officers, could 'be regarded as being semi-
official in so far as it aims at providing an authoritative reflection of current British 
policy.'  Facilities at the new premises would provide increased capacity for simultaneous 
transmissions, regional staffs were to be strengthened, and every effort was to be made, Murray 
directed, 'to develop the LPS as a comprehensive service of information and comment about 
                                                
12 'LPS as an outlet for IRD material', B Ching (IPD), March 4, 1954; Confidential Memo, F C Stacey (IRD), March 
5, 1954, TNA FO 1110/715/PR10111/15. 
13 'The London Press Service' H A H Cortazzi (IRD), January 3, 1958, TNA FO 1110/871/PR10111/57. 
14 Information Officer, British Embassy Beirut to IRD, February 13, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1154/PR1088/2. It is 
worth noting that the Middle East was by no means the main market for IRD inspired LPS material.  In the first 8 
months of 1959 a total of 474 anti-Communist articles were successfully placed and published in a total of 13 
countries around the world, with Rangoon, Burma and Venezuela placing the majority (329 articles in Rangoon 
alone), 'LPS Usage', Minute, J Sanders (IRD), September 11, 1959 TNA FO 1110/1229/PR10114/22. 
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British policy and the British way of life.' 15  The LPS had provided 7 programmes (reduced to 4 
by 1958 due to budgetary considerations), supplemented by regional programmes, and each 
broadcast to a different schedule.  The new, streamlined LPS provided a single, regionally 
tailored service; a combination of items of both regional and general interest, diplomatic and 
general commentary, press extracts, and feature articles.  Information officers were encouraged 
to help develop the information in these regional bulletins to be as relevant as possible, and to 
feed back information on local issues and events.  The LPS, Norman Reddaway admitted, 
provided only a one-sided view of the British press; a full summary of all press comment was 
made available to Information Officers, but this was to be for information only, and not for 
dissemination.  An anti-Communist theme could still only be developed as part of a presentation 
of the wider, official British view on any item of interest, and the reliance on the Information 
Officers at the British overseas posts to place items carried by the LPS rendered any polemic 
impractical – heavily slanted material would prove impossible to place.16  Despite these 
restrictions, IRD valued the service for what it provided them, and one almost unique benefit 
was speed of distribution. 
Apart from the BBC, LPS was IRD's only 'speedy outlet abroad'.  In contrast to the 
BBC, the LPS was completely – explicitly – under government control.  It was, IRD's Hugh 
Cortazzi emphasised in 1958, important that the department used 'to the utmost the services 
which it [LPS] provides'.17  At least one IRD official had noted several years earlier that this 
emerging combination of ability and desire to rapidly turn around information illustrated a shift 
in IRD from a strategic to a tactical focus as a department (a change of emphasis perhaps not 
paralleled at that point by a change in organisational structure).18  This combination of cultural 
change and additional facility provided one of the foundations of IRD's revised mission in the 
                                                
15 Confidential PP12/2, Ralph Murray (FO), May 19, 1958, TNA CO 1027/88/INF57/01. 
16 'London Press Service' G F N Reddaway (IRD), May 12, 1956, TNA FO 1110/871/PR10111/57. 
17 'The London Press Service' H A H Cortazzi (IRD), January 3, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1100/PR10111/14. 
18 Confidential Memo, F C Stacey (IRD), March 5, 1954,   TNA FO 1110/715/PR10111/15. 
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Middle East.  The utility of LPS for IRD in its anti-Communist role was proven, and it was clear 
that LPS was considered to be an important, and appropriate, vehicle for the new, post-Suez 
propaganda strategy of the British Government, a major element of which was Transmission 
'X'.19 
 
Transmission 'X' 
Transmission 'X' had a simple remit.  It aimed, as described by Donald Hopson, to provide 
'Information Officers with topical raw material that they can adapt for unattributed use in the 
local press or radio.'20  IRD generally described 'X' as a rebuttal service, though outside the 
department a more nuanced view prevailed in some quarters.  Cairo Radio mostly engaged in 
distorting facts whilst lacing them with emotion, and so 'X' did not so much seek to rebut lies 
from Cairo Radio, but rather to undermine the credibility of the service itself,21 and this view is 
more technically correct.  As originally devised 'X' was political commentary, issued daily, often 
consisting of only two or three items per service, in a form in which individual posts could easily 
adapt to their requirements.22  The trick, of course, was making sure that this initially limited 
supply of information was as topically relevant as possible for the broadest audience.  This was 
centrally-authored propaganda; a key issue for many of the receiving posts was whether the one-
size-fits-all propaganda issued from London was appropriate, or workable, for local use.  The 
Colonial Office (CO) in particular was unconvinced, and sure that their men on the ground 
                                                
19 The LPS still exists today, 'funded by UK Trade & Investment, a government department that supports business', 
its website proclaims, at pains to point out that 'the day to day operation is in the hands of a team of highly 
experienced professional journalists. This ensures objectivity, quality and focus on real news that the world's media 
appreciates.'  http://www.londonpressservice.org.uk/about_us, consulted September 4, 2010;  Following cuts to the 
information services budgets in 1964, the LPS was re-engineered as a service supporting British commercial interests 
overseas.  A Moore (IPD), Draft minute on propaganda work, undated but June/July 1964, TNA FO 
1110/1843/PR1125/10. 
20 Original emphasis; D C Hopson (IRD) to T A H Scott (CRO London), September 1, 1960, TNA FO 
1110/1337/PR1125/21. 
21 'Note of a meeting held at the Colonial Office on 20th November on proposed monitoring and guidance service 
to East Africa', TNA CO/1027/239/INF III/027. 
22 Confidential Circular, Kit Barclay, January 29, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1616/PR1011/2/G. 
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could do better.23  This resistance far outlasted the CO's general resistance to IRD work in the 
colonies.  To survive, therefore, 'X' had to expand relatively quickly into a "multi-directional" 
service, tailored to specific needs, and this was driven in large part by resistance to its original 
form. 
Transmission 'X' would run parallel to the LPS as part of a suite of different material 
already used in combination by posts in the Middle East, and by RIO Beirut.  For 'X', speed and 
coverage were of the essence.  IRD already had cause to believe such an approach would work. 
Successes such as that described below, of an RIO campaign against the Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Conference in Cairo in late 1957, set the scene for the adoption of 'X' later in 1958: 
We distributed privately and on a personal basis much background briefing 
material (your Intel was particularly useful here), kept up running fire in our LPS 
bulletin, and commissioned a number of articles from our "panel".  Three of 
these, attacking the final resolutions of this Conference, appeared in the press the 
morning after the Conference dispersed, and before anyone else had had the time 
to digest the resolutions.  These articles…set the tune for subsequent comment, 
and exercised a noticeable and wholly salutary effect upon public opinion.  By the 
end, the Conference was being freely spoken of as a Communist "racket"'24 
This was what 'X' would aim to do: get topical, relevant information out to information officers, 
the BBC, and media and opinion shapers with such speed that pieces of Cairo Radio propaganda 
did not have time to find a foothold, and could be defused. 
It was the conclusion of the Hill Committee that the effect of Cairo Radio was so serious 
in Aden and the Horn of Africa that by late 1958 there was a need to address the situation.  
Donald Hopson, IRD's head, thoughtfully set out both the threat from Cairo Radio, and the 
issues pertaining to any British response: 
The Cairo Radio broadcasts are not in general straight falsehood, but extremely 
clever angled commentary based on distortions of truth and couched in the 
customary colourful Arab idiom.  It is therefore not usually so much a question 
of "nailing the lie", as of exposing the distortions with enough ridicule and wit 
                                                
23 O H Morris (CO London) to H M Carless (IRD), January 21, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1359/PR1125/3. 
24 Information Officer, British Embassy Beirut to IRD, February 13, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1154/PR1088/2. 
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not to bore the audience.  There are two inhibiting factors, one political and one 
psychological.  On general policy grounds and in view of the U.N. Arab 
resolution and present efforts to encourage a radio truce, radio polemics against 
the Egyptian Government must be restricted.  Secondly, this is a negative 
defensive measure; it will not reduce Cairo Radio's audience but may even 
increase it; and it cannot replace positive measures to improve our broadcasting 
as a real counter-attraction.25 
By mid-October 1958, IRD's Donald Hopson was setting out the framework for what 
would become IRD's Transmission 'X' news commentary service.  The issue was to ensure that 
the BBC, and the radio stations of the CO and of friendly states in the Middle East and Africa, 
could be provided with both the material and the means to broadcast counter-propaganda 
programming.  Each carried their own obstacles to overcome: the BBC had editorial 
independence, Colonial broadcasters were often poorly equipped, and friendly states were often 
unwilling to use 'provocative' material.  In addition to this, Hopson identified 3 areas that 
required attention: 
a) The improvement of monitoring services, 
b) the provision of material for commentary, 
c) communications.26 
Both a) and b) were down to the BBC.  IRD drove an expansion of the BBC's local monitoring 
service across Africa in partnership with the corporation, who ultimately constructed the new 
monitoring station at Karen as noted earlier, with the main aim of monitoring Cairo Radio 
programmes directed at the region.  Both the BBC and IRD took on extra staff.  At this stage, 
the only colonial post that received the London Press Service by Hellschreiber (rather than airmail) 
was Aden, and IRD sought the expansion of this service to other posts so that their commentary 
service could be distributed quickly as possible.  In order to provide IRD with the raw material 
on which to base their new commentary, the BBC were to produce a daily monitoring summary 
on Middle East themes, along the lines of the existing summary produced for Soviet 
broadcasting, and this equivalence speaks to the importance placed on the summary.  IRD would 
                                                
25 'Countering Cairo Radio, D C Hopson (IRD), October 18, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1067/PR136/48/G. 
26 'Countering Cairo Radio, D C Hopson (IRD), October 18, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1067/PR136/48/G. 
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be directly responsible for a significant increase in the work of by the BBC at Caversham.27  BBC 
Monitoring would take an even more direct role from 1959, providing a 'preamble' to 'X', of 
between 100 and 150 words, summarising 'hostile radio propaganda themes'.28  
'X' was turned around from idea to execution with commendable speed: a succession of 
dummy runs were produced throughout November and early December 1958, with the first 
'edition' produced on the 15th of that month.  It was first announced to the posts that would 
receive it on 24 November.  The whole process was overseen by Ralph Murray, the ex-head of 
IRD, now assistant under-secretary of state at the FO.  Murray commented, often at length, on 
each successive revision, and was instrumental in shaping the initial form of the service.29  The 
service was essentially in two parts, with the first section covering various themes of Cairo Radio 
propaganda, offering a paragraph or two on each.  The second section consisted of one or two 
full-length essays, or radio scripts, intended to be used verbatim.  The two other interested 
parties in 'X', IPD and the CO, who had both raised objections, would retain some control over 
the service's output.  The Middle East Regional Advisor in IPD would, in consultation with 
relevant political departments, be responsible for providing political clearance for 'X' material, 
and the same would be true for the Colonial Office within their sphere of responsibility.30   
Whilst IRD designed 'X' to be picked apart and used as appropriate, much as the Digest 
was, the department were very particular about how it was written.  As noted, the original 
intention – which would barely outlast the first few weeks – was that it would be a single, blanket 
service for use by all receiving posts.  IRD wanted to ensure that the 'most subtle and 
appropriate slant or angle' was applied to any commentary, and 'X' was therefore almost wholly 
written or commissioned by the department.  This was not just to ensure tight editorial 
                                                
27 'Countering Cairo Radio, D C Hopson (IRD), October 18, 1958; Memo, D C Hopson, October 28, 1958; TNA 
FO 1110/1067/PR136/48/G. 
28 'Transmission 'X' Progress Report, D C Hopson (IRD), May 13, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1359/PR1125/23 
29 See throughout FO 1110/1097. 
30 Confidential Memo Ralph Murray to Sir Roger Stevens (Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office), 
December 2, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1097/PR1125/5. 
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compliance; the service needed to be guarded as much as practicable against 'unfriendly 
monitoring'. Transmission 'X's delivery method meant that it could be easily monitored by 
anyone with the appropriate technical means, and so information officers' contacts identified by 
marrying content to output.31  The fear was of course that this would enable enemies to make life 
difficult for certain recipients, or to capitalise from exposing the service.  These concerns would 
seem to have been unfounded: IRD detected no use of either LPS or 'X' material to bring 
pressure to bear on contacts or recipients, by either the Russians or the Egyptians.  The reason 
was, Hopson surmised, 'that the LPS as a whole is so much a part of the landscape in the 
propaganda world, and not by Russian standards a very sensational or important feature, that it 
has just not been worth our opponents' while to bother about the 'X' part of it'.32  Despite the 
care that IRD exercised over content, there was by its nature a need to turn content around 
rapidly, and this did produce detractors, even amongst ex-IRD staff:  'I'm sorry if the letters I 
write from time to time about Transmission 'X' all seem rather nagging', wrote one recipient, 'but 
I cannot help feeling that it would be worth from time to time a day's delay in transmission in 
order to produce a more coherent argumentation.'33 
As originally intended, 'X' held the sole remit of countering hostile propaganda 
originating from Cairo.  In this role, the service slotted neatly into the anti-Nasser role of IRD in 
the Middle East, and, as it was originally envisaged, Transmission 'X' would have no anti-
Communist role whatsoever, except, perhaps, to indict Egypt through any association with the 
Communists in the course of rebuttal.  In a matter of months, and even before IRD had 
conducted its first review of the service, it had expanded considerably in scope, scale and 
purpose.  The political climate had changed:  a tentative rapprochement with Egypt, and the 
resumption of diplomatic relations with Cairo were seen to be fundamental in protecting British 
                                                
31 Minute, M Terry (CO), TNA CO 1027/239/INF111/027; Much of 'X' was delivered 'en clair' – unencrypted. 
32 D C Hopson (IRD) to R Murray (Assistant Under Secretary of State for the FO), December 1, 1960, TNA FO 
1110/1337/PR1125/46. 
33 J M O Snodgrass (RIO Beirut) to C F R Barclay (IRD), February 5, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1583/PR1125/3. 
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interests both strategic and economic, and the perceived threat of Communism was on the rise 
throughout the Middle East and Africa. 
Although the FO wished to increase its engagement with Cairo Radio propaganda, they 
were chary of becoming embroiled in a 'radio war' which would be contrary to their stated aim of 
achieving a modus vivendi, and in which Britain would fight from a position of weakness.  'Our 
principle endeavours in these areas must be positive and factual and our intention predominantly 
constructive...put out on the London Press Service, it will, of course, be accessible to monitoring 
and therefore known to foreign governments as officially sponsored.  Controversial or critical 
material will therefore be attributed to "well informed circles" or other suitable source[s] in order 
to render it, so far as tactically necessary, disavowable'.34  This obfuscation backfired on one 
occasion: 'Could you possibly send us Transmission 'X' by airmail..?' asked the Embassy in 
Khartoum in March 1959, to which a mildly aggrieved IRD replied '[w]e have in fact been 
posting to you every day by airmail three copies..[it] is identified as 'Daily Radio Commentary' 
with the attribution 'By a Middle East Correspondent.'35 
As 'X' expanded, it grew from something with the air of a project, with a team self-
contained in all respects and headed by J V Riley, into a part of the general editorial function of 
IRD.  From the start of 1959 the team was headed by an IRD officer, with Hugh Carless acting 
as liaison with the political departments and briefing the BBC, Leslie Sheridan in charge of 
technical administration and production, and Riley acting as advisor on affairs in the Middle East 
and Africa, along with a general staff of writers, so it was coordinated at the highest level of 
IRD.36   
                                                
34 Foreign Office Telegram 809 to Beirut, November 24, 1958, TNA CO 1027/239/INF III/027. 
35 E F G Maynard (British Embassy Khartoum) to IRD, March 31, 1959; IRD to Maynard, April 8, 1959; TNA FO 
1110/1359/PR1125/14. 
36 Confidential Minute, J V Riley (IRD), January 21, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1359/PR1125/10. 
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In early 1959, 14 FO posts received 'X' across North Africa and the Middle East, along 
with the 6 CO posts in East Africa.37  By 1960 'X' was received in 47 posts across the Middle 
East, Africa, Asia and Europe, by Hellschreiber, air mail/diplomatic bag, or by RTT.  Whilst its 
original remit had been to rebut and undermine propaganda from Cairo Radio aimed at British 
interests in the region, it was developed into a service to counter all propaganda and 
broadcasting so aimed, with particular focus on that emerging from Communist sources.38 
 
The thaw in relations with the UAR and the expansion of anti-Communist content in 
Transmission 'X' 
Whilst, following the resumption of diplomatic relations with the UAR in 1960, 'X' continued to 
be aimed at Cairo Radio, in reality the beginnings of a thaw between London and Cairo were 
paralleled by a number of other events, which resulted in far less 'X' output being aimed at the 
regime.  'X' was in any case already being used far more within IRD's traditional context of anti-
Communism. 
In the Middle East, few newspapers had been happy to carry Cairo Radio related 
material, except in the few instances when co-option of Transmission 'X' material could be used 
to further the agendas of local newspapers in local feuds – hardly what IRD had in mind.39  In 
Aden, one of the main battlegrounds between Britain and Arab nationalism, it was the purview 
of the CO to request Transmission 'X' material – the legacy of early run-ins with IRD over 
content, and this was only asked for infrequently.  By late 1960, the CO was reporting that the 
effect of Cairo Radio in East Africa had significantly diminished, and with the independence of 
British Somaliland (freeing Britain of a direct interest in the country), IRD could clearly see that 
                                                
37 'Transmission 'X' Progress Report', D C Hopson (IRD), May 13, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1359/PR1125/23. 
38 D C Hopson (IRD) to T A H Scott (CRO London), September 1, 1960, TNA FO 1110/1337/PR1125/21. 
39 Though mentioning this issue, IRD do not provide any examples of this in their correspondence. 
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the traditional market for Transmission 'X' was much reduced.40  IRD, through 'X', maintained 
the ability to rebut any serious excesses from Cairo Radio in the years following, and by 1963 an 
expansion in use of the LPS and 'X' was again being considered. 
But this did not mean that 'X' no longer had a function.  Much as 'X' had come about 
through the existing means of delivery of the LPS, so the increasing need to counter 
Communism in the region found an existing tool in 'X'.  Its future, IRD recognised, lay 
increasingly in Afro-Asia rather than the Middle East; the rise of independent states and the 
targeting of this 'neutral bloc' by Moscow, along with the increasing presence of propaganda 
emanating from Peking, meant a rebalancing of the service to deal with these threats.  The 
extension of Britain's wireless telegraph network into Asia and the Far East was also seen as 
giving vital extra reach to the service.41  Kit Barclay noted in 1961 that 'X's 'original terms of 
reference are at present no longer strictly applicable.'42  Lord Norwich summed up the general 
feeling: 
The days of anti-Nasser transmission have gone and are unlikely to return.  As an 
anti-Communist weapon, however, Transmission 'X' seems to me to be quite 
excellent and certainly has a considerable effect in the M[iddle] E[ast]…its 
primary purpose should now formally be set down as discrediting 
Communism…the Afro-Asian countries are the battleground of the Cold War.  
It is obviously to them, in the first instance, that it should be directed.43  
Despite the fact that Britain was scarcely engaging with UAR propaganda, nor producing 
anti-Nasserite propaganda itself to any great degree, convincing the Egyptians of this fact proved 
problematic. The Foreign Office in general asserted in 1960 that they had not been engaged in 
anti-Egyptian or anti-Nasser propaganda since the latter part of 1959 – and this is an important 
point, though one that carried a mild caveat: 'There has been no anti-Nasser propaganda on our 
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part in the last nine months', noted David Roberts of the FO.  'The UAR authorities could be 
assured of this. (But we should consult IRD...first)...Transmission 'X' has rebutted the lies of 
Cairo Radio from time to time...I do not think it can reasonably be called "overdoing" it, 
however'.44  In targeting Communism, the UAR was a subject of Transmission 'X' material, 
particularly when highlighting the issues and perceived dangers of Soviet aid, but J O Wright of 
IRD asserted that it had 'been more than fair in publicising Egyptian anti-Communist 
pronouncements' whilst admitting that this support may not have been entirely welcome.45  
Mohamed Heikal was but one avenue through which the British sought to reassure the 
Egyptians that they were being both scrupulous and fair.  In a conversation between Heikal and 
Colin Crowe, the British chargé d'affaires in Cairo, Crowe brought up the subject of British anti-
Communist propaganda in the region – surely this was no cause for Egyptian concern?  Crowe 
noted that 
Heikal replied that it severely embarrassed them.  They were fighting an all out 
battle against Communism and articles about the dangers of the arms deal with 
Russia, or on the disadvantages of positive neutralism as opposed to working 
with the West, did not help.  Nor was it useful to be told, on the re-establishment 
of diplomatic relations with the UK, that at last the UAR had seen the light and 
cooperation with the West was the right line to follow46  
D A Roberts at the FO sought to explain the Egyptian position in a memo of March 
1960.  In his opinion, the Egyptian propaganda campaign was faltering at that moment, and that 
it was logical that their propagandists, 'who must earn their keep like everyone else', would look 
to point the blame for their misfortune elsewhere.  Additionally, given the plethora of agencies 
working in the region, it was, Roberts felt, perhaps understandable that some of the activity was 
blamed on the British.  Neatly summing up the FO position, Roberts noted 
Now clearly there is no point in our annoying the Egyptians unless it pays us 
commensurate dividend, but it seems that merely to be in the business of 
propaganda in the Middle East annoys the Egyptians by being in a field which 
                                                
44 Minute by D A Roberts, March 10, 1960, TNA FO 371/150926/VG1051/37. 
45 Minute by J O Wright (IRD), March 17, 1960, TNA FO 371/150926/VG1051/37. 
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they regard as their exclusive property.  Presumably it is in our interests on 
balance to remain in business and we can afford the luxury of not pleasing 
Nasser.47 
With the service now holding an anti-Communist focus, its concerns regarding Cairo 
Radio were limited to 'occasional refutations of some of the more outrageous lies in the UAR 
broadcasting services about HMG'.  Information officers in the Middle East, whose task it was 
to make use of Transmission 'X' material, were by this point concentrating far more on 
projecting a favourable image of Britain in the region, by and large ignoring the anti-British 
rhetoric emerging from Cairo.48 
And so 'X' horizons had broadened.  Whilst nominally retaining, but rarely exercising, its 
original mandate, it was now focussed on expanding an anti-Communist role throughout Asia 
and Africa.  Having established itself already as an effective tool in the Middle East, it was seen 
(at least by IRD) as the only existing 'quick-reaction' service of the sort required.  In 1960, with 
the LPS being extended into West Africa, 'X' continued to be rolled out to the territories there.  
Serious consideration was also being given to wireless transmission to posts where it was to that 
point only received by airmail, and the possibility of developing a complementary, South 
American service was also being considered.  The flexibility of 'X' to respond to specific requests 
for material, honed through CO and CRO usage and criticism, meant that it was now providing 
special services for the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) that had replaced the defunct 
Baghdad Pact.  These included a weekly, 600-word report for use by CENTO's Counter 
Subversion Office.49 
In 1961 the official terms of reference for Transmission 'X' were redefined; they were: 
a) to cover the Afro-Asian world generally as its target; 
b) to continue its special tasks for CENTO and African posts; 
                                                
47 Minute by D A Roberts, March 10, 1960, TNA FO 371/150926/VG1051/37. 
48 P M Crosthwaite to R Stevens, March 10, 1960, TNA FO 371/150926/VG1051/37. 
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c) to be prepared at short notice to concentrate on specific targets in its general 
area as policy requires; 
d) to continue to monitor Cairo Radio with a view to countering it when 
necessary.50 
By 1962, Transmission 'X' had expanded out of all proportion to its original mandate, by then 
consisting of 9 different services: a 'Daily Commentary', general Scripts, West and East Africa 
Specials, specific African and Asian Scripts, a French/English Commentary, Exclusive Services 
for Ankara and Tokyo, and a Weekly Themes centred on Cairo Radio.  Far from being a Middle 
Eastern affair, as it had begun, Transmission 'X' was distributed across the Middle East, the 
whole of Africa, in Asia, South America and various British posts throughout Europe.51 
The 'Daily Commentary' of Transmission 'X', its bread and butter, covered a wide range 
of issues.  The 10 July 1962 edition, under its usual 'Special Correspondent' by-line, explored the 
following themes: East/West Berlin, and the views of Algerian workers 'lured' to East Berlin to 
work of the conditions they found there; the Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at improving 
farm production, reports of thousands of university students being sent to work on farms, and 
the commonality of this problem throughout Communist states; the attempts of Communist 
front organisations to disguise the food shortages and rationing faced by Cuban families, food 
riots in Cuba, and the 'Communist indoctrination' of Cuban school children.  In the 'West Africa 
Special' of the same day, the issues of Communist-sponsored 'peace congresses' was explored, 
and the issue of minority Communist groups attending, purporting to be official representatives 
of their countries of origin.  Arab nationalist issues are not mentioned.52 
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The reaction to Transmission 'X' in Foreign Office posts. 
In the Middle East, there was a generally favourable response to the initial 'X' output.  This 
gradually improved as the service itself improved, and was paralleled by increasing success in 
placing material in the region's media.  Of course, in many cases, local politics and state control 
meant that placing anti-Nasser or anti-Communist material was often wholly prohibited. If 
relations with Cairo or Moscow were good or improving, such as in Ethiopia, there was little 
market for 'X' material – even displaying 'X' material in Embassy reading rooms could prove 
problematic.  It was not just resistance from the authorities that made things difficult: Rabat 
reported that it was 'the attitude of Moroccan opinion, not just Moroccan Government opinion 
to the cold war which hamstrings us'.  Baghdad was no longer the friend it once was, and no 
material could be placed in the media there.  In situations such as that in Kuwait there was 
simply nothing that could be done to place material, with no printed press, and a radio service so 
apolitical that news itself was seen to be too controversial to broadcast.53 
Information officers in the Middle East provided generally positive feedback and were 
quick to call for anti-Communist material, and these constituted some of the earliest suggestions 
made to IRD regarding content.  These suggestions chart the market for propaganda across the 
Middle East at the end of 1958, and called for information on: Russian oil exports; politically-
motivated Sino-Soviet economic activity; the hostility of Communism towards nationalism; the 
isolation of Iraq; the situation in Eastern Europe (especially Hungary); reassurances about the 
Common Market; the employment of women for hard labour in Communist countries; Sino-
Soviet tensions; the propaganda link between Cairo, Damascus and Moscow; Egyptian 
propaganda in general.54  In many cases, posts asked for material on Arab nationalism to be 
explicitly excluded.  Here, then, is another reason for British information departments, including 
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IRD, cutting back on the amount of material dealing with Arab nationalism and Nasserism.  This 
was the case in Tripoli, for example, which wanted anti-Communist material, but no anti-Nasser 
commentary to be sent.55  Given the proximity both physically and emotionally to the cause of 
Arab nationalism in the region, the anti-Communist message arguably had an immediately 
greater utility across the Middle East, and this use swiftly rose to the fore of the service's output. 
In some instances, 'X' was immediately successful – Ankara placed up to 60% of 'X's 
output in the local press in the first year via the CENTO Counter Subversion Office, and 'X' was 
also distributed to a number of opinion leaders throughout the country.  Attempts were also 
made to make it 'a source of talking points for a 'grapevine' of selected foreign diplomats.'  'X' 
therefore achieved coverage across the board, proving a flexible tool.  RIO Beirut managed to 
place around 20% of 'X's output in the press.  Radio was another matter however, with much 
less success in Turkey and none in the Lebanon – perhaps the point to be made here is that 'X' 
was not having much success combating Cairo Radio in its own medium.  In any case, Radio 
Cairo and its affiliates ruled the airwaves in the Middle East.  In Jordan, however, the situation 
was reversed, with no success in print, but some apparent success in placing articles in the talks 
and commentaries of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service – at least according to the Hashemite 
Broadcasting Service: the Embassy were unable to ascertain to what extent scripts that were 
passed to them were used, 'despite repeated requests.'56   
Things had improved by 1961, and whilst the amount used, and ability to use, 'X' varied 
significantly across the region, it was the conclusion of the Regional Information Officers that 
the service was 'most valuable'.  Tehran considered 'X' to be 'part of their "daily bread"', and 
Radio Iran used up to 40% of the 'X' material given to them by the information officer there.  
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Success in placing 'X' material was also evident in Rabat and Tripoli, although in the latter the 
Libyan Broadcasting Service took pains to disguise the source of the material.57 
 There were still issues, however.  In Beirut, whilst material was successfully placed, it 
often needed to be 'watered down', rehashed by local journalists employed to pass the work off 
as their own. The quality of the in-house translations of articles into Arabic by IRD were often 
deemed to be so poor that they would not be acceptable to Middle Eastern newspapers (RIO 
Beirut vetoed a suggestion that the RIO that it should handle the translations itself because this 
would delay getting topical articles out).58 This contrasts with early reception in Bahrain, who 
considered the translations to be of good quality.59  Opinions as to the quality of the Arabic 
translations varied significantly from post to post, both in style and in the accuracy of any 
translation itself, although quite why this should be so perhaps speaks more to the quality of 
translators available at the various posts.  In any case, often the material was seen by RIO Beirut 
as unsuitable for Arab consumption – too complicated – an opinion held by J Snodgrass whose 
views, with regrettable Orientalist overtones, are worth quoting in full: 
The average Arab newspaper-reader has an untrained mind which does not easily 
follow a sustained argument.  In particular he is often unable or too idle to follow 
the process of reasoning which we frequently employ, wherein a premise, for 
example a quotation from some Soviet leader, is first stated and then 
methodically picked apart.  The Arab will not grasp anything more than the 
premise set out at the beginning of the article, and the resulting effect is counter-
productive.  This is, of course, a criticism of the Arab, not of Transmission 'X', 
but it is one which conditions all our work.60 
In general, shorter articles were found to be easier to place than the full-length 
commentaries also supplied as part of 'X', but beyond this posts found it difficult to assess to 
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what extent material was used.  In some instances 'X' output was reproduced verbatim; in other 
instances output was either rewritten internally or by local editors before printing or 
broadcasting.  What is impossible to assess is to what extent editors were influenced by reading 
'X' articles, picking and choosing the odd fact or comment, or shaping how they dealt with 
information from alternative sources. 
 
Difficulties in East Africa: The Colonial Office 
A point worth repeating here is that the Foreign Office, and therefore IRD, needed to both pay 
attention to, and make compromises with, other Whitehall departments with interests in Africa.  
The Colonial Office (CO), Dominions Office (DO) and the Commonwealth Relations Office 
(CRO) all had to be consulted and considered.  Each Office of course held its own views on the 
threat from Communism or Nasserism, and how IRD sought to address them, whilst each was, 
in its own way, occasionally as guilty of the single-mindedness and parochialism of which they 
sometimes accused IRD. 
British colonial posts raised concerns over Transmission 'X' via the CO as early as 
January 1959, mere weeks after the service had begun on December 15, 1958.  The 6 Colonial 
territories in East Africa and the Gulf had received 'X', known to the CO as RIVAROL, to 
almost universal disapproval.  Impressions of the service were varied, but almost wholly 
negative, prompting a number of early observations from the CO that questioned whether the 
service was in fact workable.  
In Aden the early content of the service was deemed to be lacking in local value, and too 
detailed – and too boring – to arouse any local interest.  There was, in general, 'too much detail, 
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too many names and not enough punch.'61  Perhaps the strongest negative views could be found 
in Dar es Salaam.  There, the post noted that one that item in a RIVAROL piece referred to a 
Cairo Radio broadcast a fortnight old – 'so much for our emphasis on speed' – and noted 'feeble 
attempts to catch Cairo out in self-contradiction, and the elaborate refutation of specific items 
from the Cairo Radio broadcasts...The allegedly delicate angles put on the items by the Foreign 
Office can only be described...as a lot of hoo-ha.'62 
This led O H Morris of the CO to comment: 
the material is for the most part too remote in interest.  The outlook of the 
relatively unsophisticated inhabitants of our territories tends to be extremely 
parochial and their interests tend to centre on purely local affairs...obliquely 
slanted stories are not appropriate for local consumption and what is needed is 
something very much more simple and factual.   
Morris also believed the basic premise of the service to be flawed, and dispensed his wisdom on 
the matter to IRD's Hugh Carless in no uncertain terms:  
I am not at all sure in my own mind that it will be possible to devise a centralised 
service in London to provide the kind of information which our territories 
appear to need.  I am doubtful whether it is possible to conduct counter-
propaganda on a centralised basis.  The most effective counter-propaganda 
within a territory is that which (i) is based on knowledge or experienced 
judgement of the actual impact of a particular piece of enemy propaganda on the 
local population and (ii) attempts promptly to counteract that impact in a way 
which will itself make an impact upon or be acceptable to local opinion.  I am 
not even sure that it is practicable to attempt to prepare counter-propaganda on a 
general East African basis; perhaps, after all, we shall have to look to the 
individual territories to devise their own material.63 
The CO was most certainly not on board with Transmission 'X' in its early form.  'It seems 
probable', wrote Morris to D C Hopson, 'that we will be making some fairly substantial 
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excisions...we shall need to do some careful rethinking about this whole exercise.  It may be that 
we need to put in a Colonial Office hand at an earlier stage in the preparation of this material.'64 
Following a subsequent meeting between Morris and Hopson, it was decided that IRD 
would focus the efforts of Transmission 'X' and RIVAROL on the Middle East.  An 'Africa 
Only' script would be produced, if necessary, in response to Cairo Radio's targeting of an issue in 
Africa.  This script would not be forwarded to Middle East posts: they had stated that the 
material would not be of any interest to them.  IRD's first couple of efforts at 'Africa Only' 
scripts did little to impress the CO in the few weeks after this decision, however, and 
consultation between the CO and the African posts concerned revealed the extent of their 
misgivings:  
IRD are unable to assess accurately the kind of topic which is likely to have 
interested listeners in our RIVAROL territories...IRD do not seem to be able to 
write up topics in an appropriate form...We might overcome this to some extent 
by more consultation with IRD during the initial stages of drafting these articles, 
but to some extent, the difficulty stems from the nature of IRD.  By and large, 
they are not so constituted as to be able to explain in a positive way HMG's 
political and constitutional polices in respect of African territories.  There is not a 
lot we can do about this...65 
The solution the CO proposed was that the individual posts would drive the East 
African content of 'X', requesting information as and when it was required and tailored to its 
needs.  In the CO's opinion only the posts in question were in a position to assess either the 
effect of Cairo Radio in their particular territory, or the extent that they needed special material 
over and above that available through channels such as intels and guidances.66  Resistance to 'X' 
had been fierce:  Margaret Terry of the CO would have withdrawn RIVAROL scripts from issue 
to posts as soon as was practicable, had this proven possible.  Terry would push for a separate 
East Africa service, and for a summary of Cairo Radio trends that she would arrange for through 
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Riley.  These would join the Daily Commentary as regular 'X' output and add breadth and 
flexibility enough to begin to placate the CO.67  The Cairo Radio propaganda report (later known 
as Cairo Radio Themes) was a one-page, weekly summary of Voice of the Arabs and Voice of Free 
Africa broadcast themes, entirely without IRD commentary or critique, purely to inform, and 
though this was initially intended for the CO, it would subsequently be widely distributed across 
most if not all recipients of 'X'68 
IRD therefore lost a degree of editorial control over some of the content of 'X', and the 
intended uniformity of the service had been exposed as unworkable – a microcosm of the 
general issue IRD faced in all material intended for a Middle East or African audience.  However 
a certain degree of caution should be exercised over the first point: as noted above, IRD were 
keen to receive suggestions from local information officers as to subjects that 'X' should carry – 
and there was a standing request for these – so content was to a degree shaped by the needs of 
individual posts in any case.  Formalising this process, at the point of an annual review of the 
service in September 1959, IRD made a specific request to each post for any suggestions as to 
content or subjects to be made.69  
It is clear in the meantime that RIVAROL/'X' continued to be produced in its original 
form despite these concerns and suggestions.  The CO's misgivings were enough, however, to 
show IRD that, if they wanted 'X' material to be used in CO posts, they would need to adapt the 
service.  '[T]he service we have attempted to give so far can never fully serve the interests of 
both Arab posts and colonial posts, since the latter are largely parochial and unconcerned with 
Arab politics', reported Riley, 'if the service is to continue, it will have to attempt to produce a 
separate service for colonial posts...a new formula will have to be devised for it, since it has 
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grown out of the original one.'70  Despite the concerns raised by the territories over 
RIVAROL/'X', McMullen at the CO confessed to 'a sneaking suspicion I have that no one knows 
or has thought very deeply about the right way to counter UAR/Communist propaganda.'71  The 
territories were quick to criticise IRD output, but not so quick to provide alternatives.  Among 
the limited positive suggestions from the CO was that topics that related to African subjects 
should be attributed to a named author.  Not only would this make the articles more attractive to 
editors, but it 'would also partly dispense with the need for such a rigmarole as "informed 
circles", which bears the taint of Government handouts.'  Hopson agreed that this would be 
something worth doing.72 
Alongside the previously mentioned complaints about a lack of relevance and over-
complexity, which, McMullen noted, IRD seemed anxious to correct, there were other issues to 
which the department seemed much less responsive: those of style and approach.  As noted in 
the previous chapters, IRD repeatedly faced the charge that they were far too Eurocentric in 
their approach to propaganda, a view shared at all levels of the Colonial Office.  In the CO's 
opinion, IRD seemed to 'aim at the European liberal exclusively e.g. they always assume that 
their target disapproves of violence...they seem far too emotionally involved in their anti-
communism or anti-Nasserism...they seem to have got their needle stuck in a groove both as to 
the approach...and as to language: the same clichés have been cropping up regularly and 
monotonously to my knowledge since the late 40's.'  McMullen asserted that it would not be 
difficult to improve the RIVAROL service – it was simply a question of expense, and the effort 
involved to do so.  The CO would do well, in his opinion, to hold off further comment on 
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Transmission 'X'/RIVAROL until it became clear whether the service would be of any use in the 
long term.73  
Despite the CO's reservations, Transmission 'X' continued to provide a service for CO 
posts.  With the expansion of domestic broadcasting in East Africa, there was now a viable, local 
alternative to Cairo Radio, and as a consequence its impact was reduced.  The focus of 'X' 
switched to Communist propaganda, particularly that emanating from China – the English 
language broadcasts from Moscow were not seen by the CO as having much of an effect.  
Morris' previous reservations about the viability of 'X' as a service seem to have disappeared in 
the light of this new direction of threat, and in August 1960 he asked Hopson to consider 
substituting some of 'X's normal output for articles tailored towards local African interest.  
Rather than directly seeking to rebut or counter Peking, Morris saw opportunity in the significant 
interest the East African press had in developments elsewhere in Africa.  This interest was at that 
time supplied by the coverage of news agencies such as Reuters, which was patchy.  If IRD, 
through Transmission 'X', could supply a news commentary service on developments taking 
place in non-British Africa, Morris assured Hopson this would be 'snapped up'.74 
Hopson believed that 'X' could do this – in fact already was to some extent, as it was 
covering developments in African countries achieving independence from France.  Morris' needs 
would have to be fulfilled by being 'presented as a counter to Communist bloc and other 
propaganda directed against British interests in Africa as a whole, in conformity with 
Transmission 'X's charter – and with IRD's charter in general', but Hopson believed that within 
these limits 'X' could still provide the foundation for such a commentary service.75  And so it did, 
subsequently providing two separate but complementary services for the CO: the East Africa 
Special, an article produced once a week on a single topic slanted for an East African audience; 
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and African News Snippets, which provided an almost wholly factual summary of news from the 
continent, as per Morris' requests noted above.76  Here, again, IRD displayed flexibility in 
adapting to the needs of posts, with 'X' carrying material that was neither counter-Communist or 
counter-nationalist, but that nonetheless supported British aims. 
There was an increasing acceptance of the daily Transmission 'X' news commentary 
service within the CO.  There are few examples of outright praise, though material on the 
problems the USSR had experienced with planned agriculture in 1962 did elicit some.  'We have 
been greatly encouraged to note the quantity (and quality if I may say so) of I.R.D. material 
produced on this subject', noted the CO.  'We are taking every opportunity of distributing such 
material to all our British Information Services posts, not only those in East Africa'.  This was 
'gratifying', wrote Klatt of IRD, 'all the more so as the Colonial Office has not always seen eye to 
eye with us'.  IRD therefore needed to 'show our continuing willingness to co-operate.'77 
RIVAROL/'X' got off to a poor start with the CO.  The consensus was that the service 
had little of relevance to say to African listeners, and there was resistance to the idea that a 
centralised service was practicable or even a good idea.  Once Cairo Radio had been replaced by 
a new threat, the CO suddenly saw the potential of the service.  O H Morris, one of its leading 
early detractors, came full circle, courting IRD and the service to address local issues on Africa 
and Communism.  'X' had diversified, completing the first of a number of further divisions of its 
service that would be driven by local needs and those of other departments such as the CRO. 
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French-Speaking West Africa, Previous British Colonies, and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office. 
The Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) had received 'X' from its inception, but had not 
sent it out to their posts.78  It was finally rolled out in November 1960, roughly two years after 
the service began – the CRO having reserved a veto for material directed at, or about, 
Commonwealth countries.79  'X' was now received across Africa; once again, it was to mixed 
reviews, and faced a variety of obstacles.  In Accra, overt anti-Communist propaganda could not 
be placed because of strict governmental censorship of the press.  In Lagos, the style of the 'X' 
news snippets was viewed as simply not suitable for the press there.  However, things were more 
positive in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, with Transmission 'X' being seen as already having had 
considerable value in areas other than those under the CRO's purview.  The fact that it was 
difficult to place information was not the point – it was, J C Hyde in Salisbury argued, not the 
basis on which the usefulness of the information should be judged: 'If [local publicists] are not 
interested', noted Hyde, 'then they should be'.  Posts made increasingly diverse use of 'X' 
material.  For example, when questions about Communist literature and broadcasts were raised 
in the territories in the Federation of Rhodesia by local Africans – questions that territorial 
officials could not answer with sufficient authority – the post at Salisbury requested extra copies 
of 'X' to use as confidential briefing material for local administrators.  By 1960 South Africa was 
also interested in the service, and 'X' had completed its roll-out across the continent.80   
West Africa required a new direction for 'X', and another sub-service of commentary 
tailored for the region.  In this area, Cairo Radio was not the threat against which it was 
deployed: Chinese Communism was seen to be the main threat to Western interests, though 
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Afro-Asian issues were certainly important in that context.  Straight news and objective content 
– much more like a worldwide version of the LPS; objective news supporting Western interests – 
was seen as much more likely to gain editorial editorial approval in the region.  As with the other 
major deployments of 'X', a dummy run was sent out for approval and comments, but in this 
case IRD themselves were quick to point out flaws in their own initial content, taking particular 
issue with the new service's even-handedness.  '[T]hough we should be fairly objective I do not 
think we should take it too far!' advised Tucker upon reading the dummy material.  Hopson 
agreed: 'There are one or two items which are so objective as to bring us no joy at all'.81 
In French-Speaking Africa, Dakar considered (the mild version of) 'X' to be 'good and 
useful'; Leopoldville, in contrast to most other posts, considered X's anti-Communist output to 
be too mild, almost 'too subtle for local consumption – present indications are that nothing is 
too piquant for the [ex-Belgian sections of the] Congolese in this sphere.'82  These two former 
colonies bracketed the two extremes of what was required of 'X'.  The two posts would receive 
the service by RTT rather than by airmail for speed, and translated by IRD into French.  This 
new, West Africa service, that covered the entire region, comprised around 500 words.83  The 
West Africa Special was indeed more impartial and factual than the usual 'X' content, though 
terms such as 'hypocrisy' and 'blatant falsity' would be comfortably deployed in analyses of 
Peking Radio, nestled output amongst more measured prose.84 
 
                                                
81 'Transmission 'X' – for West Africa: 'dummy run'', Minute, H H Tucker (IRD) 24 January 1961 and D C Hopson 
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82 D A Roberts (British Embassy, Dakar) to J G McMinnies (IRD), March 20, 1961; J N Croce (British Embassy, 
Leopoldville), March 29, 1961; TNA FO 1110/1455/PR1125/4A. 
83 J G McMinnies (IRD) to D A Roberts (Dakar), February 23, 1961, TNA FO 1110/1455/PR1125/4. 
84 'West Africa Special', 'Daily Commentary', January 9, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1616/PR1125/2/G. 
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Usage in Asia, Europe and at Home. 
Given that this chapter has a secondary aim of fully covering 'X', even if this means moving 
outside the scope of the thesis, it should also briefly consider the use of the service outside of the 
region under study.  'Athens, Berne, Bonn, Oslo, Rome and Vienna have regular customers for 
'X'', reported IRD in 1961, although there is no analysis in the files anywhere to indicate how this 
was received, or used, by the posts concerned.  It is perhaps most likely that these customers of 
'X' treated the output as part of the general ebb and flow of information to and from IRD to 
countries whose positions within the Cold War were fixed.  In one case at least, however, this 
fed back into the Middle East, as Rome Radio's Arabic Service used 'X' information in its 
broadcasts. 85 
In Asia, 'X' constituted the majority – 80% – of anti-Communist material placed by 
information officers in Thailand.  Indonesia and Burma proved more resistant to anti-
Communist information work in general, but in Burma 'X' got 'a good proportionate showing.'  
Vietnam, Tokyo and Hong Kong also placed some 'X' material, but in the case of RIO 
Singapore, Malaya, Colombo or Borneo IRD rather inexplicably had no information about their 
usage.  Communist subversion, spy rings and (understandably) China were the preferred 
subjects.  In Hong Kong a weekly special 'Commentary on Communism' was produced, with 
notional attribution rather than the 'special correspondent' by-line.86  Japan would be provided 
with its own 'Tokyo Exclusive', a weekly commentary on Communism specially tailored for local 
consumption.87  With this, IRD would find echoes of the criticism of the service that it first 
encountered from the Colonial Office 6 years previously.  Whilst (in contrast with the CO) 
Tokyo always found something of value in the weekly 'Colin Johnstone' articles they were sent, 
there was 'too many colour words, too many irrelevant details and too many cases of just plain 
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waffle.'  IRD were also accused of 'bad English'; it was all of 'disappointingly low quality'.88  IRD 
were more sanguine about the quality of their product by this point, having honed it over some 
considerable time and ascribed these issues to a failure to adequately understand the purpose of 
'X' and how it would be used.  '[I]f you regard some of the details [as] irrelevant', IRD replied, 'it 
would be fairly easy for you to simply delete them'.89  
The various 'X' commentaries and specials were of course distributed throughout the 
FO, CO, CRO and COI offices in London.  Outside the government, and from the beginning, 
the daily transmission of 'X' was also couriered from Carlton House Terrace at around 4.30pm to 
the BBC: this proved too late to be included in the BBC's political commentary for the day, a 
situation that Ralph Murray saw as unacceptable.  This did not form the only point of contact, 
however, with Riley often in telephone contact with the BBC's Arabic desk during the morning, 
in the event of any particularly appropriate piece of content being available. As such 'X' material 
did find its way into the Daily Commentaries produced by the Arabic desk.  IRD did not imagine 
that the BBC would necessarily use the scripts they were sent, but the hope was that their 
content would at least influence programme controllers.90  By 1963, 'X' material was still 
despatched to the BBC at Bush House in the last van of the day, with commentary, scripts, and 
regional specials delivered to Hugh Lunghi of Central European Services, the head of Africa, 
Caribbean and Colonial Services, and various other heads and members of Middle Eastern, Latin 
American and African services, along with D M Graham of the BBC Central Research Unit.91  
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Refocussing the LPS and 'X' post-1963 
In July 1963, the decision was taken to change the name of the Transmission 'X' service to the 
'Topical Commentary Service' (TCS) to better reflect the content and type of material 
produced.92  At the point of the change of name, 'X'/TCS was reported to be producing the 
following output, a considerable expansion over 'X''s original remit: 
Daily Commentary English, approximately 1,200 words.  Three or four items 
– one item translated into French for West Africa. 
Gordon Tate Articles About three a week.  Generally in English but 
occasionally translated into French. 
Weekly Commentary In English and French.  A digest of African items from 
the Daily Commentaries. 
East Africa Special A weekly article in English with a slightly anti-Communist 
pay-off. 
African Snippets Weekly news snippets in English.  Mainly straight but a 
few exposure items 
Tokyo Exclusive Weekly Commentary on Communism in English. 
Cairo Radio Themes Weekly summary of Cairo's main propaganda line to 
Arabs and East Africa. 
Ankara Exclusive Three or four articles weekly.93 
 
When the Qasim regime fell to a coup d'état on the 8 February 1963, there was a flurry of 
anti-Communist activity towards Iraq.  Any hopes of getting 'X' into the one of the two really 
important markets that had to that point eluded it, and perhaps the front line against 
Communism in the Middle East, proved illusory.  The Ba'athist regime soon forbade publication 
of anti-Communist material in the newspapers, and so Transmission 'X', in line with most IRD 
material, was impossible to place.  In December 1963, the extent of Transmission 'X' distribution 
in Baghdad was the four walls of the British Embassy.94 
The recommendation of the Plowden Report on Representational Services Overseas in 
1964 was that efforts in the information field needed to be linked directly to policy objectives. 
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The same year Heads of Missions in underdeveloped countries began to call for increases in 
British Council work and improvements in the reception quality of BBC programmes.  It was, in 
IPD's assessment, the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America where the new 
propaganda effort must be directed.  Substantial funds would be required from the 1965/66 
onwards to effect the required changes.  Following a 50% increase in the information budget for 
1960/61, the Treasury was likely to be wholly unsympathetic to any further increases, and these 
funds would need to be met by cuts elsewhere.95  'Are these broadcasts important enough to 
survive the present economic blizzard?', Hopson was asked as early as 1961.  It is a measure of 
how IRD saw 'X' that Hopson believed that they were.96 
The lack of adequate news agency coverage was a driver for rolling out 'X' across West 
Africa.  Once a substantial news agency network was established, the material that IOs had 
previously worked so hard to distribute could now be easily picked up by editors and 
commentators from news agency sources.  The situation was compounded by the growth of 
television and increased radio network coverage.  The recommendation of the Plowden Report 
was that the LPS no longer needed to support a positive projection of British values and 
interests.  The same year the output of the service was significantly reduced, as part of the 
budget saving towards the new information requirements.  The LPS would be turned into an 
airmail-only service,97 and refocused on supporting British commercial interests.  Political 
material and feature articles would be dropped to a moderate level of approximately 6 per 
month.98  LPS would no longer be, as Ralph Murray had put it, 'a comprehensive service of 
information and comment about British policy and the British way of life.'99  In any case, by mid-
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1964 it was only the Middle East and the (French) West Africa editions of the TCS that were 
sent by LPS, and these were moved over to other delivery methods when the cuts in the LPS 
budget were announced.100 
Cairo Radio's attacks on British interests and policies in the Middle East continued 
beyond this point, and IRD continued to prepare monthly reports for the FO on the station's 
activities.  During 1965, the station continued to broadcast anti-British, anti-imperialist rhetoric, 
incitement to violence, and approval of violent acts committed against British troops and citizens 
in the region.  If Britain was prepared to compromise on information activity in search of better 
relations with Egypt, the reverse was not the case.  IRD explained why: 'Cairo consistently took 
the line that the UAR could not barter its commitments to Arab nationalism for the benefits of 
improved relations with Britain.'  Heikal, reporting in Al-Ahram, with the article broadcast by 
Cairo Radio, affirmed that Egyptian interests were diametrically opposed to those of the 
British.101  Cairo Radio continued to influence radio stations in Yemen, and Sana'a radio praised 
the assassination of Sir Arthur Charles, speaker of the Aden National Council, in September 
1965.  Cairo continued to produce atrocity propaganda aimed at the British, for example 
accusing the British of killing civilians in attacks in Dhofar.102  The Voice of the Arab's impact had 
been in decline throughout the 1960's, but its credibility would not survive its reporting of the 
Six Day War in 1967.  The Voice of the Arabs broadcasts were so divorced from the fact of what 
was happening on the ground that they were impossible to defend in the face of the truth – the 
nature and the fact of its propaganda fully exposed.  Having been instrumental for the build-up 
of Egyptian confidence in their military prior to the war, and for sustaining this during at least 
the first two days of the crisis, Ahmed Said was eventually dismissed, and Voice of the Arabs  
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entered a new phase.  Although it did not wholly give up on revolutionary propaganda, 
encouraging such in both Muscat and Oman, senior employees whose career spanned both sides 
of the Six Day War reported that the broadcasts were so bland post-1967 that they were 
indistinguishable from the regular domestic service.103  
As discussed below, the ultimate fate of 'X' is unclear, and in any case falls outside the 
scope of this thesis.  One element of it – the East Africa Special – was terminated in August 
1965: the development of news communication throughout the continent had rendered it 
somewhat redundant by that point, and it was dropped with no objection from the receiving 
posts.104 
 
Conclusion: the importance of Transmission 'X' 
Transmission 'X' material was by its nature ephemeral, and only exemplar or dummy-run 
material exists in the National Archives, as part of correspondence files.105  It is in fact largely 
due to the intransigence of the CO over their use of the RIVAROL service that anything exists 
beyond a handful of files within the IRD series, their dissatisfaction generating an amount of 
correspondence out of proportion to their share of the posts receiving the service. Given the 
dry, factual nature of 'X' output, there perhaps would be little additional value in making an 
extended analysis of the content of the service over time, even if sufficient material existed to 
make this possible.  It is also impossible to measure the impact of the service in any real sense.  
This is of course the case with all propaganda, but to a greater degree with 'X'.  There are 
occasional references to the amount of articles successfully placed by information officers in 
local media, but there are glaring omissions too – as noted above, at one stage IRD had no 
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information on RIO Singapore's use of 'X' material.  It was also not the practice to separate 'X' 
from the normal output of the LPS in reports prepared on that service.  In fact, in 1961 'X' 
material was specifically excluded from consideration in Leslie Glass' review of the use of IRD 
material, as it did not fall in to any convenient category and thus merited separate consideration, 
which it did not receive until January 1963.  As Kit Barclay noted: 
From time to time we receive requests and suggestions from posts for the 
treatment of particular subjects of interest to them; we also try to meet ad hoc 
requests for counter-propaganda action.  These help us in trying to assess the use 
of Political Commentary, as do periodic reports we receive from a number of 
posts.  But our picture is still very incomplete.106 
'X' material could inspire articles, subtly influence the editorial line, or have one or two facts or 
observations plucked from it – all of which without using any of the text contained in the 
commentary, and thus impossible to attribute to 'X' with any degree of reliability. 
There is, regrettably, no information on the end of 'X', or the TCS as it was known by 
the point it disappears from the files.  There are three possibilities: firstly, the advent of new 
media and news agency coverage of world events may have removed the need for the service by 
the mid-1960s, and it quietly faded away; secondly, after disconnecting 'X' from the LPS, it was 
absorbed into another service, becoming part of the general editorial output of IRD; or thirdly, 
the service continued in some form, and evidence of this exists in some form in files which fall 
outside of the remit of this thesis and which to this point the author has been unable to find – 
perhaps 'X' had become a regular and unremarkable part of the normal IRD output, scarcely 
worthy of mention.  At this point it is impossible to say, though it was the rise of news agency 
coverage that would seem to be the most plausible. 
None of this detracts from the importance of the service.  It is clear from the way it is 
described by senior members of IRD, and in the way it was considered by the majority of posts 
where it was received, that it was valued and served a unique function.  A significant percentage 
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of IRD work was the mobilization of facts presented in such a way as to either further British or 
Western interests, or to work against those of the Communist Bloc or the forces of anti-
imperialism.  In this regard it is abundantly clear that 'X' was a major part of this work in the 
Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia.  It came into being as a means of combating Cairo Radio, 
perceived as the preeminent threat to British interests in the Middle East and East Africa, and it 
was considered the best and only rebuttal tool available to the Western powers to this end.  By 
the end of the period under examination it had become flexible and responsive enough to deal 
with all manner of broadcasting threats on three continents, a complementary weapon alongside 
the BBC in the war against Communism, and a service that grew in the main due to requests 
from posts.  It was sufficiently well thought of that it expanded to the Far East largely driven by 
these requests.  It managed to attract zero interest from either Radio Cairo or the Communist 
bloc, and was never exposed for what it was despite its widespread distribution and little in the 
way of secure communication. 
In the Middle East, a reduced market for IRD's traditional product, coupled with a 
softly-softly approach towards Nasser, meant that 'X' was one of the main thrusts of IRD's work 
in the region.  Across the area under consideration, apart from the BBC and the general service 
of the LPS, Transmission 'X's Daily Commentary remained the fastest means by which IRD 
could respond to propaganda directed at British interests – on a daily basis to most receiving 
posts.  Less regularly, but with the ability to be driven by the needs of individual posts, articles 
and specials provided a fuller exploration of topics and themes.  In posts such as Ankara and 
Salisbury 'X' was used for purposes far beyond IRD's original intention.  By 1963, the 
distribution list for 'X' covered 14 pages, which serves to illustrate quite how widespread its use 
had become.107 
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Transmission 'X' correspondence reinforces a number of points about IRD, and was 
representative of difficulties and problems IRD experienced in general over the regions under 
discussion.  Firstly, there was a degree of disdain for IRD's methodology, and resentment at any 
encroachment into propaganda or information work by IRD in territories that fell under the 
administration of the other foreign departments.  This was most marked in the Colonial Office, 
sections of which still considered IRD to be peddlers of out-of-date, unsubtle, Eurocentric 
propaganda that had no place in the countries they administered, despite the improvement under 
Stacpoole.  The Commonwealth Relations Office was much more measured in its analysis.  In 
the case of the CO, this attitude was fuelled by the second point to be repeated here:  IRD's 
monolithic approach to propaganda did not work in the Middle East or Africa.  Attempts to 
provide a 'catch-all' service, driven by and authored from London, were unworkable, and earned 
them little support.  When Transmission 'X' was turned towards combating Communism, IRD 
was on more traditional ground and the service was much better received.  Thirdly, IRD proved 
remarkably flexible, prepared to go to significant lengths to ensure that material found a home in 
posts, even if it proved necessary to edit or alter this far beyond their original intention.  
Fourthly, the dry, factual content of 'X' gives insight into some of the methodical, workmanlike, 
constant output that IRD generated – the propaganda war seen through the lens of 
Transmission 'X' is very dull indeed. 
Transmission 'X' bridges the areas under consideration in this thesis.  It was a highly 
significant tool for IRD, but it was far from the only one the department used either in the 
Middle East or Africa.  The final two chapters will therefore return to the situation following 
Suez, and consider the more traditional work of IRD, beginning with that in Africa. 
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Chapter Six 
Counter-Communism and Decolonisation in Africa 
 
The dialectic between decolonizers and nationalists was worked out within the 
basic bipolarity of international politics; how and when a country achieved its 
independence depended less on its supposed state of political maturity than on 
prevailing priorities of Cold War strategy.1 
J D Hargreaves, 'Approaches to Decolonization' 
[A]s the Colonies approach independence they will inevitably become more 
exposed to contact with Communist countries and organisations, and I suggest 
that if means can be devised of carrying out suitable measures now, we may save 
ourselves much trouble and expense later on.2 
Douglas Dodds-Parker (FO), March 28, 1956 
 
IRD broadly faced the same challenges in northern and eastern Africa as it did in the Middle 
East.  However, the texture of the Communist and Arab nationalist challenges to British 
interests, and the potential for IRD to meet them effectively, varied significantly.  Put simply, the 
Communist threat in the Middle East was a paper tiger, and despite early Western fears 
Communism never achieved a significant foothold in the region.  Arab nationalism was an 
unstoppable force – accommodation with the movement was the only answer that made sense – 
and it soon became seen as a valuable bulwark against the spread of Communism. 
In Africa, however, both threats played out across a tapestry of differing national and 
regional interests, backgrounds and religions.  In the Muslim nations of North and East Africa, 
Arab nationalist propaganda found a receptive audience.  In the largely Christian nations of West 
Africa, it carried far less weight.  Decolonisation spread rapidly across the continent, but there 
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was a significant regional variation in timing and outcome: for the British-controlled nations, 
West Africa began its transition to independence before the East, and so provided IRD with an 
opportunity to supply information about events in the former to the recipients in the latter. 
Communist propagandists worked through Egyptian cultural and political connections with 
Africa, and forged their own, but in contrast with the Middle East there was a genuine 
groundswell of indigenous socialist movements.  Colonialism was a still-open wound. 
The Arab nationalist threat to British interests in Africa was in decline by 1961.  It had 
been, by and large, a broadcast threat, albeit one supported by training and education 
programmes.  The danger from Communism in Africa was on the increase and for the 
Communist powers broadcasting was but one strand of a diverse cultural propaganda drive into 
the continent.  Cairo's African campaign, and IRD's response to broadcasting has been covered 
in the preceding chapters.  This chapter will consider how IRD saw, and reacted to, Communist 
designs on Africa within the context of decolonisation.  The specifics of IRD's work in Africa 
varied significantly from country to country, and the record is patchy at best – for example, there 
is a comparatively large amount of information on the Congo, but little on Somalia.  The 
intention here, therefore, is to concentrate on the themes and factors that held wide significance 
for Africa, though with the use of specific examples. 
Having secured a direct role for the department in Africa, IRD sought to expand their 
work to meet the renewed Soviet and nascent Chinese efforts to penetrate Africa.  Communist 
penetration and Western response brought the continent a decisive Cold War significance, and 
the process of decolonisation framed the efforts of all sides.  The situation was fluid, and the 
period under consideration essentially amounted to a jockeying for position, wherein the aim of 
both Western and Communist information agencies was to establish a preferential relationship 
with the regimes of nations following their independence.  This chapter will first look at how 
IRD assessed the growing Communist threat to British interests in Africa, in which China was a 
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significant player in contrast to the Middle East.  For IRD, as for the Communist powers, Africa 
was almost wholly a new market for their product and services, and this presented the 
department with a number of challenges as they sought to secure the loyalty of colonial nations 
following independence.  IRD's portfolio of products has already been discussed; these same 
publications were distributed throughout Africa to broadly the same type of recipients.  What is 
somewhat surprising is that, despite producing material on Africa, as late as 1962 nothing was 
produced by the department written specifically for an African audience.  The second, longest 
section of this chapter will examine the methods and tactics the department deployed in a 
specifically African context.   
In East Africa IRD faced a number of obstacles to overcome, even as late as 1961.  
Despite the department's improved relationship with the Colonial Office Information 
Department, two out of the three CO information officers stationed in East Africa remained 
determinedly opposed to IRD material.  Other issues, such as political restrictions on 
propaganda in certain nations, affected IRD on a country-by-country basis.  The legacy of 
colonialism was a regional issue for British propagandists, much as it had been in the Middle 
East, but in Africa the history of slavery and subsequent colonisation was particularly divisive.  
The maintenance of relationships with white-minority regimes in South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia perpetuated old tensions, and worked against the positive message that Britain was 
trying to project.  The third and final section of this chapter will explore these obstacles to IRD 
work in Africa. 
 
Communist tactics in Africa 
The Communist push into Africa was paralleled by a burgeoning interest that nations 
approaching independence had in the outside world.  Nowhere was this more evident than in 
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Nigeria.  The IO there, Colin MacLaren, summarised the situation with a concision that often 
escaped IRD's own arguments.  With more and more of the population 'beginning to feel their 
oats' and look to the outside world, they were increasingly exposed to Nasserite and Communist 
propaganda.  'If someone does not dive in with the right thing', MacLaren reported, 'someone 
will dive in with the wrong thing.  I think in a way it is as simple as that.'3  The fear amongst the 
British information services was that the desire amongst Nigerians for reading material, and their 
curiosity about the wider world, was growing faster than their ability to satisfy it.4 
The arrival of the Reuters news service in Nigeria exposed the country to Soviet 
criticisms of the West and illustrated Communist influence throughout the world.  Whilst there 
did not appear to be any consequent increase in Communist activity in the country, MacLaren 
detected a significant increase in interest about Communism amongst the educated and 
government officials, and newspapers were affording greater coverage to Communism and 
Communist nations.  There was, MacLaren emphasised, 'a need for serious study of the 
techniques required to counter communist propaganda when it begins to show itself seriously.  
The material produced by the Foreign Office shows no sign of any understanding of what 
motives dominate the minds of nationalists – and that means practically all natives able to have 
any political notions whatever – in a country about to shed European control.'  Whilst feelings 
towards Communism were generally negative, highlighting (for example) the situation in 
Hungary required 'an effort of imagination that few…are in a position to make'.  The 
requirement for overt propaganda methods meant that any attack on Communism was evidently 
from a non-Nigerian source, and this therefore raised the issue of whom this benefited.  In 
MacLaren's opinion, British agencies, including IRD, needed to get a grip on the 'mental 
                                                
3 C F MacLaren to J Stacpoole, December 19, 1957, TNA FO 1110/1167/PR10109/6/G. 
4 'General notes on British information services in West African Colonial Territories', J W Stacpoole, June 1958, 
TNA FO 1110/1167/PR10109/57. 
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processes' of the Nigerian population before any propaganda could hope to be persuasive.5  
MacLaren's reading of the situation was important to IRD.  Perhaps the one source based in 
Africa that the department really trusted, MacLaren would return to London to work for IRD 
following Nigerian independence.6   
The Communist nations naturally benefitted from this increased exposure.  Though 
Communism was in no way universally popular, neither were the nations of the West.  The task 
for the Communists was to shape the perception of their nations to the good.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Soviet relations with the developing nations of Africa were no longer contingent on a 
shared socialist ideology.  At this stage, the aim was to pull allegiances away from the Western 
nations and ideally towards the Communists.  In a similar vein, from the African side, whilst 
Communism itself was perhaps not that attractive, there were aspects of the Soviet and Chinese 
positions in world affairs and elements of their foreign policy that were.  In East Africa, it was 
recognised by the British that there were few genuine Communists but a significant proportion 
of African nationalists who were Communist sympathisers.  The pattern adopted by the 
Communists to penetrate Africa in the information field, as seen by IRD and generalised as this 
may be, was 'to cultivate sympathetic journalist-politicians before independence…and after 
independence, when bloc-trained journalists enter naturally into the official nationalist 
government…to shift the emphasis onto the general aid plan of which information projects and 
training are only one aspect.'  This was a long-term strategy, without instant results and at the 
mercy of the decolonisation process.  By late 1963, IRD assessed that Kenya and Zanzibar were 
still at the first stage, Tanganyika and Uganda where somewhat in the middle, with the 
negotiation of aid agreements still progressing.  The Somali Republic was already at an advanced 
                                                
5 'A Note on Anti-Communist Propaganda in Nigeria', C MacLaren, undated but May 1958, TNA FO 
1110/1167/PR10109/57. 
6 O H Morris (CO) to D C Hopson (IRD), 17 October 1961; TNA FO 1110/1447/PR10585/4. 
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stage.  Ethiopia fell outside the general pattern and the Communists had made no headway 
there.7 
It wasn't just journalism, of course.  There were other routes to shaping opinion and 
establishing influence, particularly the formation or development of Communist 'front' 
organisations – putatively independent organisations in fact under the control of the Soviet bloc 
or China (particularly the former).  Here, too, though IRD targeted such organisations, the 
department did not believe that these were agitating for the adoption of Communism itself.  In 
1959 there did not appear to be sufficient evidence that the 'objective conditions' existed for it to 
flourish.  Rather, African nationalism and anti-colonial attitudes were deployed 'to wean the 
emergent states away from the West.'  Local leaders of front organisations such as the World 
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) 
were encouraged by the Soviets to further their positions within local government and unite 
disparate smaller groups under their organisations.  The organisations themselves were used by 
the Communists to disseminate propaganda.8 
Even in the case of trade unions, IRD saw no concrete threat from sustained Communist 
influence in dependent territories, although the situation in West Africa was seen as more 
troubling, and more significant inroads had been made into French territories.  IRD advised a 
cautious approach towards British attempts to influence African trade unions.  In the 
department's view, failure to do so risked what was the defining nature of democratic trade 
unions – independence – being lost.  There was also a continental dimension to future plans, as 
                                                
7 'Communist Penetration of East African Information Media', September 19, 1963, TNA FO 
1110/1692/PR10556/4/G. 
8 Draft, 'Communist "Front" Organisations in Africa', enclosure with D C Hopson (IRD) to C G Costley-White 
(CRO), August 6, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1231/PR1032/57/G. 
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from the department's standpoint in 1959 the concept of a pan-African trade union seemed 
likely to have increasing appeal.9 
There were also more practical and straightforward means to win influence: the provision 
of money and services.  The development of infrastructure and trade links, training of skills, and 
cold hard cash were naturally attractive to nations emerging from colonial control.  A joint 
US/UK Information Working Group was quick to identify the independence of 'almost a score' 
of African countries in 1960 of having 'vastly increased the possibilities of Sino-Soviet activities 
in the continent…[the Communists] have been quick to seize their opportunity to penetrate 
Africa by every means available – diplomatic, economic, cultural and propaganda.'  Economic 
moves into newly independent nations, including loans at low interest (in the case of Chinese 
loans to Ghana and Guinea, interest-free), were 'deceptively attractive' and 'tempting if not 
irresistible to African governments who are eager to industrialise their countries as rapidly as 
possible.'10 
The working group believed that the Sino-Soviet push for cultural relations, with its 
attendant opportunities for propaganda, found its most serious expression in training 
opportunities for Africans within the Soviet bloc, and the provision of instructors and teachers 
for African countries.  Communist front organisations played 'a supporting role to Communist 
governmental efforts'.  Efforts were confined to promoting extremist organisations under pan-
Africanism; international organisations were wary of offending any organisations by seeking 
affiliates.11 
Though historically the nations of Africa had little common purpose, rejection of 
colonialism presented a common and uniting cause to fight.  The concept of Pan-Africanism, 
                                                
9 Draft, 'The Orientation of Trade Unions in Tropical Africa', enclosure with D C Hopson (IRD) to C G Costley-
White (CO), April 12, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1231/PR1032/58/G. 
10 'United States – United Kingdom Information Working Group Meeting October-November 1961, United 
Kingdom Paper' FO 1110/1435/PR10554/61/G. 
11 'United States – United Kingdom Information Working Group Meeting October-November 1961, United 
Kingdom Paper' FO 1110/1435/PR10554/61/G. 
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and the movement that supported it, had developed through the early twentieth century.  
Married to the Cold War push for decolonization in the 1950s, and the perceived value of 
aligned nations to both the Soviet Union and America, this was a fertile ground for propaganda.  
The USA and USSR pushed African politics into a Cold War context, and the Sino-Soviet split 
of the 1960s meant that Africa 'became a three-way ideological battleground', as Maoism 
competed with American capitalism and Soviet Communism for the hearts and minds of African 
leaders and revolutionaries.12  In the same way as Arab nationalism would come to be seen as an 
asset in keeping the Communists out of the Middle East, African nationalism was increasingly 
seen by IRD as filling a similar role. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the pan-African movement was 'not basically hostile to the West, 
save on the colonial issue.'  Rather than attempt to counter or side-line the movement, the 
colonial powers needed instead to cultivate it as a bulwark against both Communist and Egyptian 
influence.  Failure to do so ran the risk of it becoming 'a vehicle for Soviet subversion'.  
Communist penetration and co-option of wider African movements and organisations was a 
greater threat however.  IRD's David Lancashire noted that 'the revolutionary pan-Africanist 
who is directly or indirectly boosted by Communist propaganda is not, in the public mind, 
turned into a Communist stooge; if they register the point at all, he is merely seen to be enlisting 
allies in a just cause.'13  By 1961, David Roberts of IRD was championing a 'campaign to expose 
Communist subversion of African organisations'.  He reasoned that this removed 'the need to 
explain what Communism is from scratch and merely concentrates on the simpler thesis that the 
Communists are taking the Africans for a ride.'14  As noted previously, there was a latent concern 
amongst IOs that too much education about Communism could be counterproductive.  By 
                                                
12 Nicholas Cull, "Africa", in Cull, ed, Propaganda and mass persuasion: a historical encyclopedia, 1500 to the 
present (Santa Barbara Calif., 2003), pp. 8-9. 
13 'Report on visits to Lagos, Lomé, Accra, Freetown and Conakry', July 1961, H H D Lancashire, TNA FO 
1110/1436/PR10555/5. 
14 IRD noted that pan-Africanism was a somewhat artificial construct when applied across Africa as a whole, but did 
have attraction for countries on both sides of the Sahara.  Draft, 'Pan-African Movements', enclosure with D C 
Hopson (IRD) to C G Costley-White (CRO), August 6, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1231/PR1032/57/G; Minute, D A 
Roberts (IRD), October 23, 1961, TNA FO1110/1488/PR1011/101/G. 
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targeting IRD's campaign thus, this issue was avoided and the IOs' constant demands for 
simplified propaganda satisfied.   
Soviet tactics in the short- and medium-term were seen by FO as primarily to subvert 
and co-opt pan-Africanism and its organisations for their own use.  By associating a Communist 
front organisation with each pan-African organisation, the Communists sought to co-opt the 
most dynamic political force in Africa and spread influence beyond those countries in which they 
had diplomatic representation.  The Communist bloc's 'normal tactics of penetration' would also 
be deployed: trade and aid, travel to the bloc, propaganda (supported by 'very heavy broadcasting 
schedules'), and bribery.  In the long term, it was the 'allegiance of the next generation of African 
leaders' that was being sought.15 
To that end, the Soviets and the Chinese funded the AAPSC's Permanent Secretariat in 
Cairo.  Its anti-colonial stance and rhetoric appealed to both.   This was not necessarily a wholly 
successful exercise; whatever ancillary benefits may have accrued.  The conclusion was that, wary 
of tarring the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) movement with outside 
influence, genuine penetration of Africa through the organisation was 'outwardly negligible.'  
Ultimately, the support from both major Communist powers may have damaged the institution 
to some extent; the USA believed that the Sino-Soviet split had certainly done so.16 
Afro-Marxism, a term without precise definition, was nonetheless used to describe the 
direction of African leaders whose economic and political analysis was Marxist in origin but did 
not embrace – and sometimes rejected – Communism.  Though something to be monitored, 
Afro-Marxism was not viewed as necessarily a precursor to Communism.  African Socialism, 
which alongside Afro-Marxism could in theory be exploited in the short-term by the Communist 
                                                
15 Confidential despatch, November 19, 1962, TNA FO1110/1564/PR10554/76. 
16 Draft, 'Afro-Asian Influence on Africa', enclosure with D C Hopson (IRD) to C G Costley-White (CRO), August 
6, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1231/PR1032/57/G ; R D Clift (UK Delegation to NATO) to D A Roberts (IRD), 
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powers, presented 'doctrinal difficulties' arising from the particular nature of fractured African 
socialist practices – so fractured, in fact, that IRD did not see any detailed analysis of it to be 
profitable.17 
The use of slogans and catch phrases, it could be argued, has a greater significance for 
propagandists in the case of less literate and less-developed societies.  The 'sound-bite' has the 
ability to instantly convey a whole range of associated meanings.  In Africa at the end of 1961, it 
was recognised by IRD that the Soviets were making a much better fist of this than the Western 
nations.  The phrase 'neo-colonialism', it was believed, had become sufficiently ingrained in 
African discourse that it would be difficult to shift – impossible, perhaps, even using 'tit-for-tat 
phrases such as "Neo-Imperialism"', no matter how attractive that particular appellation was for 
the British in their 'semantic warfare' with the Soviets.  IRD's concern was that 'Socialist-minded 
African nationalists' who sought to express their hostility to the West seemed all too ready to 
adopt Communist propaganda jargon to do so.  'Neo-colonialism' in IRD's estimate seemed 'to 
be catching on very widely, and is poisoning African minds.'  More work needed to be done.18  
IRD penned an interim report as a stop-gap in late 1963, and also commissioned a Background 
Book by Brian Crozier on the subject of neo-colonialism, which was published in 1964.19 
Despite any estimate of printed or radio propaganda impact being purely speculative, 
increases in both over the few years leading up to 1961 signified 'a danger that their influence has 
risen sharply.'20  At an information officers' conference in Nairobi in 1961, the British 
Information Services projected that '[f]ew people who study the African scene closely have any 
doubts but that within a few years of independence genuine parliamentary democracy will have 
disappeared in the region of Africa under discussion and have been replaced, in essence if not in 
                                                
17 'Communist Prospects in Tropical Africa.', D A Roberts (IRD), enclosure with R H K Marett to Sir Roger 
Stevens, June 7, 1962, TNA FO1110/1564/PR10554/49. 
18 H M Carless (IRD) to D A Roberts (FO), September 25, 1961, TNA FO 1110/1435/PR10554/52; Minute, Hugh 
Carless, April 1961, TNA FO 1110/1435/PR10554/8. 
19 Confidential, J B Ure (IRD) to P M Foster, October 31, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1691/PR10554/58. 
20 'United States – United Kingdom Information Working Group Meeting October-November 1961, United 
Kingdom Paper' FO 1110/1435/PR10554/61/G. 
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form, by some kind of authoritarian government, in the range extending from military 
dictatorship to "banana republic", as was neatly summed up somewhere as "tyranny tempered by 
inefficiency"…None of the emergent territories has a chance of reaching the necessary levels of 
public awareness and responsibility in time.'21  If these constraints were true, they could only 
complicate IRD's efforts to secure Western-leaning regimes following independence.  For the 
Soviets, any destabilisation of the status quo would be enough in the short term. 
 
IRD Methodology in Africa  
The situation that presented itself to IRD in Africa was different again to that in the 
Middle East, which in itself had required new thinking not based on European practice.  '[W]e 
would do well', noted IRD's David Lancashire, 'to realise that the mood of the African-in-the-
street towards a communism whose dialectics and intentions they do not grasp (perhaps the one 
generalisation it is safe to make) is conditioned by different factors from those operating in 
Europe or even Asia'.22  IRD were not averse to the odd generalisation of their own, however: 
despite what was perceived as short-term differences in tactics between the Communist powers, 
the conclusion was that it was still practical to not distinguish between Soviet and Chinese 
information campaigns.23 
In Africa, IRD still targeted educated elites and opinion-shapers over the masses.  There 
was, however, another tranche of society to consider – a definition tainted by imperialist 
prejudices, but nonetheless relevant: 'évolués'; Europeanised Africans.  These may have been few 
                                                
21 'Information Officers' Conference, Nairobi, 1961.  'Information Work in Emergent African Countries.'  Note by 
British Information Services, Kenya.', TNA FO 1110/ 1578/PR10585/3. 
22 'Report on visits to Lagos, Lomé, Accra, Freetown and Conakry', July 1961, H H D Lancashire, TNA FO 
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and far between – for example in Congo-Leopoldville24 – yet their low numbers made them even 
more valuable targets for IRD.  These Europeanised Africans, educated by definition, could be 
worthy of attention even at school-leaver age, with a reasonable expectation that they would 
become influential in perhaps a decade's time.25  As such, efforts to court évolués formed a slightly 
more long-term strand of the prevailing effort to influence the immediate successor regimes and 
opinion-shapers of the newly independent nations of Africa. 
There were two distinct elements to IRD's work in Africa: positive publicity – Britain as 
friend, supporter of independence, and associate – and counter-publicity, where the main focus 
was on 'the positive presentation of our policy, objectives and way of life.'  These were largely 
enacted via British trade and institutional links.  British policy accepted that counter-propaganda 
was a necessity across Africa, but there were two standout considerations.  Firstly, the British 
were aware that any indiscriminate campaign ran the risk of raising awareness of Communist 
ideas outside of the intellectual or political circles in which it was already present.  This was the 
constant concern of the CO in the first few years under examination, though IRD believed their 
assessment of the risk to be inflated.  Secondly, there was the risk of British propaganda 'being 
suspect as parti [pris] and therefore counterproductive.'26  IRD avoided criticism of African 
national governments' links or relationships with Communist nations, preferring to concentrate 
their efforts on Communist, or Communist-penetrated, organisations.27 
One example of the above was IRD's strategy towards Guinea.  Having followed an 
avowedly revolutionary socialist policy since independence in 1958, Guinea was a model of 
political repression and personal oppression.  Though IRD was firmly of the opinion that 'many 
of Guinea's misfortunes have arisen from her own pig-headed incompetence', the department 
was adamant that they should not point this out.  Rather, efforts were directed towards showing 
                                                
24 In the Belgian Congo, the term was applied generally to the educated middle class. 
25 Appendix J, 'Information Research Department Work', September 29, 1962, TNA FO 
1110/1531/PR10158/18/G. 
26 Original text is parti puis. 'Information Policy for Africa', June 30, 1961, TNA FO1110/1564/PR10554/76 
27 Minute, Hugh Carless, April 1961, TNA FO 1110/1435/PR10554/8. 
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how the Guineans had been misled and taken advantage of by Communists.  'From this the 
moral for the whole of Africa is deduced.'28 
General British information work across Africa was as varied as one would expect.  In 
East Africa, whilst opportunities to place material in the press and radio were limited, Britain 
fostered goodwill by providing equipment such as printing presses or transmitters, trained staff 
and seconded BBC staff.  In French West Africa, where Britain had little in the way of interests 
to protect, Bob Marett notes that rather than appoint information officers, it was British practice 
to open small embassies wherein the emphasis was more on offering assistance to newly 
independent nations than on normal information work.  As such, information work became the 
responsibility of all staff.  'The Information Officer', explains Marett, 'if anybody could be called 
that, was essentially the Ambassador himself.'29  Yet IRD and the African IOs progressively 
developed an increasingly cogent strategy for Africa as a whole. 
At a Regional Information Conference at Dakar in April 1961, four main points arose 
out of the discussion.  That all material for Africa should be 'Africanised' mirrored previous 
conclusions on IRD work in the Middle East: material should be topical and appropriate.  
Radicalism in Africa, and the 'natural left-wing, almost revolutionary socialist swing' needed to be 
accommodated and respected.  This paralleled the accommodation of Arab nationalism in the 
Middle East – fighting battles that could not be won could only ever be counterproductive.  The 
desire amongst Africans to stay out of the Cold War meant that rather than strict anti-
Communism, propaganda should emphasise constructive themes, illustrating the benefit to 
Africans of following a certain course – although Communist machinations should also be 
discretely highlighted whenever possible.  Finally, 'cross-fertilisation' between former British and 
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French colonies, and visits to Britain and Europe, were to be encouraged as much as possible.30  
On the flipside of this final point, IRD also liaised with other Western nations to restrict the 
movement of students who transited areas in Western Europe en route to the Soviet Bloc.31 
Beyond these points, and with front activity intensifying, IRD believed that the 
information services needed to do all that was possible to expose the true nature of such 
organisations, and their connection with and utility to the Communist powers.  At the same time 
this support was to be provided to non-Communist international organisations, and delegates 
who could be relied upon to support Western interests sent to international conferences, even 
those that were 'ostensibly harmless', to ensure that British interests did not go by default.32 
Issues of topicality were coloured by issues of colonialism.  During a 1961 tour of West 
African posts by IRD's David Lancashire, a key concern of posts was how to make the 
department's standard anti-Communist fare relevant – at all – to Africans.  Colonialism worked 
against many of the standard examples IRD used elsewhere.  An official from the Nigerian 
Foreign Office reported that criticism of the Hungarian government met with the response that 
'it may be Communist but it is run by Hungarians, not by foreigners and for the present that is 
all that matters to us'.33  IRD obviously needed to focus on African issues.  
IOs in East Africa were convinced of the need for restrained propaganda.  Their 
conclusion was that 'any statement emerging from the United Kingdom which disparages the 
ideology, politics or behaviour of another Power can only be counter-productive.'  Propaganda 
needed to be subtle, avoid directly challenging Communism, and be dispassionate and factual.  In 
the IOs' opinions it was important to exploit 'all the advantages of inner lines of communication' 
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before independence.34  What was wanted in Britain's East African colonies was 'not so much 
material taking an openly anti-Communist line as material about developments in Africa written 
from the point of view of a moderate Nationalist whose leanings were towards the West rather 
than towards the Communists.'  This type of information work would normally have been 
conducted by IPD, yet in East Africa it was (primarily) through the effectiveness of 
Transmission 'X' that IRD took on this role.35  'Positive' information work had been part of 
IRD's original mandate, though this had been quickly been set aside in the late 1940s in favour 
of more 'offensive' propaganda, ceding the positive role to IPD and the British Council.36  Here, 
though, IRD's continued to diversify and take on responsibilities that would appear beyond the 
department's remit.    
British information policy in Africa from 1962 was increasingly positive, and directed 
along a number of political themes: the right to independence, and to defend that right; 
promotion of inter-racial relationships; helping nations work towards a 'strong and inviolable 
Africa…[a]bove all'; the example of parliamentary democracy, while accepting that Africans 
should create their own administrations; promotion of the Commonwealth and the United 
Nations; nuclear disarmament, with the necessity of British deterrent strategy until that point; 
stable, economically viable decolonisation.  In the economic sphere, the British emphasised an 
increase in trade, commercial relationships and provision of technical advice.  Britain was to 
assist in the African nations' inclusion into the global economy.  Culturally, the aim was to 
promote English language teaching and educate about African culture, and here the British 
Council had a significant role.  Countering Communism meant exposing the deficiencies of 
'scientific socialism' – planned economies, development programmes and governance – while 
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showing the variety of ways the West could help post-colonial Africa develop.  Britain's 
achievements in 'political and economic liberation' of colonial peoples were to be contrasted with 
the suppression of national loyalty, eradication of religion and economic exploitation faced by 
the satellite nations of the Soviet bloc.37  Efforts were being made on the part of the Soviets to 
're-write' African history in a Marxist context.  This, IRD's David Roberts noted, had 'always 
been a Communist obsession'.  The issue in Africa was that the Western powers had 'failed to 
provide a history of Africa acceptable to Africans for the up and coming generation.'38 
IRD work in certain African nations was comparatively easy, notably the Congo and 
Nigeria.  In the case of the former, one IRD officer wrote that she was 'hampered only by lack 
of material.'39  This was not the case in the majority of nations, and where IRD work proved 
problematic, one solution was to get someone else to do it.  In mid-1961, IRD established a 
contact within the Agence France-Presse (AFP) news agency.  The agency, administered in Paris 
and an official organ of the French Government, was an important new route for IRD given the 
agency's prodigious output – 16,000 words daily to East Africa alone.40  AFP was understandably 
reluctant to receive anti-Communist material directly from IRD regarding ex-French colonies,41 
but the real benefit was providing a third-party route for information in to ex- or current British 
ones.  Other agencies could also distribute IRD material where IRD was unable to do so.  For 
example, in post-independence Somalia, where the British information office had been closed, 
the number-two man in the American Embassy in Mogadishu passed on IRD material to select 
high-level individuals via the Chief of Police, and recipients included the Prime Minster.42  British 
nationals could also be counted upon: the English Radio broadcasts of Radio Brazzaville were 
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handled by three British subjects and so offered a reliable means to get the department's material 
transmitted.43 
Contacts with the British press could also be exploited.  Norman Reddaway believed that 
the most useful means 'of propagating I.R.D.'s wares [in neutralist countries] is to expand the 
distribution of [largely British] newspapers and periodicals which regularly reflect discrete 
briefing by I.R.D. in London.'44  This technique bypassed local restrictions on propaganda; 
however these prohibitions could often simply be sidestepped.  In Khartoum, distribution of 
propaganda by foreign nations was banned, yet the Sudanese police seemed happy to turn a blind 
eye to its circumvention.  Rather than being tasked with distribution, the IO in Khartoum sent 
lists back to either the RIO or IRD of persons to whom certain material should be forwarded 
under plain cover.  The Sudanese police were apparently fully aware of this situation and took no 
action.45   
Publishing of IRD-sponsored or -authored material provided another opportunity for 
IRD to get their material into Africa with its provenance obscured, and there were a number of 
schemes to get cheap books onto the African market.  For example, in mid-1963 IRD were in 
consultation with Longman's with the aim of producing cheap books for underdeveloped 
nations, with Africa the first and main target.  Additionally, Franklins were seeking 'co-operation' 
for a new and widespread publishing scheme in Nigeria.46  Such co-operation was viewed with 
caution by IRD.  Franklin's was a cartel, created in large part by the USIA and one that made use 
of USIA posts abroad to support its operations via local publishers.  IRD were in two minds: 
whilst the department's J B Ure could see in the Franklin's scheme the potential to reach a vast 
and untapped market, and a chance to adapt the scheme to create and distribute (particularly 
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'indigenous') IRD material, Tucker was wary of the financial implications, and whether the 
scheme was 'in essence an attempt to harness the Nigerian market to the American system.'47 
IRD obviously believed that just getting the information into the right hands could be 
profitable.  In Uganda, IRD sent out material under plain cover to recipients who the 
department assumed were 'unaware of its origin'.  These materials were mailed from within 
Uganda.  With Uganda approaching independence, there was obviously some concern how a 
successor government would view such practice, but there were no plans to stop it.  IRD's J G 
McMinnies argued that, as well as making it difficult to resume it in the future, 'recipients might 
well react with enquiries, perhaps in embarrassing quarters, about the source, and possible 
continuation of their supply.'48 
Given the above efforts to get material into Africa, it is perhaps somewhat surprising 
then that even as late as mid-1962 no IRD material was produced specifically for an African 
audience.  Two periodicals, African Opinion and Communism and Africa, were published in English 
and French, and material was of course distributed, but nothing, including the two periodicals 
above, was tailored for Africa.  Whilst the Soviets largely made material such as general 
publications aimed at underdeveloped countries available to Africans via translation, there were a 
few such as the illustrated News magazine, certain embassy briefs, publications of front 
organisations and others that appeared to be specially prepared for an African audience.49  The 
'omni-directional' nature of the majority of IRD and COI work was a core part of its 
construction, but by 1962 Leslie Glass noted that it was 'becoming increasingly clear that if we 
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want our material to carry punch, it must have local relevance.  This means either editing or re-
writing on the spot; or more material for special areas produced in London; or both.'50 
IRD's rules concerning the distribution of their material were fairly strict, but they were 
prepared to bend them if necessary.  In countries where it was illegal to distribute material 
without an imprint, IRD got round this with the (perhaps rather thin) subterfuge that material 
was 'internal papers intended as for our own office briefs.'  Obviously, any distribution by the 
USIS or similar agency would make such a cover story unsustainable.  In certain circumstances, 
IRD would arrange for the publication to be reproduced 'in a slightly different form' omitting 
reference numbers and dates since, it was 'a pity, if the chance for such distribution occurs, to 
miss a market.'51 
One final option was to provide training for the information organisations of a nation, 
both to increase their effectiveness and presumably to influence thinking.  In 1961, two Sudanese 
officials from the Ministry of Information were invited to a 3-week course on anti-Communist 
propaganda techniques in Britain.  The first ten days were spent with the COI, BBC (at TV 
Centre and at the Monitoring Unit at Caversham) and at Oxford University, and the remainder 
with IRD at Carlton House Terrace.52  This was by any measure a comprehensive course and one 
with access to usually restricted areas of the British information apparatus, and this access and 
training was by no means restricted to the Sudanese. 
The most guaranteed way to ensure IRD interests or aims were progressed in a country 
was of course to station an IRD officer there.  Doing so allowed IRD to establish links with 
organisations perhaps beyond those that would be created by normal information officers and to 
feed back information that was specifically useful to IRD.  An example of this would be the 
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work of Elizabeth Wyndham, an IRD Officer specialising in international organisations.  In 
1958, posted to Sudan, Wyndham established a women's club, and worked hard to establish and 
maintain good relations with Sudanese society, particularly the young.  Most male university 
graduates were Communists; these were the future husbands of the women Wyndham sought to 
influence, and thus she sought to influence them by proxy.53  IRD considered Wyndham's 
reports 'particularly valuable' and deserving of distribution throughout Africa, the 
Commonwealth and the Middle East.  Her reports opened 'a window on a little known view – 
that of a traditional society, Islamic and patriarchal, where old forms are breaking down and new 
ideas are flooding in.'54 Wyndham was subsequently stationed in the Congo, where she liaised 
with the West Germans, established contact within the church, and toured the regions of the 
Congo feeding back specific and valuable information to IRD.55 
Whilst such individuals as Wyndham were skilled and of great use to IRD, they were also 
of great use to the information offices in which they were stationed.  L R Kay, IRD's man in 
Leopoldville, operated under cover of the general information staff, but was also required to 
pitch in with 'straight' information work.  (Kay was one of two assistants to the Information 
Officer.)  Kay noted that '[f]rom the point of view of my cover this makes excellent sense.' 
However, cuts to the information staff meant that he had to fill in for the Information Officer 
when he was away, and this cover was not reciprocated.  'Something has got to give', he 
explained, 'andin [sic] the circumstances I am afraid that IRD work is bound to suffer.'56   
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This potential co-option was factored in by IRD when considering new positions for 
their officers.  When discussing proposals for an IRD officer in Lagos, IRD were aware that 
whoever was sent had to be 'strong enough to cope with the C.R.O. before he will be able to 
tackle the Nigerians', and so not be side-tracked by the CRO into helping with their own 
information work.57  McMinnies in Kenya had already some experience of the High Commission 
seeking to use him as 'a useful pair of hands in Chancery.'58   
IRD officers were so fundamental to getting IRD work in place that when the (British) 
Southern Cameroons and French Cameroun merged in October 1961 to form the independent 
Republic of Cameroon,59 David Lancashire of IRD was dispatched to Yaoundé as a press attaché 
to test the market for full-time information.  This was intended to be for an initial period of 18 
months.  Despite the role involving the full remit of press officer responsibilities – of which IRD 
work would only constitute a part – IRD were prepared to foot the bill for the full 18-month 
term.  IRD, instead of the Information Executive Department (IED), also made the 
arrangements.  This may well have been, as the press officer noted, because Cameroon was 'the 
hinge between West and Central Africa…the only African country whose independent 
government is actively engaged in hostilities against a Communist revolutionary movement…the 
only country in Africa with both a French and English culture and officially using both 
languages.'60  IRD were obviously keen to establish a presence in such an important nation.  
Though happy to carry the post for the eighteen-month period, IRD saw no reason why the 
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department should continue to pay beyond that point, and the post was instead transferred to 
the open vote at the end of 1962.61 
One legacy of French colonialism was that the provision of material in French became 
increasingly important to IRD in Africa, particularly in the Congo.  In late 1960, IRD acquired an 
in-house, full-time translator in order to increase the amount of French material they were able 
to supply.62  IRD work at the recently opened consulate in Yaoundé, in Cameroon, would of 
course also benefit from French material.  Domestic African languages did not always receive the 
same attention, however.  IRD were aware that the Communist bloc was paying 'ever increasing 
attention' to Swahili, yet neither the CRO nor the BIS saw this as significant enough of an issue 
to ask for IRD material in Swahili, considering the broadcasts already available from the BBC.63 
Information officers in Africa largely fulfilled the same functions as their counterparts in 
the Middle East, but there were a number of local factors that provided additional opportunities 
for IRD.  Some of them reflected the tribal nature of African society:  In Congo-Leopoldville 
IRD targeted traditional African societal values that the department saw as inimical to 
Communist ideals and practices.  Subordination of family ties to Communist state obligations, 
compulsory working, state ownership of land and collectivisation all appeared to IRD to threaten 
traditional Congolese attitudes, which placed family first, and the state a very distant third after 
tribal ties.64 
Religion provided another opportunity, particularly in West Africa where there were 
common religious ties between Britain and its dependent territories.  As early as October 1956, 
MacLaren had established contacts with the Head of the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy in 
Nigeria.  It goes without saying how important Christian contacts would have been in a country 
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in which Christianity, playing second fiddle to Islam until the early 1950s, was on the ascendant.  
Nigerian religious figures were useful not only for their influence with the population, but also 
because they were able to read Arabic and material could therefore be supplied to them directly 
by RIO Beirut.65  MacLaren also forged links with the White Fathers, a missionary organisation 
with direct ties to Rome, that had sought the evangelization of Africa since the end of the 19th 
century.  By 1962, copies of IRD publications, brochures and periodicals were being sent to the 
organisation's London address for distribution across Africa.66 
Outside of Nigeria, L R Kay, the IRD officer in Leopoldville, passed on significant 
numbers (in the hundreds) of booklets starting in June 1963 to Pére Ryex, a Jesuit superior based 
in Kwilu province.  By any measure this represents a considerable distribution for IRD.  
Contacts with the Catholic Church were also strengthened in northern Congo during the early 
1960s, as well as with the representative of the Apostolic Delegate.67  There were also, lesser 
contacts with Islamic religious figures in the east, that echoed the sort of ties IRD had been able 
to establish in the Middle East – Somali Islamic leaders seemed receptive to IRD material on 
Communism and Islam, perhaps even to wholly authored sermons.68 
The department carried out some minor work as far out as Mauritius, and by February 
1959 had commenced work in territories as small as Guinea.69  Yet even as late as mid-1960 IRD 
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assessed British information resources in Africa to be thin on the ground, when weighed against 
the efforts of the Soviets and Chinese to penetrate Africa.70   
CO resistance continued beyond Stacpoole's appointment in 1957, and there were 
further obstacles that presented themselves to IRD.  These are discussed below.  To sum up the 
preceding two sections, one could do worse than the assertion of Ralph Murray, explaining the 
situation as faced by the FO information services to the CO in early 1961: 
The whole gravity of the cold war is changing as the factors of political, 
economic and ideological penetration by the Communist bloc change character 
with the devolution of responsibilities by the colonial powers and with the 
devotion of additional Communist resources to "co-existence", and we are 
expanding and, I hope, improving our organisation to meet this.71 
 
Obstacles and Resistance to IRD work in Africa 
As previously discussed, the Colonial Office had opposed IRD's direct involvement in 
Africa, though by 1958 the situation was improving with the COID under new leadership.  
Convincing information officers in East Africa of the value of IRD material, nevertheless, was a 
continuing and frustrating problem for IRD to overcome.  This was still the case in 1961.  By 
this point there were three IOs in East Africa – McMullen in Nairobi, Gilmour in Tanganyika 
and Morgan in Uganda – and of these, only Morgan seemed enthusiastic or even particularly 
informed about IRD work.  McMullen, formerly of the CO, was considered by IRD to be 'an old 
enemy'.  During a meeting in early 1961, Morgan at least was able to say that 'such-and-such a 
piece of I.R.D. material was distributed in such-and-such a way' for most of the department's 
material brought up in the session.  McMullen and Gilmour, in contrast, seemed either ignorant 
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of the material, or to have made no effort to distribute it – or even to have investigated the 
market for it.72   
It must have been particularly galling for IRD to continue to be so reliant on a handful of 
individuals who could so effectively stall their operation over much of the continent.  Gilmour 
and McMullen's attitude was of course a reflection of that held previously by many CO officials 
back in London.  '[T]he whole question of I.R.D./Colonial Office liaison…has never been 
satisfactory', wrote IRD's 'Tommy' Tucker in 1961, 'because of the negative attitude of the 
Colonial Office.  Indeed, the comparative success we are having with our material in other parts 
of Africa serves to highlight this attitude, not only on the part of officials in London but of those 
in the field as well.'73 
In Kenya, McMullen complained about 'a "morgue" of [IRD] material on international 
themes where the cold war operates and on Communism, which have been totally unsuitable tels 
quels, and because of lack of factual source material and time, beyond tinkering with editorially.'  
In McMullen's opinion, any improvement 'would require a fair amount of determined brain-
washing at the production level' – which was harsh comment indeed.  IRD believed that 
McMullen displayed a continued lack of understanding as to how their material was to be used.  
It was not to be treated as general information material to be handed out overtly, nor was 
McMullen supposed to focus on the 'politically conscious elite'.  'The right answer', argued IRD, 
'is to take all the opportunities available to us of influencing all sections of the population within 
reach…our main target is those who help to form public opinion in all walks of life.'  IRD fully 
rejected McMullen's belief that their material was not sufficiently based on fact.74  Ultimately, 
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McMullen performed almost no IRD work; Donald Hopson reported that McMullen 'did not 
understand it and was in consequence very much opposed to it.  He regarded it as being his job 
to only do "positive" information work'. 75 
The attitude of McMullen and Gilmour drove Ralph Murray to press for IRD 
representation in Nairobi – the Kenyan information office was the main one in East Africa and 
so had widespread responsibilities.  Murray made this suggestion to the CO within the context of 
significant increases in IRD work being undertaken across the region – an IRD officer would 
handle the increased workload, provide expertise on both Communist and Egyptian propaganda, 
and such official and unofficial techniques and facilities as were only available to the department.  
IRD was also in a perfect position, Murray argued, to stimulate a flow of West African 
information to the east, and would have the time to pursue the painstaking and involved process 
of cultivating contacts for IRD material that local IOs likely did not have.  The officer, IRD 
suggested, should hold a 'recognisable status' in Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika.  
Whilst the CO baulked at the idea of an IRD representative with such wide-ranging 
responsibilities, the idea of an officer attached to Kenya as an IO, who could offer advice to the 
other territories, was acceptable.  The officer could even have cover as CO staff.76 
Seconded to Nairobi in November 1961 under the above agreement, IRD's, John 
McMinnies opened up contacts throughout the Kenyan administration; in various ministries, 
intelligence, the military, broadcasting and education.  In addition, IRD could now count on a 
flow of information and intelligence out of the country, better informing their work.  Despite 
only officially covering Kenya as per the CO's restrictions, McMinnies had visited and assisted 
Tanganyika and Uganda within a few months of his arrival.77 
                                                
75 'I.R.D. Officer, Nairobi', D C Hopson, April 11, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1578/PR10585/24/G. 
76 Ralph Murray (FO) to C Y Carstairs (CO), February 10, 1961; C Y Carstairs to R Murray, April 5, 1961; R Murray 
to C Y Carstairs, April 11, 1961;TNA FO 1110/1435/PR10554/1/G. 
77 'I.R.D. Officer, Nairobi', D C Hopson, April 11, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1578/PR10585/24/G. 
195 
 
The CO had proven so intractable across Africa that in 1958 the Embassy in Khartoum 
had written in exasperation to ask IRD 'on which side is the Colonial Office batting? On the 
Christian and anti-communist or the Soviet and communist? ...I cannot, even after deep thought, 
attempt a guess as to why they should not help us like men in this fight.'78   Yet this resistance 
was fading as territories achieved independence and subsequently fell under FO or 
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) responsibility.   
Nigeria was the second African nation to join the Commonwealth during the Cold War 
(Ghana was the first), and the first nation to do so whilst IRD was involved in Africa.  The 
contrast with how the CRO viewed IRD is clearly evident.  After Nigerian independence it was 
the view of the High Commission in Lagos that 'much of the IRD non-attributable material on 
offer was not worth the risk we should run in passing it around.'  The 'techniques and materials 
of colonial days' were no longer seen as relevant.  Yet the CRO was quick to ask for IRD help in 
reviewing counter-Communist work in the country – help that would also provide IRD with an 
opportunity to gain valuable on-the-spot intelligence on the situation in Nigeria.  The High 
Commission wanted 'an IRD specialist of senior rank, to visit Lagos and our outposts for a 
minimum of ten days… to cast an expert eye on the Communist propaganda material reaching 
this country…and to advise us… and the visit should provide IRD themselves with detailed and 
first-hand information.'79  
It is worth pointing out that the CO Information Department was – by and large, and 
with the possible exception of Cox – not working to be obstructive for the sake of it, much as it 
must have seemed that way to IRD.  The CO information department (COID) was, prior to 
1946, the CO's Public Relations Branch, not a full information arm.  As Rosaleen Smyth has 
described, a CO handbook published in 1948 set out the role of the COID as both to develop 
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the information departments of the individual colonies, and to strengthen and maintain the 
relationship between Britain and her colonies '"by giving them information about British life and 
achievement, by explaining relevant government policy, and by trying to prove that the Western 
democratic life has more to offer than Communism'" – though, as Smyth notes, post-war 
colonial policy was 'developed within the context of the Cold War…[and with] a hint of 
approaching decolonisation.'80  Where IRD had quickly adapted to a multi-faceted approach to 
counter-Communism, the CO in Africa, insulated from Communism, would not have needed to 
do so.  That the COID, with a decade-long history of countering Communism – or not – in 
territories that were its sole purview, shifted its attitude at all is perhaps most surprising, and 
surely a product of rapid decolonisation and the sudden exigencies of the Communist threat as 
to any desire to do so.  By 1962 the Colonial Office was a pale shadow of its former self, and it 
recognised that its time had largely passed, accepting that 
[t]he area to which the Colonial Office directs its information work has 
considerably diminished in the past few years, and will continue to diminish.  We 
are therefore generally content to fall in with the views of the other Overseas 
Departments.81 
IRD encountered resistance beyond that of the CO, of course.  For example, in May 
1960 the Chancery in Ethiopia decided that with a wholly state-controlled media there was little 
market for IRD's product.  The Embassy sent a letter to IRD asking them to stop sending all of 
their material forthwith.  With Communist economic penetration already evident, the Chancery's 
letter left Hopson rather nonplussed:   
'We had believed we were in on a rising market in Africa…I am not in a position 
to express an opinion about the scope for information work in Ethiopia…We 
must leave you to be the best judge of that.  But, frankly, these two most recent 
letters have made me wonder whether we at home and you in the field are really 
on the same wavelength as regards aims and objects….I find it hard to believe 
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that there is no one in Ethiopia who would not be interested in facts…of such 
vital concern to the future of his country.82 
The Embassy at Addis Ababa was at pains to stress how difficult it was to cultivate personal 
contacts.  Such carefully cultivated personal friendships as the Embassy staff had managed to 
make were, they said, in danger of being ruined if they attempted to pass IRD material.83 
Independent, Commonwealth, and under a highly left-wing regime, Ghana presented a 
particular challenge to IRD work.  It was difficult to circulate any of the department's material 
there, even to those sympathetic to Britain's position, as there was a risk that this would 
compromise them to the authorities.  IRD sympathised with the High Commission that it was 
'without doubt that Accra is a tough assignment'.  By March 1962, the British High 
Commissioner in Accra was calling for an IRD officer to be attached to his staff to help out, 
ostensibly as a Second Secretary.84  The British viewed Ghana not only as under threat of 
Communist subversion, but as a threat to the rest of the continent, too.  Any information work 
in this most authoritarian of the newly independent African states was immensely difficult.  The 
information infrastructure was controlled by 'left-wing extremists… [who were] supervised 
closely by the President and his information advisors so that it is impossible…to place I.R.D. 
material in them.  It was – 'a situation…which approaches that prevailing in a Communist 
country'.85 
Criticisms of topicality and appropriateness of IRD material, as far as the UKIOs in East 
Africa were concerned, centred on both cultural and racial issues.  There was, in the case of the 
former, an assumption of similar cultural, religious and moral values that was simply incorrect in 
a region where much of the population came from a tribal background.  The IOs believed the 
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85 'Note on I.R.D. Work in Ghana', August 1962-August 1963, TNA FO 1110/1697/PR10566/47/G. 
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latter, racial, factor to be perhaps the most crucial issue.  IOs perceived amongst the African 
population a 'severe psychological…block as far as anything European is concerned'.  Africans 
did 'not conceal that the principal factor motivating their current political views is a bitter 
resentment of the European, deriving from some racial slight they (alas too often) have received, 
or imagine they have received.'86 
Indeed, Britain's relationships with her colonies in Africa were often shaped by similar 
stereotypical, racial and paternalistic assumptions to those that prejudiced her relationships with 
the Middle East – and these were often even less palatable.   Such assumptions surged to the 
fore at the beginning of the Mau Mau emergency in Kenya in 1952.  British propaganda often 
sidestepped any consideration of the Kikuyu's (genuine) grievances: their behaviour was so savage 
that it stood outside any rational discussion of Kenya's political situation.  Characterised thus, 
Kenyan government and Colonial Office propaganda often explored Kikuyu acts in terms of 
irrationality and madness, of a failure to adapt to colonial civilising norms of behaviour, of 
'adolescence', and of connections to tribal (non Christian) religion.  Many settlers' actions and 
attitudes went further, coloured by (as the CO saw it) a failure to commit to future self-
government, and displaying a ruthlessness towards the insurgents.  The CO propaganda 
campaign therefore also sought to address what was seen as a concernedly 'South African 
outlook to…African problems' amongst the settler population.87 
                                                
86 'Information Material on World Affairs for African Consumption', Memorandum for a meeting on 7 December 
between Mr R H K Marett, Foreign Office, the Chief Secretary, Government of Kenya, Minister of Information and 
Broadcasting, Government of Kenya and United Kingdom Information Officers, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, 
December 7, 1960, TNA FO 1110/1435/PR10554/1/G. 
87 Carruthers, hearts and minds, pp. 136-137, 139.  Report on the situation in Kenya, written by Erskine to Harding, 
9/11/53; WO 216/860 cited in Carruthers, hearts and minds, p. 147  IRD did not operate in Colonial territories at this 
time, nor had their remit expanded beyond straight counter-Communism.  IRD were certainly involved in trying to 
paint the Mau Mau uprising as Communist-inspired in the British and international press (see Carruthers, "Red") 
however, the Emergency was essentially over by 1956-7, when IRD became active in Africa itself.  The author has 
not uncovered any evidence that IRD concerned itself locally with Mau Mau.  Race was not just a problem for the 
colonial powers.  It should also be noted that America's domestic race-relations situation derogated their messages 
of freedom and equality, and provided ample ammunition to Communist propagandists. As Kenneth Osgood has 
argued, '[f]ew issues more thoroughly hampered U.S. courtship of the developing world than American racial 
practices.', Osgood, Total Cold War, p. 281.  
199 
 
Given the above, the fact that Britain was pulled into relationships with minority 
governments in southern Africa inevitably soured the view of Britain in the eyes of black 
Africans, and undermined the message that British information policy sought to project.  A 
cornerstone of British policy was the emphasis of British principles and values – held up as a 
positive and, it was hoped, attractive example to the developing nations of Africa.  The essential 
hypocrisy of the situation was clear, as an information report of 1963 noted: 'freedom of the 
individual, equal political rights for all, equal rights before the law, impartial justice…it is no 
good our stressing these points if at the same time we seem, by upholding white minority 
governments in Southern Rhodesia or the Union [of South Africa], to be abetting the denial of 
these freedoms and rights to black African populations.'88 
Nowhere was this situation more evident than in South Africa.  IRD had to chart a 
careful course there, and a comparatively late one at that. In the last months of 1962, when IRD 
material was first requested by the Chancery in Pretoria, Roberts of IRD was well aware of the 
central issue.  'The racial policies of the South African Government entail special conditions for 
I.R.D. work', he noted.  'The over-riding consideration is that it would be fatal to allow our anti-
Communist effort to become identified in the minds of Africans with the ill-directed anti-
Communism of the South African Government.89  The problem was that Communism was a 
particularly convenient label to apply to any opposition the Afrikaner government faced.  Kit 
Barclay cautioned that this could mean the 'misuse' of supplied IRD material in support of white 
nationalist interests.  This must have been (objectively) somewhat galling, since there was 
significant resistance to Communism amongst a white population in which Barclay perceived a 
'ready market for I.R.D. material'.90 
                                                
88 'Information Policy Report', F W Marten (British Embassy, Leopoldville) to R H K Marett (FO), May 24, 1963, 
TNA FO 1110/1661/PR10158/20. 
89 'Information Research Department Work, South Africa, Appendix H', enclosure with Minute, D A Roberts, 
October 9, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1554/PR10201/9. 
90 C F R Barclay to Information Officer, Johannesburg, January 4, 1961, TNA FO 1110/1554/PR10201/1. 
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There were several strands of propaganda for IRD to consider: propaganda to Afrikaans 
and the South African authorities, with the aim of making their own propaganda more 
sophisticated; propaganda 'to progressive white opinion'; and propaganda aimed at Africans.  Of 
these, understandable when framed in a continental context, it was the latter that was IRD's 'real 
business' in South Africa.  The embassy was already engaged in overt, 'white' propaganda (if one 
will forgive the unfortunate confusion of terms) to the black population, in the form of 
newsletters.  A covert, 'black' campaign, was also being considered between IRD and the 
Embassy, and it should be noted that this was a genuine departure from IRD's standard practice 
of eschewing such material – the first example of such that this research has discovered in the 
regions under study since that during the Suez Crisis.  Any 'grey' propaganda ran the risk of 
causing major problems with the South African government – although it was noted that this 
could perhaps be achieved by 'seepage' of propaganda from Basutoland, a crown colony (present 
day Lesotho).91  By November 1962, the Secretariat in Basutoland was requesting significant 
increases to the initial volume of material sent just one month earlier.92   Naturally, contacts 
relevant to South Africa existed outside the country, notably within the ANC, and IRD, and the 
Embassy in Pretoria, sought to cultivate contacts within the organisation at its base in Dar es 
Salaam from 1962 onwards.93 
  
Conclusion: Kenya, and the end of the colonial period in Africa. 
It was 'no use to speak of keeping the Cold War out of Africa', declared IRD's David 
Roberts in 1962, a trifle obviously.  'It has arrived there and is going on.'94  As noted above, 
                                                
91 'Information Research Department Work, South Africa, Appendix H', enclosure with Minute, D A Roberts, 
October 9, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1554/PR10201/9. 
92 U B Tristram (Maseru) to K G Fry (CO), November 2, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1558/PR10542/44. 
93 J S Longrigg (Pretoria) to D A Roberts (IRD), November 29, 1962 (2 letters of the same date), TNA FO 
1110/1554/PR10201/7/G. 
94 'Communist Prospects in Tropical Africa.', D A Roberts (IRD), enclosure with R H K Marett to Sir Roger 
Stevens, June 7, 1962, TNA FO1110/1564/PR10554/49. 
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comparatively few involved in information work in Africa would have disagreed with him.  By 
this point, the British had 6 information officers in Africa, reflecting the increased importance of 
the continent:  one in Dakar covering Senegal and Mauritania; one in Abidjan covering the Ivory 
Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey; one in Bamako covering Mali; one in Yaoundé (an 
IRD officer) covering Cameroon; one in Brazzaville covering Congo-Brazzaville, the Central 
African Republic, Chad and Gabon; and one (with two assistants, one of whom was IRD) in 
Leopoldville covering Congo-Leopoldville.  In Nairobi, an IRD officer – Kay – was operating 
'under the aegis of the Colonial Office and the United Kingdom Information Office.'  Other 
posts and labour attachés performed an amount of IRD work and were briefed on IRD material 
respectively.  In Mali, the prospect of posting an IRD officer there was under constant review.  
These were, Roberts reported, 'thinly spread forces, determined by finance, manpower and the 
limits of practical possibilities…a first effort… All these officers had to master the administrative 
and technical problems of setting up posts from scratch and are now beginning to make their 
impact'95 
By the end of 1963, the only significant British territory remaining, Kenya, would also be 
independent.  The fate of this territory was viewed at the time through the lens of the fears the 
IOs noted above, and the reality of the situation on the continent.  As Kenya progressed to 
independence, IRD work shifted to a new focus.  As McMinnies explained, 'the key IRD targets 
will at last be clearly identified.  While maintaining a shotgun spread over the existing field, we 
shall need to concentrate accurate rifle fire on the individuals who will hold the vital offices after 
independence.  We would also expect, whichever party wins, to cash in on the modest stakes we 
have laid on each.'96 
                                                
95 'Communist Prospects in Tropical Africa.', D A Roberts (IRD), enclosure with R H K Marett to Sir Roger 
Stevens, June 7, 1962, TNA FO1110/1564/PR10554/49; Minute, 'Africa Section Activities', March 22, 1962, TNA 
FO 1110/1564/PR10554/22/G. 
96 J G McMinnies (BIS Nairobi) to J K Drinkall (IRD), March 15, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1704/PR10585/32/G. 
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The fear in Kenya was that the country would suffer 'the natural anti-Western spasm 
which grips most African countries attaining independence', although it was hoped these would 
be short-lived.  A bloc presence was likely to be established within Kenya before independence. 
'Communist experts can heighten and accelerate the process of demonstrating its [Kenya's] 
neutrality and African-ness in which the Government will indulge immediately after 
Independence.'  It would, in the British analysis, be reasonable to expect that Kenya would 
'swerve to the left' to the same degree as Tanganyika had.97  Of key concern to IRD was that the 
policy of non-alignment, which Kenya was to pursue after independence, would limit the scope 
for direct IRD work and force an increase in indirect methods.98 
IRD would soon have to adapt again, in Kenya and across the rest of the continent.  By 
the close of 1962 television was making its first appearance in Kenya, and new challenges and 
opportunities would therefore arise for the use of IRD material and for information work in 
general.  Stills material – maps, illustrations, photographs and cartoons – would constitute the 
material made available for television in the first instance; yet even here new rights would need to 
be arranged for old material.99  The period between 1956 and 1963 was one of preparation for 
IRD, as it was for the Communist powers.  Following independence, it seems reasonable to 
expect that both sides expanded their work considerably in the light of either stable post-colonial 
government or in any revolutionary atmosphere where allegiance to one side or the other 
remained up for grabs.  This period, however, is outside the scope of this thesis.  Any 
examination beyond 1963 would, though, give some insight into how successful IRD's early 
work was in establishing the desired relationships with the correct individuals and organisations 
following independence.  IRD were by no means confident of success.  'The ideological and 
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cultural battle is likely to be a long one' explained Roberts.  'It is only just being engaged and it is 
far too early to tell which way it will go.'100 
 
 
                                                
100 'Communist Prospects in Tropical Africa.', D A Roberts (IRD), enclosure with R H K Marett to Sir Roger 
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Chapter 7 
British Information Policy in the Post-Suez Middle East  
 
Our position is such in the Middle East today that we have comparatively few 
cards to play.  We can no longer threaten or dominate.  It follows, therefore, that, 
at any rate in the short term, we must woo.1 
Paul Wright (FO), November 7, 1957 
 
The propaganda effort in support of the British campaign during the Suez Crisis was a failure, 
though the fault lay with policymakers more than the propagandists.  It is difficult to imagine 
how it could have been a success.  Suez left Egypt's position and prestige greatly enhanced, and 
laid bare the limits of Britain's imperial reach, and her duplicity, for all to see.  As Britain 
refocussed her regional strategy away from Egypt onto the Baghdad Pact following the Egyptian 
coup of 1952, the British information services invested time, money and effort developing the 
information infrastructure in Iraq.  The Iraqi coup of July 1958, and Iraq's withdrawal from the 
pact the following March, left this investment unrealised.  The failure at Suez, and the diminution 
of the Baghdad Pact, were twin blows that forced a wholesale reassessment of British 
information work in the Middle East.  
The reformed pact, rebadged as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), struggled to 
find its feet.  Lacking Iraq as a focus, efforts were split between the remaining regional members: 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.  On the information front in which IRD was involved, working 
through the Counter Subversion Office (CSO), the effort was largely refocused on Turkey, with 
increasing cooperation with Iran.  
                                                
1 'Information Policy for the Middle East', P H G Wright, November 7, 1957, TNA FO 953/1853/P10020/3. 
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British policy shifted rapidly towards seeking a rapprochement with Nasser; Britain 
wanted to establish 'correct, if cool' relations,2 for both strategic and financial reasons.  As 
discussed in the chapter on Transmission 'X', this meant fire-fighting the worst excesses of Cairo 
Radio polemic whilst building bridges, and working on 'positive projection', in an effort to 
enhance Britain's image.  Through to 1962, the danger to British interests from Nasser's brand of 
Arab nationalism and the unfettered hostility of Cairo Radio was adjudged by the Regional 
Information Office (RIO) in Beirut to rank as a greater threat than Communist subversion,3 but 
the information services' options were curtailed by policy.  This downplayed approach fuelled 
resentment in certain quarters that the British position vis-à-vis Egypt was being allowed to go by 
default (as to an extent it was).  The more extreme of analysis outside of government declaimed: 
Using propaganda – the only real weapon he possesses – Nasser has undermined, 
defied us, abused us and defiled us; he has turned the Arab World against us, 
destroyed our prestige, lied about us and weakened us to the extent that we can 
no longer hold up our heads in the Middle East…our public relations have been 
so apathetic that, sometimes, rather than putting spokes in Nasser's wheels, we 
have actually helped spin them round.4 
These were the issues that confronted IRD in the Middle East between 1958 and 1963.  
They combined with the factors detailed previously – most importantly a parochial attitude 
(IRD's assessment) that made issues of the wider Cold War hard to sell without local relevance, 
and a cultural and educational climate that emphasised broadcast propaganda over IRD's 
traditional paper product – to create a unique set of challenges for IRD during this period, and 
these are examined below.  The two most significant nations were cut off from IRD work for 
diplomatic reasons: the UAR (Egypt and Syria) and later Iraq.  Iran and Turkey were CENTO 
nations, and thus much of IRD's work went through the CSO to both.  Various nations hindered 
                                                
2 'Information Policy Towards the Middle East', undated enclosure with Secret, R Murray (FO), November 14, 
1958, TNA FO 953/1857/P10020/72/E. 
3 G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to C F N Barclay (IRD), December 29, 1962, TNA FO 
1110/1543/PR10180/6/G. 
4 'Britain's Public Relations in the Middle East', Paper by D A Scott-Reid (Publicity Manager for the Iraq Petroleum 
Company Ltd.), December 20, 1956, TNA FO 953/1740/P1041/39. 
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IRD work through policies of non-alignment.  These were constraints of circumstance; 
constraints of policy affected all else. 
 This chapter covers the period of British rapprochement with the Arab nationalist 
movement, looking first at how British policy towards Nasser shaped information work in the 
Middle East.  The second section explores IRD's work in the Middle East, and the region-
specific material that the department produced in partnership with the Regional Information 
Office in Beirut.  It also examines the varied 'market' for IRD material in the region.  The 
CENTO CSO represented the third 'side' to the complimentary, three-pronged approach to the 
department's propaganda campaign in the Middle East, respectively: IRD propaganda from 
London, IRD propaganda adapted through the regional expertise of the RIO, and propaganda 
from CENTO nations sourced from IRD material. CENTO gave IRD material the cover of a 
regional source, and perhaps the best attribution the department could hope for.  In contrast 
with the RIO, the CENTO CSO was far from a rousing success, however.  Inheriting all of the 
Baghdad Pact's problems – and none of its infrastructure – IRD had a difficult relationship with 
the slowly developing CSO.  The third part of this chapter looks at IRD and the CSO in some 
depth.  
The final section of this chapter looks at the beginning of the end of the restrictions on 
propaganda towards Egypt. Uncomfortable with British policy, IRD and the RIO had been 
increasingly vocal over the inconsistencies between Britain's robust information approach against 
Communism, and that towards Nasserism.  By the middle of 1963, and at the end of the period 
under consideration in this thesis, IRD again started to formulate unattributable propaganda 
directed at Cairo. 
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British policy and the constraints on information work 
Britain was clear on the challenges faced in the Middle East, and IRD had several issues to 
address at once.  There was a tension between Britain's policy towards Nasser on one hand – 
restraint in the interest of better relations – and the reality of the threat Nasserism presented to 
British interests.  The Foreign Office saw that Nasser's ambition as 'the self-appointed leader of 
Arab nationalism' acquired a momentum and expansionist policy that was 'basically inimical to 
our interests.'  These interests were, in the main, the provision and supply of Middle Eastern oil, 
and the fulfilment of British responsibilities to her colonies in Africa.  The fact that both 
Egyptian and Communist propaganda threatened these interests tied the regions together.  In a 
wider, Cold War context, British policy was to oppose – and to hopefully prevent – the spread of 
Communism throughout the area, maintain communications, and develop defensive policies 
through 'partnership' and the Baghdad Pact (rather than bilaterally as previously).5 
In view of the above factors, whilst Egypt's politicking and propaganda ran contrary to 
British interests, the situation was complex.  Reviewing British policy in the Middle East in 
October 1958, the FO was clear that British interests would be best served by 'accepting the 
legitimate aims of Arab nationalism and by manoeuvring ourselves into a position in which these 
aims do not appear to the Arabs to be unobtainable except by the destruction of our position.'  
This would not apply everywhere: Britain would assist friendly, traditional regimes in the Persian 
Gulf to chart their own path of resistance to, and accommodation with, the forces of Arab 
nationalism.  In the Sudan, independence would be fully supported as a bulwark against Egyptian 
machinations into sub-Saharan Africa.  The three main aims of British policy in the Middle East 
were to maintain the supply and profitability of oil, ensure regional stability and peace, and to 
                                                
5 'Notes on British Foreign Policy IV. The Middle East', undated but 1958, TNA FO 953/1856/P10020/49; this 
brief was part of a series intended to inform Ministers, revised monthly.  This section on the Middle East was 
withdrawn following the Iraq coup in July 1958, and not immediately replaced.  
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keep the Soviets from achieving dominance.  The FO believed that accommodation with Arab 
nationalism, the dominant movement in the region, could help secure all three objectives.6    
In January 1958, information officers from across the Middle East met in Tehran to 
discuss themes that would be 'saleable' to the region.  Their recommendations emphasised a 
recasting of the British attitude towards the Arab world as one of partnership, of mutual benefit 
to both sides.  This should not try to draw on past associations; as Ralph Murray asserted: 
It is I think now acknowledged that the battle for the preservation of our 
interests in the Middle East is a propaganda battle...If we do not win this battle, 
the demagogic forces roused by our opponents can overwhelm all the military, 
political and commercial factors in our favour...we are not simply given a political 
basis for winning this battle.  We have plenty of means of communicating 
propaganda to the Arab peoples – but to attempt to make propaganda to their 
half-baked intelligentsia out of the stock 'long-standing association' line is about 
as effective as trying to promote Anglo-German relations by references to the 
Battle of Waterloo.7 
Realpolitik meant that an accommodation with the UAR was necessary, however bitter a 
taste this would leave in the mouths of some.  Britain needed a cordial relationship with Egypt, 
and as previously discussed the Arab nationalist movement could not be effectively resisted in 
any case.  Britain had significant economic interests; in the case of oil, this was a regional 
resource for which there was no viable future alternative.  Propaganda themes encompassing the 
mutual benefit of the trade in oil and the expansion of Middle Eastern were foremost in the IOs' 
minds.  Cultural and spiritual similarities could be contrasted with Soviet ideals such as atheism 
and collectivism, and common ideals such as democracy and freedom emphasised.  The danger 
of Soviet cooperation was a central theme of propaganda, to be balanced out by a positive 
projection of Britain and of Anglo-American solidarity.8 
Policy was the main constraint on information work.  The IOs in Beirut recognised this, 
as did the FO.  Commenting on the paper prepared by the IOs, the FO's Paul Wright noted that 
                                                
6 'Points for a Middle East Policy – Part I', October 15, 1958, TNA CAB 134/2342. 
7 Memo, Ralph Murray to H Beeley, November 12, 1957, TNA FCO 953/1853/P10020/1. 
8 'Information Policy for the Middle East', October 18, 1957, TNA FO 953/1853/P10020/3. 
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the root problem facing information work in the Middle East was 'the political policy which 
information must reflect.  Our position is such in the Middle East today that we have 
comparatively few cards to play.  We can no longer threaten or dominate.  It follows, therefore, 
that, at any rate in the short term, we must woo.'  A 'residual respect' for Britain, the economic 
benefits of an oil partnership, and the protective shield of British and American power against 
future aggression was, Wright bemoaned, 'a poor enough hand to play against the Russian cards 
which, though they may be jokers, are very powerful, namely 
a) support for the Arabs against Israel; 
b) a promise to free the Arab world from the Western imperialists; 
c) economic aid with no strings attached.'9 
 
Politically, Wright noted that better Anglo-Egyptian relations, the alignment of Britain 
with progressive forces rather than traditional regimes, and 'exorcising the ghost of imperialism' 
were pre-requisites in securing the region's alignment with the West instead of with 
Communism, as was a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute.  This latter view echoed that of the 
embassy in Beirut and the British Middle East Office prior to the Suez Crisis.  They were firmly 
of the opinion that the major focus of propaganda should be an accommodation or solution to 
the Arab-Israeli dispute: 'All our other Middle East policies will fail, or be limited in their 
success, until that happens.'  However, this was hardly feasible, as Wright soon realised.  Arab 
public opinion, which needed to be favourable towards Britain to provide for effective 
information work, was, in Wright's opinion, 'severely limited by the intractability of the central 
political problem of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the inability of any British voice to speak 
[overtly] on this issue in tones which its Arab listeners want to hear.'10  Beyond helping preserve 
                                                
9 'Information Policy for the Middle East', P H G Wright, November 7, 1957, TNA FO 953/1853/P10020/3. 
10 'Information Policy for the Middle East', P H G Wright, November 7, 1957, TNA FO 953/1853/P10020/3; 
(original emphasis) G R Gauntlet (Beirut) to CCB Stewart (IPD), January 23, 1956, TNA FO 953/1629/P1041/7; 
Draft on information policy for the Middle East, P H G Wright, February 13, 1958, TNA FO 
953/1854/P10020/16. 
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existing borders, Britain felt it was in no position to otherwise address the Arab-Israeli dispute 
during this period.11 
British policy was to seek 'to normalise relations' with the UAR, in so far as that was 
possible.  This aim limited the propaganda that IRD could deploy.  As a Foreign Office guidance 
telegram of June 1959 spelled out, it was  
in no part of Her Majesty's Government's policy to conduct propaganda against 
the legitimate interests of the U.A.R. (or to denigrate Nasser personally). It is 
indeed of the first importance that Egyptian suspicions should if possible be 
allayed, so that normal relations can be re-established…it is essential that the 
Egyptians…should be given no excuse for claiming that our publicity effort is 
not consistent with our desire for normal relations.12 
Egypt exerted a significant influence over the Middle East and North and East Africa – 
over much of this territory they were the preeminent threat to British interests in the last years of 
the 1950s.  Even as late as the end of 1962, the RIO believed Nasser and Egypt ranked as the 
main threat in the Middle East rather than Communism.  But by this point, in Norman 
Reddaway's analysis, this was 'changing into a threat of Nasser plus the communists or the 
communists in their own right'.  In his assessment, there was by this point a 
communist threat of some reasonable proportions in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen.  In Syria and Iraq for example there are traditional 
ties and dealings with the U.S.S.R.  In Egypt, Nasser has successfully used 
Russian help to do the West down, and is continuing to use it to keep himself 
afloat...In Jordan and Saudi Arabia the threat is more in the future13 
Back at home, IRD had been doing comparatively little to influence the press on either Arab 
nationalism or Communism in the Middle East.  In light of British policy the head of IRD's 
Middle East desk, Ann Elwell, explained the department had 
for some time past done very little on the Middle East with the British 
Press…Firstly, we have not been anxious to encourage too much anti-U.A.R. 
                                                
11 'Notes on British Foreign Policy IV. The Middle East', undated but 1958, TNA FO 953/1856/P10020/49. 
12 'Information Policy towards the U.A.R.', Foreign Office Guidance No. 209, June 3, 1959, TNA FO 
1110/1067/PR136/48/G. 
13 G F N Reddaway to C F N Barclay (IRD), December 29, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1543/PR10180/6/G. 
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comment in papers such as the Daily Telegraph which anyway does quite well in 
this line without our help.  Secondly on the more strictly I.R.D. subjects there has 
not latterly been a great deal to add to what the papers were saying already.14 
The BBC were seemingly quite content to be directed by the FO as to how to deal with Middle 
Eastern personalities, and enquired whether it was desirable for them 'to deal in a more or less 
bare-fisted manner with any of the leading statesmen (or their principle spokesmen).'15 
British propaganda and information work should, Wright argued in 1958, turn as much 
as possible on positive rather than negative themes.  The British attitude towards Arab nations 
needed to be explained not as a continuation of previous policy – as so much anti-British 
propaganda cast it – but focussed instead on partnership between the West and the Middle East.  
What was needed was to draw comparison between Communist and Western policy and practice 
implicitly as much as explicitly, and to keep Western interests out of the issue – to show that the 
West was not using the Middle East to further its own Cold War interests.  (There are parallels 
here with IRD's campaign in Africa.)  There were delicate issues, such as the authoritarian 
governments of certain Baghdad Pact members, and the imperialist associations of the continued 
British presence in Aden, and these issues too needed to be handled positively – highlighting the 
cultural and economic work Britain did on behalf of Muslims in the pact, and the preservation of 
the rights and interests of Adenis who wished to remain independent from the Yemen.16 
Propaganda and information work in the Middle East was not only a priority for the 
Foreign Office departments focussed on that particular task.  The military command in the 
region, preparing for a reduction in British strength in 1957, was convinced that a strong 
                                                
14 Ann Elwell (IRD) to Norman Reddaway (RIO Beirut), November 20, 1964, TNA FO 1110/1819/PR10547/89; 
The Telegraph had previously needed to be steered away from looking in to the effect the information services were 
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Barclay (RIO Beirut) to D A Roberts (IPD), November 14, 1958; Roberts to Barclay, November 26, 1959; TNA FO 
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15 Beresford-Clark (BBC) to F R H Murray (FO), November 3, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1067/PR136/49/G. 
16 Draft on information policy for the Middle East, P H G Wright, February 13, 1958, TNA FO 
953/1854/P10020/16. 
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information infrastructure was vital to protect British interests.  [I]t becomes all the more 
important', the HQ of British Middle East Land Forces wrote to the Chiefs of Staff, 'to 
strengthen in every way possible the peacetime propaganda under the direct control of H.M.G.'.  
To do so would, in their assessment, reduce the chances of requiring a military commitment, and 
in the event of war provide for 'efficient politico-military psychological warfare.'17 
There was, then, an inherent tension between threat and response, and desire and ability: 
Nasser was the greatest threat to British interests, but re-establishing normal relations meant not 
confronting Cairo propaganda head-on, nor risking covert action that may be uncovered; the 
military saw strengthening the propaganda machinery in the Middle East as a paramount aim, but 
with the loss of Iraq and the fallout from Suez, the information infrastructure was weakened, not 
strengthened, and IRD was forced to adapt. 
There were, however, positive signs that British policy could pay dividends.  The Afro-
Asian Writers' Conference was a microcosm of all the issues against which IRD faced in the 
Middle East.  After the first conference was held in Tashkent in 1958 the second was held in 
Cairo, attracting 44 delegations from 43 countries and including the Arab League (despite 
assurances from member countries, none of the delegations came from a CENTO member).  
Attended by both the Soviet Union and China, the conference intertwined threads of 
Communism and Afro-Asian solidarity (under the auspices of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity 
Organisation, based in Egypt and a central pillar of Egypt's cultural drive into Africa), and 
emphasised issues surrounding anti-colonialism.  In the assessment of the British, the conference 
was a tool for the Communist nations to culturally penetrate the African nations present.18  Yet a 
few months later a number of themes with which to separate Egypt from the Soviets began to 
present themselves. 
                                                
17 'What on earth is "politico-military psychological warfare"? – a regrettable example of the practice of taking refuge 
in long winded jargon from clean thinking?!'.  Minutes, C C B Stewart (IPD), 26 March, 1957; Top Secret, HQ 
MELF to MOD, March 21, 1957; FO 953/1740/P1041/42/G. 
18 H Beeley (British Embassy, Cairo) to the Earl of Home (FO), March 1, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1603/PR151/30. 
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In a speech on May 30 1962, Nasser set out the ways in which the form of Arab 
Socialism that he advocated differed from Communism.  Arab values of religion, democracy, 
land ownership, private property and peaceful change were arrayed against Communism's 
atheism, dictatorship, collectivism, state property and revolutionary violence.  Leslie Glass of the 
FO seized upon this as a road-map for the direction of IRD propaganda aimed at non-aligned 
nations in the region.  Whilst avoiding praising Arab socialism, IRD were tasked to 'plan a 
campaign by various methods…quoting chapter and verse both of ideology and actual activities, 
the Communist attitude on these five points…fairly short, simple and adapted to non-aligned 
countries, and we should plug away hard at all these things for the next 12 months.'19 
IRD saw these contrasts as 'mainly of degree and application rather than of principle.'  
Yet at this point Nasser was still formulating the direction of Arab Socialism he was advocating.  
IRD noted with interest that the differences, whilst apparently slight, were fundamental to both 
Soviet and Chinese Communism, and were optimistic that therein lay potential leverage. 
Nasser's bold assertion that he can bring about a happy democratic state of 
affairs without any help from Marxism-Leninism is a clear challenge to the Soviet 
Union and World Communism.  So far, Moscow propaganda has been silent, but 
true to Communist form, oblique criticisms are beginning to appear, notably in 
the World Marxist Review and in the French Communist weekly, Democratie 
Nouvelle20 
Having avoided criticism of Arab nationalism, the British therefore had the potential to 
reap the benefit by using Arab Socialism and Nasser's message for their own Cold War 
propaganda needs, without facing any significant charge of hypocrisy.  Here, then, was a 
concrete example of the direct usefulness of Arab socialism to the British information effort in 
the Middle East.  That this was possible was only due to Britain's policy of rapprochement in the 
years after Suez. 
 
                                                
19 Minute, L C Glass (FO), June 22, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1600/PR148/1. 
20 Minute, B L Strachan (IRD), June 21, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1600/PR148/1. 
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Information work in the Middle East 
The policy detailed above was the driving force behind the creation of the Transmission 'X' 
service.  'X' allowed IRD to use any half-truths, spin or lies on the part of Cairo Radio against it 
without recourse to similar tactics, and within guidelines.  'X' was a significant and widely used 
tool for the RIO and information officers to use, but it was not the only one.  British 
information work after Suez relied heavily on what RIO Beirut referred to as 'the "old faithfuls": 
themes of propaganda, tried, tested and agreed upon for Arabic-speaking areas.  These were: 
Treatment of Arab students in the bloc 
Aid and Trade Aims 
Attitude to Islam 
Attitude to Nationalities problems, e.g. the Kurds Criticism of Arab Countries' 
Internal and External Policies 
Criticism of Arab Political Movements 
Wooing of Developing Countries 
Coherent accounts of British policies and actions in Aden and the Gulf21 
IRD and IPD shared responsibility for propaganda and information work in the Middle 
East, and neither had main authority.  Each department was responsible for its own work, 
supervised by Ralph Murray, in whom, as an ex-head of the department, IRD could at least be 
guaranteed a sympathetic ear.  Bob Marett (himself ex-IPD), was by this stage working alongside 
Murray at the FO and recalled that the information departments were 'working at high pitch and 
with a new sense of purpose' following Murray's promotion in 1957.22  Working under Murray 
and Marett in 1957, UK-based responsibility in IPD lay with a Middle East advisor and two 
officers; in IRD one officer was responsible for the Middle East, the Far East and South East 
Asia, supported by a team of researchers.  By this point, both departments liaised on a daily 
                                                
21 I L Monro (RIO Beirut) to A C Elwell (IRD), March 21, 1964, TNA FO 1110/1819/PR10547/25. 
22 Marett, Back door, p. 191. 
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basis, and independently consulted with the News Department, political departments, Cultural 
Relations Department, CRO and CO, MoD, Board of Trade, COI and the BBC.23 
Organisations outside government also had a motivated self-interest in maintaining 
Britain's position in the Middle East.   Most significant of these, the oil companies were happy to 
contribute to the British information effort, alongside their own considerable public relations 
campaigns.  For example, BP were for their part by mid-1957 aiming to help with better 
premises and equipment for the British Council in Kuwait and for the Embassy information 
centre in Baghdad, with the supply to bookshops and newsagents stocking British books across 
the Middle East, and with the flow of visitors between the Middle East and Britain.  Shell alone 
was prepared to commit £100,000 per annum from 1958 onwards for publicity, and jointly with 
BP, subsidise broadcasting for an additional £50,000 per annum.24 
Norman Reddaway, ex of IRD and now at the RIO in Beirut, was as well placed as any 
to comment on IRD work in the region.  Information officers were 'less active on traditional 
I.R.D. business than in many parts of the world because the main pressure does not come from 
the Communists and because there is a virtual embargo on propaganda vis-à-vis Cairo.'  There 
was very little of IRD's 'traditional paper product' passed out.25  Reflecting this, whilst IRD 
financially supported 'one or two' people in areas such as Somali, the RIO and the CENTO CSO 
were the only two places in which IRD officers were stationed across the Middle East.  In the 
RIO, this was two officers and one trainee, whilst IRD provided one officer and his assistant to 
the CSO.26  Arabs were, in Reddaway's words, 'listeners not readers', and were 'passionate' in 
                                                
23 G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to C F N Barclay (IRD, December 29, 1962, TNA FO 
1110/1543/PR10180/6/G; 'Information work in the Middle East', undated but with S Hebblethwaite (Treasury) to 
R Murray (FO), May 14, 1957, TNA FO 953/1740/PR1041/50. Christopher 'Kit' Barclay had moved the other way, 
from the RIO back to IRD, underlining the relationship between the two. 
24 Chisolm (British Petroleum) to C C B Stewart (IPD), May 30, 1957, TNA FO 953/1741/P1041/63; Minute, P H 
G Wright (IPD), July 1 1958, TNA FO 953/1856/10020/13. 
25 G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to Sir John Nicholls (FO), December 7, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1689/PR10547/85. 
26 G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to C F N Barclay (IRD, December 29, 1962, TNA FO 
1110/1543/PR10180/6/G; Secret, C F R Barclay to R H K Marett, February 14, 1963, TNA FO 
1110/1683/PR10523/19/G. 
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avoiding becoming tangled up in the Cold War.  In the Middle East it was IRD's 'speed and 
flexibility' that was paramount – a reference to Transmission 'X', amongst other things – and it 
was through facilitating visits to Britain, contacts with organisations, and through the provision 
of personnel that IRD made itself useful to the cultural and information efforts in the region.27  
(Technical expertise and provision and allocation of financial support should be added to this 
list.) 
'Plugging', the practice of repeating and reformulating the same propaganda points again 
and again, was recognised by IPD as a fundamental propaganda technique, and one heavily 
exploited by Cairo Radio.  On the British side, IPD found 'the greatest difficulty in putting this 
elementary principle into practice…all normal channels of expression open to the Department, 
such as the BBC, London Press Service, Agencies etc. are bedevilled by the journalistic 
conception of what does and what does not constitute "news".  In practice any given items of 
news or public statement of opinion once used is considered dead unless some fresh peg can be 
found to hang it on.'  It was, in IPD's consideration, this particular disparity between the practice 
of Cairo Radio and that of the British that accounted for much of the criticism levelled at the 
British propaganda effort in the Middle East.28  This was less of an issue in respect of work 
directed at personal contacts, the mainstay of the more 'intellectual' end of IRD's output such as 
the Interpreter, but this did little to allay public fears that the British were doing little, and it carried 
its own risks.  Propaganda activities were certainly frowned upon in non-aligned nations, and 
illegal in several.  As David Roberts of IRD explained, the department's work in the Middle East 
often depended on these contacts, and of many 'personal arrangements (often illegal) built up 
over the years.'29 
                                                
27 G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to Sir John Nicholls (FO), December 7, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1689/PR10547/85. 
28 The solution put forward was to feed several themes suitable for 'plugging' each week, incorporate them into as 
many ministerial or similar speeches as possible, and so have them picked up by the BBC, LPS etc. repeatedly.  
Minute, C M Pirie-Gordon (IPD), April 24, 1957, TNA FO 953/1740/P1041/47. 
29 D A Roberts (IRD) to C F R Barclay (RIO Beirut), November 26, 1959, TNA FO 
953/1939/P10043/13/P10045/13. 
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IRD placed great emphasis on getting the right information to the right people.  
Sometimes posts felt that they were failing because they had achieved only limited distribution of 
IRD material, and IRD were clear that this was not the case.  IPD were clear on this point: the 
amount of propaganda was not the issue; all propaganda would fail to be effective if the message 
it carried was not right.  It was not possible to overcome such 'sales resistance' just by forcing 
increasing amounts of propaganda across a region.  '[O]ne of our difficulties in getting these 
facts and views understood in the Middle East', noted IPD's head, 'is the need to overcome, 
against the background of the tensions in the area, the sales resistance of the local populations to 
anything which they think savours of British "propaganda".  If they do not like the taste of the 
medicine offered them, they will not like it any more – they may dislike it more – if you try to 
make them swallow twice as much.'30 
IOs needed to be highly selective not just in to whom information and material was 
passed to, but what and how much.  Too much material might mean that little if any was read, 
and there was a danger, as IRD's Ann Elwell realised, that material could be collected by a 
recipient not to be used 'but for reasons either of hope that it may…be the talisman for which he 
is looking, or out of pure politeness.  We…believe in rigorous selectivity'.  This also meant that 
IRD relied on IOs to tell them if they were receiving too much product, so that supplies could 
be trimmed.31 
 
Material and Markets in the Middle East 
The portfolio of products that IRD made available to posts has already been examined in the 
preceding chapters, and so only a few region-specific initiatives are worth examining.  These 
products were largely distributed in two ways, with IRD providing English language material to 
                                                
30 Draft for house of commons debate, C C B Stewart (IPD), March 13, 1956, TNA FO 953/1729/P1041/33. 
31 A C Elwell (IRD) to D J Makinson (Tehran), May 10, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1642/PR10134/12. 
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information officers at posts and Arabic language information work tailored to the region 
produced by the RIO at Beirut.  By early 1960 IRD were writing special articles upon request 
and producing their own material in Arabic.  Image-based propaganda was of high value in a 
region with widespread illiteracy, and by this point 'Fact Features' contained an illustrated series 
and IRD had retained an in-house cartoonist.  Local IOs noted that religious material was 'still 
very much in demand.'32  Preceding the quick-reaction material for broadcast that was part of the 
Transmission 'X' service, IRD had begun producing radio scripts in April 1957, authored to be 
ready for broadcast.33 
By 1961 RIO Beirut was issuing 25-30 anti-Communist articles in Arabic every month.  
The majority of these were 'edited version of I.R.D. articles, radio scripts and Digest items.'  Ten 
or so articles a month were authored in-house by the RIO.  IRD material also appeared in radio 
scripts produced by the RIO's writers' panel and excerpts from 'Fact Features' were often used in 
local newspapers.  It was not until September 1960 that the RIO first passed these figures on to 
IRD; before then they had simply provided a list of pamphlets in production each month.  
Coupled with the possibility of 'inadequate reporting from the field', it is clear that any detailed 
analysis of figures would be impracticable.34   
By mid-1961 the RIO's average output of articles per month had climbed to 35.  The 
office was producing, on average, 12 booklets in Arabic on anti-Communist themes per year.  
These were translations or adaptations of material produced in London, and production runs 
varied from between 3,000 and 5,000 copies.  Between 1956 and 1961 the RIO published 35 
books in Arabic, either reprints of English-language books or commissioned by the RIO, and 
these ran on average to 3,000 copies.35  Between 1963 and 1964 RIO Beirut published 11 books 
in Arabic, with 4 more in hand.  Many of these were from staple IRD-approved authors such as 
                                                
32 'Extract from Summary Record of the R.I.O. M.E. Conference Beirut 11-14 April 1960', 
FO1110/1322/PR10104/61. 
33 Letter, Information Research Department, January 27, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1100/PR10111/6/G. 
34 C F R Barclay (RIO Beirut) to H Carless (IRD), September 26, 1960, TNA FO 1110/1322/PR10104/99. 
35 'Anti-Communist Propaganda in the Middle East', June 7, 1961, TNA FO 1110/1432/PR10547/65. 
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Brian Crozier, Robert Conquest and Walter Kolarz.36  Publishing contracts were sometimes a 
partnership affair: for example, arrangements were made in 1963 under the Arabic Commercial 
Books Scheme for Zohair Baalbaki, a Syrian publisher, to publish a book per month annually, 
with the RIO contracted to pay the costs of seven and the publisher five.37  The same scheme 
even managed to penetrate into Iraq, and IRD was particularly heartened to note that (a rather 
modest) 200 books from the scheme had been distributed in Iraq by mid-1963.38 
It was not the case that IRD solely concerned itself with securing books and magazines 
with an overtly pro-British or anti-Communist slant.  That Reddaway at the RIO and Ackland at 
IRD were both prepared to get involved with procuring issues of "The Dairy Farmer" and 
"Electrical and Radio Trading" for Kuwait – with Ackland forwarding them by bag personally 
each issue – shows that even the most mundane of publications had value to the cultural side of 
IRD's campaign.39 
The trade in literature was in some instances a purely cultural effort for IRD.  In 1961, 
Makinson, the Press Officer in Tehran, had arranged translation rights for the publication of 
best-selling English novels that were 'only anti-Communist in the sense that they pre-empted 
Russian translations of our classics, for example Dickens' novels, which might present a gloomy 
picture of industrial England.'40  Payment for these rights – and of £500 to cover publication – 
had been made by IRD.  Contact with the publisher was solely through a local British Council 
officer who, acting as a 'cut out', represented the payments as having come from an anonymous 
donor.  When both the British Council officer and Makinson moved on in 1963, IRD took over 
the scheme wholesale, arranging the rights for a run of 10,000 copies for each of 11 titles 
                                                
36 In total between 1962 and 1965, 24 books were published under the Arabic Commercial Books Scheme. M 
Franklin (RIO Beirut) to H Tucker (IRD), November 4, 1964, TNA FO 111/1819/PR10547/25. 
37 Annexe to P E Dahan-Bouchard (RIO Beirut) to D R M Ackland (IRD), December 6, 1963, TNA FO 
1110/1716/PR121/605. 
38 H H Tucker (IRD) to N Reddaway (RIO Beirut), June 7, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1716/PR121/356/G. 
39 G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to D R M Ackland (IRD), March 8, 1963; Ackland to I Goulding (Kuwait), March 
19, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1682/PR10505/1. 
40 D J Makinson (Tehran) to D R M Ackland (IRD), April 29, 1963, TNA FO 1110/1717/PR121/295. 
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including works by authors such as Milton, Wells and Buchan.  This time IRD worked through 
the London publishing agent Peter Janson-Smith, covering his costs.  It is worth noting that the 
publisher in Tehran was H Santini of Franklin's, the aforementioned publishing house that was 
heavily linked with the USIA.  There is no evidence that the USIA were informed of IRD's 
involvement.41 
Originally produced for internal use, IRD's weekly Arabic Press Extracts was by the end of 
1958 made available to select recipients across the Foreign Service, the BBC, and individuals 
such as Sefton Delmer, the Second World War propagandist now resident at the Daily Express.  
The aim of the Extracts was to supplement other material already produced – for example the 
BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts – and to contain 'nuggets' of information not found 
elsewhere.  Indeed, this is what the BBC found most valuable: it was the 'gossip' contained 
therein, information not normally reported by any agency or the BBC's monitoring service that 
was the report's worth.42  Despite this, the Extracts were discontinued in May 1959, replaced by 
the new 'Fact Features', which as the name suggests was intended to be an entirely factual report 
of some 350 words, containing diagrams where possible. 43 
Across the Middle East in 1961, IRD and the RIO achieved mixed results.  In Iran, 
information supplied was edited to suit local conditions by Tehran press and radio.  Pamphlet 
distribution matched that within the Lebanon at 200.  Turkey – understandably given its issues 
with the Soviets, and membership of both CENTO and NATO – published a total of 388 
scripts, articles and commentaries, and booklets were widely distributed.  Tel Aviv Radio made 
regular use of IRD and RIO radio scripts.  In the Persian Gulf, Radio Bahrain and both local 
                                                
41 D J Makinson (Tehran) to D R M Ackland (IRD), April 29, 1963; Makinson to Ackland, July 6, 1963; Ackland to 
Peter Janson-Smith, July 13, 1963; TNA FO 1110/1717/PR121/295, and passim. 
42 Minute, 'Arabic Press Extracts', November 28, 1958; Confidential Minute, Leslie Sheridan, November 13, 1958; H 
M Carless (IRD) to P G D Adams (RIO Beirut), December 19, 1958; Gordon Waterfield (BBC) to D C Hopson 
(IRD), December 4, 1958; TNA FO 1110/1096/PR1124/6/G. 
43 Confidential note, Information Research Department, May 7, 1958, TNA FO 1110/1237/PR1124/8; 
Confidential Minute, H H Tucker (IRD), October 9, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1237/PR1126/G. 
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newspapers made use of IRD's anti-Communist material.44  In contrast to the situation in Africa, 
where Communist radio broadcasts to the continent had doubled in 1961, there was little change 
in the number of broadcasts from Communist sources to the Arab Middle East, and only a 5% 
increase to non-Arab countries.45  In all cases the aim was that such material would be attractive 
enough on its own merits to be published.  However Hopson noted that 'in some countries, 
Jordan for instance', payment to newspapers was made by Missions for both 'projection of 
Britain' and I.R.D. material.46 
IRD was almost wholly prevented from working in the UAR and Iraq.  In the case of the 
former it was because of attempts to build bridges.  In the case of the latter, it was through trying 
to maintain what was left of a once strong relationship.  Yet there remained routes for IRD 
material into Egypt.  One stemmed from the more cordial relationship between Cairo and 
Washington.  In 1959, the USIA in Egypt started to receive copies of The Interpreter, Digest and 
Religious Digest from IRD via the USIS in London at the Americans' request (British and 
American cooperation in information work across the Middle East and North Africa was 
formalised in October 1957).47  It is not possible to judge the extent to which the Americans 
used them but at least the department's product was getting in to Egypt in a small way.48  There 
was also the fact that anti-Communist material produced by the Cairo press – usually directed 
against Arabic Communism – sometimes reflected ideas and themes which IRD and the RIO 
had been distributing in neighbouring countries, and which may arguably have been picked up.49  
Any material broadcast with sufficient strength to be listened to in Egypt may well also have had 
an effect. 
                                                
44 'Anti-Communist Propaganda in the Middle East', June 7, 1961, TNA FO 1110/1432/PR10547/65. 
45 Minute, J Walsh (IRD), March 5, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1522/PR10145/20/G. 
46 D C Hopson (IRD) to N W H Gaydon (British Embassy, Leopoldville), May 5, 1961, TNA FO 
1110/140//PR10158/18/G. 
47 Telegram no. 2155, Sir H Caccia (Washington) to Foreign Office, October 21, 1957, TNA FO 
1110/1049/PR10104/146/G. 
48 Minute J B White, 6 May, 1959; IRD to Chancery, Washington, February 18, 1959; Chancery, Washington to 
IRD, February 27, 1959, TNA FO 1110/1172/PR1016/1. 
49 'Anti-Communist Propaganda in the Middle East', June 7, 1961, TNA FO 1110/1432/PR10547/65. 
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This cross-pollination of propaganda from neighbouring countries was one of the few 
routes open for the British towards Iraq.  The years following the Iraqi coup saw a significant 
shift in that nation's alignment: from the great hope of British propagandists of a Baghdad Pact 
centred on Iraq, the country by this point had over 630 Eastern bloc technicians involved in 
projects financed by Soviet credit which by 1961 stood at £73m.  Despite measures against local 
Communists, Iraq was considered to be increasingly dependent on the Soviet bloc and 'fully 
aligned with the Russians on every political issue'.  By the early 1960s Qasim's claim on Kuwait 
only exacerbated already deteriorating relations.  Britain was involved in little information work 
and 'virtually nothing at all on the I.R.D. front.'50  Qasim's perceived 'insecurity' limited the 
amount of work that could be done because the lion's share of British information effort was 
turned to calming the Iraqi regime and reassuring them of Britain's intentions.51 
The British Ambassador in Iraq noted that the Iraqi press relied heavily on foreign 
broadcasts for news but, though there was a ready supply of material from RIO Beirut, the 
Embassy in Jordan was struggling at this stage to get material placed on the Hashemite 
Broadcasting Service (HBS).  The Jordanian service was a well-established broadcaster with a 
long reach and would have provided a route into Iraq for IRD material.  Yet the British embassy 
was short-staffed and with no guarantee of success declined to make fresh efforts to court the 
HBS, though their 'shortcomings in IRD work…[weighed] much on the Ambassadors 
conscience'.52 
This had not always been the case.  Four years earlier in 1959, the HBS were making 'full 
use' of British radio scripts.  Cultural programming such as 'women's corner, children's corner 
and…medical programmes' were much used, as was anti-Communist material, though this was 
                                                
50 Draft by Ann Elwell ACE 2/10; G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to C F R Barclay (IRD), August 25, 1962; 
FO1110/1549/PR10193/28/G. 
51 Roger Allen (British Embassy, Baghdad) to Sir Humphrey Trevelyan (FO), April 2, 1962, TNA FO 
953/2086/P1935/1. 
52 A J D Stirling (British Embassy, Amman) to A C Elwell (IRD), January 18, 1963, TNA FO 
1110/1486/PR101/243/A. 
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not used in full.  The broadcaster described anti-Communist material as 'excellent' and they made 
use of as much material as could be supplied.  IRD material in Arabic was being used to build up 
an anti-Communist resource library.  Due to high demand for Arabic material from Jordan, IRD 
even – on request – dusted off a number of the 'more dateless' Voice of Britain scripts aimed at 
the positive projection of Britain, some of which both the RIO and Amman were able to make 
use of.53 
Alongside the HBS, the Jordanian press was placing an average of 40 articles a month by 
1961.  Yet by the end of the year the British Ambassador was reporting that the situation was in 
sharp decline.  The last full time IO had been transferred to combined duties at the Chancery.  
However good arrangements appeared on paper, the Ambassador reported that information 
work had 'not been taken seriously in Amman for some time.'  The embassy's inability to use the 
HBS towards Iraq was but one example.  Whilst the Ambassador, with a number of political and 
developmental battles to fight, was prepared to let straight information work falter for a time, he 
called for an IRD officer to be sent out on contract to head the information office (as cover) and 
to concentrate on IRD work.  With an additional post in the Middle East already secured in the 
British information budget, the question was whether Jordan – adjudged only fourth in need in 
the region by Reddaway after Iraq, Egypt and Syria – warranted an IRD officer.  However 
dispassionate this assessment, each of the three British embassies in those three countries had 
advised against any IRD work.  The fact was that Jordan had an enthusiastic Ambassador and 
was therefore likely the best place in which to make such an effort.54  A year later, however, the 
situation had improved.  The Chancery had reviewed the need for an IRD officer and concluded 
that the work being done by that point was 'adequate for present purposes.'  It was 'essential', 
however, that the possibility of an IRD post be kept open for the next nine months, in case the 
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Reddaway (IRD), January 2, 1963; Reddaway to Barclay, December 29, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1543/PR10180/6/G. 
224 
 
situation changed following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Jordan and the 
Soviets.55 
The assessment of information work in the Lebanon was fairly positive, though little 
early progress was made with Lebanese radio (by 1958 the RIO was busy translating IRD radio 
scripts into Arabic, which it was hoped would be useful in improving the situation).  The 
Information Department at the British Embassy in Beirut made 'fairly extensive' use of IRD 
material, placing anti-Communist articles in the press, forwarding certain IRD publications (for 
example the 'Facts About…' series) to the press, with 'one or two outstanding editors' receiving 
the Interpreter.  The information department also worked with a panel of journalists who 
produced around 12 articles per month, some based directly on IRD material and quotations.  By 
1961, between 150 and 200 anti-Communist articles were appearing in the Lebanese press each 
year, and 200 copies of anti-Communist pamphlets were being distributed to confidential 
contacts.  RIO material in Arabic was distributed – some of it on a large scale – and there 
appeared to be strong links with trade unions.56 
Elsewhere there remained little or no opportunity for IRD work.  In Kuwait, 'the Radio 
and Television Station's eschewal of all political controversy and…reluctance of the newspapers 
to engage in Cold War polemics' limited the amount of IRD work that could be performed 
beyond a limited number of personal contacts.57  There was no press in Bahrain and so the 
issuing of daily commentary to the information office there was a waste: '[w]e can only read it 
ourselves – which I am afraid is seldom rewarding'.  Likewise the Digest was of no use.  Books 
and the Interpreter were considered useful for background, but it was 'the simple graphic 
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approach' – in limited numbers – that was most suitable.58  IRD remained almost wholly 
disengaged from Saudi Arabia. 
 
The CENTO member states and the Counter Subversion Office59 
The Baghdad Pact was set up under the concept of a 'Northern Tier' defensive system to provide 
a political and military defence against the Soviet Union's border, and to tie the nations into what 
was hoped would be seen as a mutually beneficial organisation.  IRD's involvement was through 
supply of staff, material and expertise to the Counter Subversion Office (CSO), which handled 
counter-subversion and propaganda duties (a PR office handled positive information), and 
attendance at infrequent Counter Subversion Committee (CSC) meetings, through which 
strategies were developed.60  Britain had made a considerable investment in time and effort to set 
up Baghdad Radio as a regional counter to Cairo Radio.  This had value to both the information 
services and to the military: In the opinion of the Political Office Middle East Forces in 1957, if 
Baghdad Radio, 'an Arab station on Arab territory could become really effective it might be the 
best possible counterblast to Egyptian, Soviet and other hostile propaganda; more so than British 
efforts even.'61 
This Arab provenance was of particular value to the British, and IRD were keen to invest 
time and effort in the information capabilities of the Baghdad Pact.  As the FO's Levant 
Department put it in 1956: 'Good Iraqi propaganda could clearly be of great value in other Arab 
countries; it would suffer less from xenophobic prejudice than our own efforts, and the Iraqis 
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could say things which we should like to say, but cannot.'62  The reversal of British fortune in 
Iraq was therefore highly significant.  From a pro-Western, partnership regime under Nuri as-
Said, the Iraqi revolution ushered in an administration under Abd al-Karim Qasim that was 
actively hostile – Britain was, in the words of Roger Allen at the Embassy in Baghdad 'the 
principle villain in his international scene' – and so whilst a very small amount of information 
work was performed, and almost none related to IRD, the focus of British information work was 
preparing the ground for any replacement regime.63 
The CSO was moved from Baghdad to Ankara following the Iraqi withdrawal from the 
pact, and Ankara subsequently become CENTO's HQ.  In contrast with the mainly security 
service representatives from the regional members of the pact, the post of British representative 
was filled by an IRD officer, as was that of his assistant.  (The department also paid for the 
positions of J A Speares and Tony Hornyold.)  Not only did this appointment inevitably forge 
strong links between IRD and the CSO, it also presented a direct channel for IRD to the Turkish 
authorities.  There was, in Kit Barclay's words, 'excellent co-operation with the Turks for the 
distribution of our material.'  This was mostly via writers' panels of Turkish journalists who 
adapted IRD material, as well as a book translation effort and the usual selected distribution of 
material such as the Interpreter.64 
The Turks, largely aligned with the British view of the use and methodology of 
information and propaganda, and with the offices of the CSO based in Ankara, certainly made 
the best use of the potential of the CSO.  In fact, as Reddaway explained, the Turks 'very 
sensibly come to use the C.S.O. as their own I.R.D.'.  The Iranians, though lacking the 
convenience of the CSO office in their own city, also made good use of the material, supported 
by strong British support in Tehran and the firm backing of SAVAK's head of propaganda.  
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Pakistan, further away still from Ankara than Tehran, seemed uncertain of the benefit that could 
be gained from the CSO and poorly represented.65 
The hand-over notes of the Deputy Press Officer in Tehran, Makinson, provide some 
idea of how IRD material was used in Iran.  With a post in which IRD work was considered a 
particular responsibility, Makinson spent around 65% of his time on IRD work, with the balance 
spent on other information work – keeping in touch with newspapers, performing PR functions 
and the like.  All counter subversion material was and had been placed through SAVAK and the 
Iranian Department of Public Relations and Radio.  Makinson trained SAVAK in counter 
subversion, acted as a conduit for IRD material, and (with difficulty) stimulated Iranian 
involvement in the CSO.  Throughout the 'radio war' between the Soviets and Iran which took 
place between 1959 and the start of 1962, IRD supplied 'robust' anti-Communist material for 
SAVAK's use – the Embassy reported that the Iranians appeared to be prepared to 'try anything' 
and were using almost everything anti-Communist that the British were able to supply.  
Following a reduction in tensions between Tehran and Moscow in 1962, the British thereafter 
supplied more discreet propaganda targeted more at Communism in general rather than at the 
Soviets.  IRD material was also used as reference material for Embassy staff and in particular the 
information staff including Makinson.66  As Makinson described, the CSO 'have only to walk 
across the road to get at the whole machinery of Turkish Government…By contrast 
communication with Tehran and Karachi appears inefficient…But it is unwise to write off the 
Iranian C.S. effort because it does not reach the standard of what we call Turkish/CSO co-
operation.  The latter enjoys all the advantages of bilateral negotiation, plus the facilities of a well 
staffed research office on the spot, which both Tehran and Karachi lack'.67 
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IRD was responsible for the British contribution to the CSO, providing the British input 
of material, including much from the BBC, along with staff.  It is apparent that what IRD 
wanted from the CSO was in effect a multilateral version of itself, though narrower in scope, and 
with the success of efforts in Turkey matched in the other nations and with all working well 
together.  As such, and as Adams of RIO Beirut noted, it was 'lamentable' that the organisation 
had 'to devote so much of its time and energies to the problems of its own organisation and 
administration.'  Having begun to free itself from a bureaucratic mire towards the end of its 
tenure in Baghdad, the transfer from Baghdad Pact to CENTO and its relocation to Ankara 
seems to have thrown all into disarray.  The CSO also not only found itself scouring Ankara for 
new offices but without a transmitter of its own – its original one was left behind in Baghdad 
and proved problematic to recover.  The situation obviously impacted on the CSO's 
productivity, and in early 1959 the CSO was still working towards specimen publicity rather than 
fully operational.  '[C]onsiderable progress' had however been made in educating the members 'in 
the psychological aspects of subversion and in the need to provide a psychological antidote.'  In 
Adams' opinion, even if no other result were to come about, the CSO would have justified its 
existence through this training.68 
There were other problems within the organisation.  It was noted by IRD that the 
supporting staff lacked experience 'in even the simplest of information research procedures: 
filing, press cuttings, assembly of material on given themes etc.' Even the name 'Counter-
Subversion Office' seemed to Donald Hopson unfortunate, as it gave the impression that it was 
'capable of dealing with all the problems of human discontent.'  It had done 'some useful work' 
in his opinion, but was still by late 1959 hamstrung by lack of material being contributed by 
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member nations other than Britain.69  IRD's contribution was so significant that the CSO's 
limited duplication facilities could not meet the requirements of the regional members for the 
department's material, and so the CSO had to call for increased amounts of briefs, articles and 
radio scripts from IRD directly so as to meet demand.70 
By this point there were, at least, a handful of projects under preparation.  Turkish and 
Iranian writers' panels were now working on contracted material, and Speares found the 
programme of tasks on which the CSO were embarking to be encouraging.71  Yet progress was 
'slow and all too dependent on Asian personal interests and amour proper.'72  By February 1960, 
Hugh Carless reported that the CSO seemed to be 'gradually shaping into the mould we have 
cast for it – a unit concentrating on research and unattributable publicity about Communism and 
the briefing of governments about front organisations, conferences, etc.'73.  With a significant 
number of pamphlets being produced, the issue was by this point one of quality, usually arising 
out of a lack of experience amongst their authors of the requirements of propaganda material.74 
Even so, by March it was not at all clear by this point that the CSO had a future.  The 
Iranians (with the notable exception of SAVAK's propaganda chief) had veered between wanting 
to scrap the CSO and use their contributed resources internally, and the other extreme of turning 
the CSO 'into a psychological warfare headquarters for the Middle East.'  The American 
representatives seemed to have focussed on keeping the CSO small, their contributing officers 
sometimes obstructive towards an organisation that they had 'never liked' according to Carless.  
For example, the US Chief of Operations did not regularly attend and in cases where he could be 
useful, such as in helping improve pamphlets' propaganda value by sub-editing, he appeared 
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unwilling to help.  Of the other member nations, Pakistan's opinion was equivocal, whilst that of 
the Turks tended to mirror Britain and IRD's aim of a limited research and propaganda remit for 
the office.  Carless' aim amongst these contrasting opinions was to keep the CSO – rebadged as a 
reference or research section – focussed on research and unattributable counter-Communist 
publicity, and to turn it into a smaller 'backroom section' of CENTO's Public Relations Division.  
Whilst this carried the risk of downgrading the CSO in the eyes of Iran and Pakistan, it would 
mean that the CENTO PR Division emerged as an equivalent of NATO's Information Section.75 
Much of the issue stemmed from the CSO's directive to respond to '[a]ny attack on the 
purposes of the Pact, from whatever quarter and whether directly Communist-inspired or not'.76  
The Counter Subversion Committee's terms of reference (1955) defined subversion as Communist 
subversion, whereas the Counter Subversion Office's terms (1956) did not – and in fact included a 
passage on countering neutralism.  The CSO's terms of reference were wholly unacceptable to 
the British and Americans, but proved highly attractive to Iran and Pakistan (particularly the 
latter).77  Separating Communist threats from non-Communist ones was not straightforward, 
however.  Chikara Hashimoto argues that the 'demarcation line between Communist and non-
Communist activities was often blurred – because Communist Parties were illegal in the Pact 
area, their subversive activities were often conducted in tandem with non-Communist groups 
against local governments.'78  This can only have served to further complicate the issue. 
IRD's head Donald Hopson believed that the CSO needed to focus on propaganda 
rather than counter-subversion, as the latter role's reliance on political action held a potential for 
future problems.  That the regional members did not share this view was evidenced by the fact 
that local nations' representation was drawn from their respective security services.  This made it 
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difficult for both the CSO and IRD to assess how their material was used or distributed, or its 
perceived value, as security officials were reluctant to speak on such matters.  Another issue, one 
to IRD's credit, was that member nations did not see how information material produced by the 
CSO itself could be as well-prepared or bilaterally available as that produced by IRD.  The issues 
surrounding subversion meant that the regional members of the CENTO secretariat (in Speares' 
assessment) saw in the American and British representatives an 'intention to soft-pedal or even 
abolish' counter subversion activities, 'behind every administrative move or suggestion no matter 
how innocent.'79 
The issue of whether the CSO should be a propaganda office or – as the Iranians wanted 
– target itself at counter-subversion and psychological warfare, was moot in Hopson's 
assessment.  Combatting Communist subversion required the attention of the whole of 
governmental and national activity.  'We cannot expect five or six chaps sitting together in 
Ankara to do more than make a very limited contribution to the solution of this problem', he 
wrote.80  By early 1960, the head of the propaganda section of Iran's SAVAK intelligence 
organisation finally agreed with IRD's position, that the CSO should be confined to propaganda 
and information work. 81 
Britain's stance arose out of the need to avoid associating CENTO with regional disputes 
that included one or more member countries.  For example, any criticism of India – even 
implicitly, even within a counter-Communist context – risked bringing CENTO into the regional 
dispute between Pakistan and India.  Additionally, there was unease in Turkey lest any form of 
provocative broadcasts from Ankara added unnecessary extra strain on relations with the 
Soviets.  There was, therefore, an emphasis on avoiding any such associations whilst aiming such 
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defensive criticism and commentary as they were able on Communist aims, tactics and 
propaganda.82  It is not the case that Britain wished to keep out of issues of regional, non-
Communist subversion, just that CENTO was not the place to do it.  Officials had made 
representation that they would be happy to engage with such issues bilaterally, but none of the 
regional members had taken up the offer.83  There was also a practical dimension to limiting the 
work of the CSO.  With only 'five or six chaps' working at the office, it was British policy to 
'safeguard against the diversion of the slender resources of the Counter Subversion Office into 
undesirable fields.'84 
A significant proportion of the IRD files relating to the CSO concern the continuing 
issue over the office's terms of reference, which had still not been agreed upon by the end of 
1963.  IRD found the whole debate somewhat spurious: the need for unanimity over any action 
coupled with the lumbering bureaucracy of member nations meant that it would be fairly simple 
to block any unwanted proposals. 85  Indeed, the CSO was reported to work well 'without being 
troubled by disputes over principles'.  By 1963, the regional members had not put forward any 
contentious proposals and the US and UK had not had to use their veto powers.  As regards the 
terms of reference, the decision was made '[t]o put the question under the mat.'86  Despite all the 
disagreements and wrangling, Kit Barclay believed the organisation had performed quite well.87 
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The CENTO CSO became a 'clearing house' for material between the member nations, 
much in the same way as IRD acted in the propaganda and information sphere for the British 
government.  In mid-1960, the decision was made to use the CSO to facilitate information on, 
and rebuttal of, hostile radio broadcasts, and in this sense the office slotted into the wider web of 
Transmission 'X' and the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts as not just a recipient of 
information but also as a provider of, in this case, Turkish-language monitoring summaries.88 
Through 1962-1963 the regional members increasingly availed themselves of the services 
of the CSO, driven in the main by a far greater engagement on the part of Pakistan.  As a result, 
operational expenditure doubled over the year to £2,040 per month.  Perhaps the most 
successful initiative of the CSO, the use of the Turkish and Iranian writers panels of journalists 
to edit, translate and regionalise material, was by this point also being adopted by Pakistan.89 
 
A return to unattributable propaganda against Egypt. 
IRD had engaged with the worst excesses of Cairo Radio propaganda through 
Transmission 'X'.  As previously discussed, though counter-Communism soon constituted the 
bulk of Transmission 'X' output, the service retained a nominal mandate to counter the more 
extreme of Cairo Radio's anti-British or anti-imperial rhetoric: this was, of course, the reason it 
had come into existence and it had been practically the only tool deployed by the British to do 
so.  However, by the time of the Regional Information Officer's Conference in early 1962 the 
policy of restraint towards Cairo was beginning to chafe somewhat, at least in certain circles.  
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The general consensus was that a campaign of unattributable publicity, whilst not a cure-all for 
the situation, would at least stop Britain's case 'going by default'.  Norman Reddaway, amongst 
others, came away from the conference convinced that more needed to be done, and began to 
start mobilising support. Authorisation, noted Reddaway, needed to be extended from solely 
anti-Communist publicity 'to cover hostile activities by the Egyptians and possibly others, [so 
that] IRD could adjust its machinery and be on the lookout for suitable openings for action.'  
Placing articles in the British press so that LPS and the BBC, as well as regional newspapers 
could pick them up, seemed to be the best solution.90  
There was, however, considerable disagreement between IRD and the various other 
Political Departments as to the amount of damage Cairo was doing to British interests, and 
whether or not action was better than inaction.  IRD's opinion was clear: 'Cairo's propaganda 
machine continues to be unrepentantly and vividly hostile', wrote Kit Barclay to Reddaway in 
August 1962; it was anomalous to be 'attacking Communist propaganda in the Middle East and 
Africa, while allowing a clear field to very similar damaging outpourings from Cairo.'  'You have 
my sympathy', replied Reddaway, 'doing a sorcerer's apprentice act amongst the measured 
haverings of Eastern Department and all the doubts of the better-notters.  Aden is…an excellent 
example of how we pay for a policy of stiff-upper-lipmanship…we should go in for 
unattributable publicity, mainly in our own press and beam it out here by BBC and LPS.'91  
In an April 1963 reassessment of policy, Foreign Secretary Lord Home set out how 
British information services would address the important issues in the region.  Douglas-Home, 
who would become Prime Minister in October later that year, was firmly of the view, shared by 
the US State Department and much of the Foreign Office (though it would appear IRD and IPD 
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were not consulted),92 that Nasser's ability to harm British interests in the Middle East would 
only be increased by open hostility towards the Egyptian President.  In Home's opinion, any 
attempt to separate British opposition to Nasser from opposition to Arab nationalism would be 
doomed to failure. Home was in 'no doubt that vigorous [Arab] nationalism [was] the most 
effective antidote to Communism in the Middle East, even though it may also take an anti-
Western form'; Britain should adopt '[a] public posture of benevolent approval for Arab unity in 
general'.  The Foreign Secretary made it clear, however, that Britain should be seen to honour its 
obligations, for example to Kuwait, and that she should be ready to 'oppose Egyptian subversion 
in territories with which we are directly concerned'.93 
Home's report noted avoidance of open opposition to Nasser, or of the appearance of 
hostility, and this was interpreted by IRD as giving them greater freedom to pursue a wider range 
of 'unattributable publicity' within the context of the above. Nothing in Home's dispatch 
explicitly excluded such a response to Egyptian activities, be they by the intelligence services or 
agencies such as Cairo Radio.  Britain could easily be considered to hold a direct or indirect 
interest in most of the nations of the Middle East, because of CENTO, oil and overflight rights. 
The dispatch signalled a sea change in IRD work in the region.  The department concluded that 
'[t]his means that it is only in Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia [and] the [internal affairs 
of] the Yemen…that we need pay no heed to UAR subversion'.  IRD began to proceed 
accordingly.  It is worth noting that Home's dispatch did not address Egyptian activities in 
Africa, and so IRD's activities in this area remained unchanged.94  The gloves were back off to 
some degree, and as such Transmission 'X' became but one of a suite of means available to get at 
Cairo, no longer the only tool for the job. 
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Conclusion 
IRD's efforts in the Middle East over this period were limited; by policy, the political 
situation in the region, and by Britain's reduced standing after Suez.  The policy of 
rapprochement with Nasser, whilst it left information departments frustrated, was formulated in 
response to the overriding need to build bridges with Egypt following Suez.  Once diplomatic 
relations had improved, constraints on IRD began to relax a little.  There was even some 
evidence of a benefit to information work, in the possible uses of Arab Socialism against 
Communism noted above, but this was an exception. 
The Middle East continued to be a difficult region in which for IRD to ply its trade.  
IRD remained locked out of the two main powers in the region, Iraq and Egypt, and had no 
dealings with Saudi Arabia.  The department had largely overcome issues of topicality and 
relevance in its material, aided by relationships with the RIO and CENTO CSO, but there 
remained political issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the desire of many nations to stay 
out of the Cold War, that were insurmountable.  The CENTO CSO represented a means for 
IRD to push their own material out through a local organisation, but internal difficulties limited 
its effectiveness.  It did, however, act as a useful conduit for IRD information and expertise to 
the member countries. 
Decisive conclusions on the effectiveness of IRD work in the Middle East prove elusive.  
If information on IRD work during this period seems patchy, that was the case at the time.  At a 
meeting of the region's information officers at RIO Beirut in May of 1962, Strachan, the IRD 
attendee, reported that there remained widespread ignorance of IRD work.  'Apart from pushing 
out our material in the few countries where this is easily done, many would, I suspect, sooner 
have nothing to do with it', he reported.  This naturally meant that very little information flowed 
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the other way.  IRD remained ignorant of how much of its material was reaching its targets and 
what effect it had. 'We rely entirely on the Information Officer playing it by ear, which could, if 
his hearing is poor, be disastrous', he explained 
This seems deplorably amateurish.  We should have a small section of experts in 
the most modern techniques of operational and market research.  There are many 
difficulties but they could be overcome.  For instance, data could be gathered 
under cover of a commercial type operation or in informal conversation.  After 
all, the target population, leader of opinion, is small and the samples would be 
correspondingly so.  We desperately need statistical information on reading and 
listening habits, basic attitudes, susceptibilities and so on.  For example, we have 
no data even on so simple a thing as the virtues which are most admired in a 
given country.  For all I know, when our material depicts the Russians as pitiless 
tyrants, it may be giving them quite a boost in some parts of the world! 
In the margin, IRD's head Donald Hopson has written 'This is V. true'95 
 
 
                                                
95 B L Strachan (IRD) to C F R Barclay (IRD), May 14, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1562/PR10547/79/G. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
As Susan Carruthers correctly asserted in 1995, the examination of IRD continues to provide 'a 
salutary corrective to the notion that only one side engaged in the cold war competition to win 
hearts and minds'.1  In the post-Suez Middle East and decolonising Africa this thesis' study of 
IRD humbly offers a further corrective.  It sets the active and expanding role of IRD in 
countering both Communism and Arab nationalism against the assertions of historians who have 
stressed the rapid ceding of Britain's Middle Eastern role and influence to America following 
Suez.  As such, it is hoped that it adds in a small way to the comparatively recent historiography 
of Suez that offers a far more nuanced and complex reading of the crisis' impact.2  
The British did not roll over, defeated and shorn of regional ambition, after Suez.  Many 
– though not all – Foreign Office officials believed that Britain should proactively maintain her 
position in the Gulf; that her relationships and interests were important not just to the nation, 
but also in a wider Cold War context, performing a role that the US lacked the experience to 
adequately perform.  The FO briefed strongly in support of this position in advance of the 
Anglo-American Bermuda conference at the start of 1957 – a conference that repaired much of 
the rift between the two nations that the crisis had brought to a head.3  As Richard V Damm has 
shown, British assertiveness was matched by an American position that sought consistency of 
policy between the two nations in the Middle East, and even to rebuild Britain's standing.  For 
his part, Macmillan assured the Americans that through 'power, prestige, propaganda, assistance 
                                                
1 Carruthers, "Red", p. 294. 
2 For example – and oft cited - Peter Hahn's argument that Suez 'destroyed all vestiges of Britain's influence in the 
Middle East' is patently outmoded (Peter Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and 
diplomacy in the early Cold war (Chapel Hill, 1991), p240.  For an in-depth re-examination of the impact and aftermath 
of Suez, and reassessment of its historiography see primarily Simon C. Smith, Reassessing Suez 1956: new perspectives on 
the crisis and its aftermath (Aldershot, 2008) and Smith, Ending Empire, but also Tore Tingvold Petersen, "Transfer of 
Power in the Middle East", The International History Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1997), among others. 
3 Smith, Ending Empire, p. 73. 
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and services' nationalism in the Middle East could be appropriately channelled to the benefit of 
Western interests.4 
Suez may even have been 'a blessing in disguise' for the British.  America could hardly 
repeat such actions as the ones taken during the crisis if she wanted British assistance in the 
Middle East, and British policymakers and propagandists were well aware of this.   'Suez', argues 
Tore Petersen, 'freed Britain from the American embrace in the Middle East, and possibly also 
elsewhere'.5  Given this thesis' evidence for the interconnectivity between the Middle East and 
North and East Africa, any freedom of action Britain gained through Suez was likely also 
applicable there – more so, in fact, because of existing British imperial commitments.  Here, 
again, the fallout from Suez can be overplayed.  The Suez crisis itself was of somewhat less 
interest to British African colonial subjects – beyond the immediate aftermath of the crisis – than 
the surge in Egyptian propaganda and influence that followed it.  This is a fine distinction, yet 
the point can perhaps be underlined by the fact that IRD, despite its remit to counter Arab 
nationalism, did not find itself unduly concerned with the crisis itself beyond the issues of 
damage-limitation noted in chapter 3.  As such, and with Petersen's comments above borne in 
mind, Keith Kyle's assertion that following the crisis '[t]he final stages of decolonisation went 
rapidly ahead…with the outcome conditioned by the demonstration effect at Suez of the harsh 
limits of British power' perhaps requires mild qualification.  
'Neither the imperial project nor the imperial contest…ceased with Suez', argues A J 
Stockwell; '[c]ontinuity in imperial policy matched continuity in imperial attitudes.'  America's 
dislike of Communism, notes Stockwell, was quickly set aside in the belief that Britain's 
'evolutionary approach' to issues of self-government and decolonisation was the best hope of 
                                                
4 Author's emphasis.  Memo of Conversation, 21 March 1957, FRUS 1955-57, Vol. XII, p. 716 cited in Richard V. 
Damms, "In Search of 'Some Big, Imaginative Plan': The Eisenhower Administration and American Strategy in the 
Middle East After Suez", in Smith, ed, Reassessing Suez 1956 new perspectives on the crisis and its aftermath (Aldershot, 
2008), p. 398. 
5 Tore Tingvold Petersen, "Post-Suez Consequences: Anglo-American Relations in the Middle East from 
Eisenhower to Nixon", in Smith, ed, Reassessing Suez 1956 new perspectives on the crisis and its aftermath (Aldershot, 2008), 
p. 471. 
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securing the allegiance of successor regimes in post-independence African states.6  America 
sought the right pace of decolonisation, not the fastest, and agreed with the British Colonial 
Office that the key was avoiding 'the double danger of over-haste, which might lead to anarchy 
and open the way to Communist influence, or of dilatoriness, which might drive the potential 
leaders into collaboration with Communism'.7  As argued here, whilst IRD did not control the 
pace of change, the department was at the core of British (and so, Western) efforts to make sure 
that former colonies stayed out of the Communist sphere of influence.  British hopes were that 
colonies preferably remained economically, culturally and politically tied to Britain once they 
gained their independence.  'The British did not intend the substance of their colonial relationships 
to vanish with the trappings of colonial rule', argues John Darwin:  The intention was that 
independence would simply herald a 'new phase' in the African colonies' relationship with 
Britain, rather than any transfer of influence to either of the superpowers.  As discussed, IRD 
propaganda had a central role to play in securing this ideal, though perhaps it was largely for 
nought - Darwin concludes that the 'most striking feature of British decolonization was the 
failure to construct the expected close post-colonial relationships with the new states.'8   
 If the Suez Crisis was still a climacteric,9 it did not herald the surrender of British 
influence.  Indeed, the year of the Suez Crisis, and the crisis itself, were the catalysts for a 
significant expansion of IRD work across the regions under study. In a few short years, the 
department, responding to constant requests from posts and shifting British policy 
considerations, significantly diversified the material it offered.  The preceding chapters of this 
thesis chart that transformation, and show that IRD largely conquered the issues of topicality, 
flexibility and responsiveness that had devalued its material in the eyes of Information Officers 
                                                
6 A. J. Stockwell, "Suez 1956 and the Moral Disarmament of the British Empire", in Smith, ed, Reassessing Suez 1956: 
new perspectives on the crisis and its aftermath (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 502, 508-509. 
7 Commonwealth Relations Office to Commonwealth High Commissioners, No. 76, Secret, 28 March 1957. PRO 
(TNA) PREM 11/1724 cited in Gordon Martel, "Decolonisation after Suez: Retreat or Rationalisation?", Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2000), p. 412n. 
8 John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate (Oxford, 1991), p. 75, original emphasis; John 
Darwin, Britain and decolonisation: the retreat from empire in the post-war world (Basingstoke, 1988), p. 330. 
9 Anthony Adamthwaite's term, Adamthwaite, "Suez Revisited", p. 459. 
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and local recipients alike.  From 1956, IRD's remit was expanded to cover the increasing 
Communist propaganda threat to British interests in Africa, and the largely concurrent threat 
from Nasserite pan-Arabism and Cairo-centred pan-Africanism.  It should be emphasised that 
IRD did not just provide better, more appropriate and more tailored material: the department's 
work did not just improve, in other words.  It changed, with IRD increasingly working beyond its 
traditional remit into what could be termed 'straight' information work.  Whilst counter-
Communism remained the department's mainstay, IRD, particularly in Africa, performed both a 
cultural and 'positive projection' function.  Through Transmission 'X', IRD fulfilled the role of a 
traditional news agency, though one largely aimed at rebutting Communist and Nasserite 
propaganda – and rebuttal itself was anyway a significant change of approach.10   In East Africa 
IRD went further, however, and through 'X' the department aimed to provide a 'balanced and 
representative picture of African developments' to CO posts.11  This was positive propaganda on 
British achievements during decolonisation, and on conditions in ex-colonies following 
independence, and it was anti-Communist only in the sense that it served British interests.   
Elsewhere, the English best-seller publishing deal arranged through Peter Janson-Smith, 
discussed in Chapter 7, was a purely cultural initiative.12  No longer a solely anti-Communist 
department by 1956, by 1958 IRD had further evolved from being, as Scott Lucas and C J 
Morris have put it, 'anti-anti-British', into something altogether more rounded and diverse.  
Susan Carruther's assertion that IRD's work in the colonies was 'anti-anti-British…because it was 
                                                
10 Minute, D C Rivett-Carnac (IRD), November 9, 1960, TNA FO 1110/1337/PR1125/46/G. 
11 D C Hopson (IRD) to T A H Scott (CRO), September 1, 1960, TNA FO 1110/1337/PR1125/21. 
12 The cultural books effort also existed on a smaller scale.  Between 1958 and 1959 Khartoum reported a 'large 
unsatisfied demand for British books of any description' to IRD.  The department made arrangements with the 
British Council, who dispatched one of their younger staff members at intervals to Charing Cross Road to round up 
appropriate second-hand books.  These were then dispatched by the COI to the Sudan, where they were distributed 
to 'barrow-boys and…kiosk owners.'  Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was little feedback on success, and little if any 
money found its way back from the barrow-boys to IRD.  The scheme was dropped after a year or so.  Minute, D R 
M Ackland (IRD), May 30, 1962, TNA FO 1110/1526/PR10150/12. 
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anti-Communist', whilst applicable to her work on Malaya and Cyprus, and Kenya in 1952, does 
not apply to IRD's work post-Suez in the Middle East and Africa.13  
A greater volume of work, performed over a wider and more diverse area, necessitated 
an increase in staffing levels that was no less significant (though also due to parallel initiatives in 
South America and Asia).  In 1955, IRD employed 43 researchers and a support staff of 25.14   
By the 1960s, with Kit Barclay taking over from Donald Hopson as head of the department in 
1962, IRD had grown to around 400 staff.  This five-fold increase was not all to the good, 
according to Norman Reddaway, who believed it had changed a 'lean team' into something 'fat 
and sluggish'.15  The head of the department's Editorial Section, 'Tommy' Tucker, agreed.  In 
Tucker's view, during the 1960s IRD had 'not outgrown its strengths but…had outgrown its 
effectiveness.'  The department 'needed trimming'.16  It should not be forgotten that through the 
RIOs in Beirut and Singapore, and links with organisations such as CENTO and NATO, the 
number of staff directly involved with IRD work was larger still.  IRD's operations, and staffing 
levels, peaked in the 1960s.17 
During this period, British intelligence and information agencies agreed that Arab 
nationalism presented a greater threat to British interests than Communism across the Middle 
East and northern and eastern Africa.  The danger was well recognised even before the Suez 
Crisis, and in May 1956 IRD's work against Communism in the Middle East was subordinated to 
the task of countering Nasserite propaganda.  The situation, from a British perspective, 
worsened after Suez: far from removing Nasser, the crisis served only to elevate Nasser's 
standing.  Subsequent Egyptian foreign policy sought the removal of Western influence over an 
                                                
13 Lucas and Morris, "Crusade", p. 105, Carruthers, "Red", p. 312.  As noted earlier, IRD would even have gone so 
far as to create indirect propaganda that criticised British policy, the better to build trust in an African audience, but 
the CO would not allow it.  Minute, 'Anti-Communist Propaganda in the Colonies', H A H Cortazzi, July 31, 1957,  
TNA FO 1110/1057/PR10109/65. 
14 Jenks, Propaganda, p. 64. 
15 Reddaway was less than complimentary about his old colleague, Kit Barclay, in his new role.  Lashmar and Oliver, 
Secret Propaganda War, p. 138. 
16 Tucker Transcript, BDOHP, DOHP 11, pp. 7-8. 
17 Lashmar and Oliver, Secret Propaganda War, p. 138. 
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increasingly wide area, into territories under direct British control, predominantly by radio.  It 
was not until late 1962 that RIO Beirut believed the balance had shifted towards either a more 
equal, or predominantly Communist, threat.18 
British prestige suffered greatly over Suez, and the crisis was a resounding victory for 
Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement.  This dramatic change of fortune was, of itself, not a 
sufficient reason to give up the fight against Arab nationalism, given the scale and tenor of 
Egyptian propaganda and the danger it presented to British interests.  It was the policy of 
seeking normalised relations with Cairo as swiftly as possible that stayed British propagandists' 
hands.  In a Cold War context Arab nationalism needed to be courted and this was a further 
reason to restrict propaganda directed at Nasser or Egypt – it would be seen as also being 
directed at the wider Arab nationalist movement.  There was an apparent tension between the 
interests of propagandists – protecting British interests from nationalism – and the British policy 
of disengagement from regional politics.  The fact is, however, that there was no overarching 
regional policy.  The FO, whilst arguing forcefully for British disengagement with nationalism in 
general, also supported a renewed commitment to protect British influence and interest against 
in the Gulf and southern Arabia against the same nationalist forces.19  British territories in Africa 
were likewise to be protected from Egyptian influence.  What emerged was a pragmatic and 
flexible approach to Arab nationalism. 
James Vaughan asserts that the post-Suez political landscape of the Middle East saw IRD 
quickly refocus on countering Soviet propaganda.  In fact, IRD stands out as an exception to the 
British policy of leaving Egyptian propaganda unchecked.  IRD, working within the constraints 
of policy, was charged with defusing the polemic of Cairo Radio, and the department's solution 
was the rebuttal service Transmission 'X'.  Though 'X' ultimately became an almost exclusively 
                                                
18 G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to C F N Barclay (IRD), December 29, 1962, TNA FO 
1110/1543/PR10180/6/G. 
19 Stephen Blackwell, "Pursuing Nasser: The Macmillan Government and the Management of British Policy 
Towards the Middle East Cold War, 1957-63", Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2004), pp. 93-94 
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anti-Communist service, it continued to address Egyptian propaganda until at least late 1959.  By 
the following year, Britain had begun to divest herself of her African colonies, and so a major 
element of the danger to British interests from Cairo Radio was progressively removed.20  
Nevertheless, programmes such as the Voice of the Arabs remained a threat, as James Brennan 
notes, 'to the more intangible target of Britain's regional reputation.'21  By early 1963, IRD had 
renewed an unattributable campaign against Cairo and Nasser.22 
Vaughan notes that, after Suez, IRD became less flexible in how it approached 
Communism and Nasserism.  '[A]nti-Nasser operations', he writes, 'tended to be viewed through 
the prism of the broader Cold War struggle rather than as part of Eden's bid to defend an 
independent British position against both the forces of Arab nationalism and superpower 
encroachment upon British spheres of influence.'23  Indeed, Cold War considerations soon 
surged to the fore, yet when the wider Egyptian propaganda campaign beyond the Middle East is 
considered, the situation was more nuanced.  From 1958 onwards, British information policy 
worked to support maintaining the supply of and profit from oil (predominantly in the Gulf and 
southern Arabia), stability in the Middle East, the fulfilment of obligations to Britain's African 
colonies, and to keep Communist influence to a minimum.24  Each goal, with the exception of 
the latter, derived from independent, British interests as much as from Cold War needs, and each 
factor, for IRD, required addressing both Arab nationalist and Communist threats.  It was often 
difficult to separate the two in any case: Egypt's pivotal position as a gateway to Africa for the 
Communist powers' cultural propaganda and aid programmes leant Egyptian actions a Cold War 
dimension, as did the increasing realisation that Arab nationalism was a counter to, rather than a 
                                                
20 'The Future of Transmission 'X'', J G McMinnies (IRD), October 18, 1960, and Minutes, TNA FO 
1110/1337/PR1125/46. 
21 Brennan, "Poison and Dope: Radio and the art of political invective in East Africa, 1940-1965", p. 34. 
22 'British Policy Towards President Nasser, 'Nasserism' and Arab Nationalism', April 17, 1963, TNA FO 
1110/1631/VG1051/14; Ann Elwell (IRD) notes on 'British Policy Towards President Nasser, 'Nasserism' and 
Arab Nationalism', May 3, 1963; J L Welsner (IRD) notes May 8, 1963; Kit Barclay (IRD) notes May 10, 1963 TNA 
FO 1110/1631/PR10116/7/G. 
23 Vaughan, "Cloak", p. 78. 
24 'Notes on British Foreign Policy IV. The Middle East', undated but 1958, TNA FO 953/1856/P10020/49; Points 
for a Middle East Policy – Part I', October 15, 1958, TNA CAB 134/2342. 
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facilitator of, Communist expansion.  IRD's battle for Arab hearts and minds turned from 
seeking the defeat of Arab nationalism to attempts to shape its allegiance. 
To these ends, IRD's relationships with the RIO in Beirut, and the CENTO Counter 
Subversion Office in Ankara, were key.  A section of the RIO was to all intents and purposes 
IRD's local office in the Middle East, and staffed by former and future IRD officers.  The RIO 
increasingly shouldered the burden of making counter-Communist material attractive to local 
journalists and broadcasters, and of interest to local recipients.  By 1956, almost all of the 
material in Arabic for the Middle East and Arabaphone regions of Africa was produced by the 
RIO.  If the issues of topicality and appropriateness were finally (largely) overcome by the 
development of the RIO, the material was still from a British source.  The final piece of the 
puzzle for the Middle East, and the reason why the FO and IRD persisted with the CENTO 
CSO, was to get the same sort of material produced from a Middle Eastern source.  This process 
was far from smooth, and progress was patchy.  The CSO, in essence, provided facilities, 
manpower and a route for IRD material into the regional member states for their own use.  
Whilst Turkey benefitted most, Iran's use of the CSO gradually improved, as did Pakistan's by 
the end of the period under study.  Through the use of panels of local journalists, IRD and CSO 
research was regionalised, and found its way into local press and radio. 
If the RIO and CENTO were key, then it is no exaggeration to say that IRD's 
relationship with BBC Monitoring was fundamental.  Already reliant on monitoring for much of 
the material that informed the department's research, the need to address the increasing reach of 
Communist and Egyptian broadcasts into Africa made the service even more indispensable.  
Given how poorly intelligence from the CO was received by IRD, monitoring was the only high-
volume source of information the department could trust.  IRD were the driving force for the 
expansion of the service to cover colonial Africa, including the construction of a new monitoring 
station at Karen, near Nairobi.  As discussed in the preceding chapters, IRD and the BBC 
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developed this expanded capability in partnership.  The BBC were closely connected with 'X', to 
the point of providing a preamble to 'X' written by monitoring service staff, and a number of the 
corporation's regional desks received 'X' daily.  Working with and through the BBC, the RIO and 
the CENTO CSO, IRD adapted and responded to the needs of posts across the Middle East 
and Africa. 
IRD had a far less productive relationship with the Colonial Office.  Quite why the 
information department of the CO and regional administrations were so obstructive is unclear.  
Clearly, Cox's attitude towards IRD was central to the issue.  Philip Murphy has argued that the 
CO's attitude stemmed from 'a desire to protect its own control over policy making, and the 
finely balanced systems of consent and collaboration over which it provided.'25  The CO certainly 
believed that IRD involvement in the colonies could raise awareness of Communism – an 
assessment rejected by IRD – and Cox was at pains to note that the CO did not have the means 
to distribute material on the scale which IRD desired, even if he had a mind to do so.  But lack 
of ability was not the issue – it was the delay caused by Cox's attitude to improving the situation.  
This may only have delayed matters for a year, but that was long enough given that the majority 
of the decolonisation process in Africa was complete by the end of 1961.  As noted previously, it 
is impossible to say to what degree the delay in commencing IRD work negatively impacted the 
task of influencing successor regimes in the colonies.  IRD, at least, were livid.In Africa, Cairo 
Radio's potency as a propaganda tool was beginning to wane by 1961: the station faced 
increasing competition from the Communist nations, as well as rising numbers of domestic, 
post-independence broadcasters.  The gradual transfer of 'X' to a predominantly anti-Communist 
service reflected this shift.  In any case, in the Middle East, the audience for 'X''s material on 
Cairo had been comparatively modest.  If the period between 1956 and 1963 charts the rise, and 
the beginning of the fall, of Cairo Radio's threat to British interests in Africa, it encompassed 
                                                
25 Murphy, "Exporting a British intelligence culture: The British intelligence community and decolonisation, 1945-
1960", p. 13. 
247 
 
only the beginning of Communist campaign in Africa.  During this period, IRD and the 
department's opposite numbers in Moscow and Peking competed in a scramble for the allegiance 
of the successor regimes of post-colonial Africa. 
Without Suez, it is unlikely that Egyptian influence would have spread so far, and so 
quickly.  That the Communist powers also expanded their interest into Africa, and in the case of 
the Soviet Union across the Middle East, at the same time meant that IRD found itself 
responding to two separate yet connected threats.  Beginning with the independence of the 
Sudan in 1956, the process of decolonisation in Africa, itself likely affected by Suez, meant that 
IRD needed to find a means of countering both Communism and nationalism quickly and 
appropriately, or concede an advantage.  Topicality and resistance from posts were issues within 
IRD's power to rectify; there were, however, issues beyond the department's control that limited 
the market for the their material, or the effectiveness of any propaganda. 
Curtailed by policy and obstructed by the CO, IRD faced yet more obstacles in the 
restrictions placed upon either anti-Communist or counter-Nasserite propaganda by host 
governments, lack of radio and newspapers in certain nations, a primitive information 
infrastructure across much of Africa, difficulties within CENTO, and the almost complete 
exclusion of IRD material from the two most significant nations in the Middle East, Iraq and 
Egypt.  Peter Partner has described the 'political sterilisation of news… [as] a widespread 
phenomenon in the Arab world.'26  Whilst this latter fact strengthened the position of the BBC in 
providing a wider – and less boring – alternative for listeners (as it would have done for Sharq) it 
restricted the opportunities for Information Officers to get IRD material broadcast on domestic, 
Arab radio networks or in local newspapers.  If IRD's success post-Suez was modest, therefore, 
then this should perhaps not be a surprise. 
                                                
26 Partner, Arab, p. 125. 
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IRD's focused its propaganda on the presentation of selected facts rather than fiction, 
and this stands in stark contrast to the polemic of Cairo Radio.  Bob Marett recalls that, 'towards 
the end of 1960… I was able to have quite a friendly chat, and even compare notes, with my 
official opposite number and rival, the Egyptian Director General of Information.  I told him 
that we had always found that the most effective policy in propaganda was to tell the truth… He 
was politely disbelieving.  Either he considered this another example of British subtlety, or he 
thought me an absolute fool.'27  British propagandists, including IRD, made no attempt to 
engage with Cairo Radio on equal terms.  Whilst this was due, in the main, to the fact that the 
British simply did not have the wherewithal to do so after Suez, and were constrained by policy, 
they were also playing a longer game.  The contrasts between the two methods tended to give 
the impression at the time – which was partly true – that Britain was losing by default.  However, 
the more obvious propaganda of Cairo Radio was seen in some quarters to be less effective in 
retrospect, as Hugh Carleton-Greene, Director General of the BBC, argued in 1969: 
The power of Cairo Radio as a weapon in Col. Nasser's hands has been much 
exaggerated by many people.  In so far as Cairo Radio achieves anything it is 
through the expression of feelings… which are already there.  It does not create 
them.  Those who expect British or French or American broadcasts to compete 
with Cairo Radio are equally mistaken… The truth is an unexciting weapon and it 
often works too slowly for those who, naturally enough, are eager for quick 
results.28  
The market in the Middle East for traditional IRD work was comparatively small.  This 
stemmed largely from the moratorium on propaganda levelled at Arab nationalism noted above, 
though IRD also felt that the Communist threat was less pressing there than elsewhere (for 
example in South-East Asia).  IRD provided technical expertise, personnel, facilitated exchange 
visits and stood ready to respond quickly and with flexibility should the need arise.  IRD 
provided the same services to Africa, where the market for the department's material was 
                                                
27 Marett, Back door, p. 195. 
28 Hugh Greene, "The third floor front: a view of broadcasting in the sixties" (The Bodley Head Ltd,: London, 
1969),  pp. 28-29 cited in full in Partner, Arab, p. 146. 
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potentially significant, yet during this period limited by minimal infrastructure.  IRD also worked 
to protect and promote British interests and here, by late 1963, the situation was changing 
markedly. 
Though the ultimate fate of Transmission 'X' remains unclear to this point, it is evident 
that the need for the service was much diminished by the arrival and spread of news agencies 
across Africa.  The progressive rollout of syndicated news agencies such as Reuters into the 
developing nations during this period began to shift emphasis away from the hitherto vital 
relationships between IRD and information officers, and to refocus efforts back on IRD in 
London.29  With the scope of IO work reduced, the standing and numbers of IOs in the region 
began to decline, to the concern of IRD and the RIO.  Norman Reddaway, hardly surprisingly 
given his position as head of the RIO and his association with IRD, noted that it was 'doubtful 
whether this reduction has been wise.'  The traditional role of IOs, and IRD's connection to 
them was clearly changing however, as Reddway explained in December 1963: 
Governmental publicity is suspect, radio sets universal, the news-agencies and 
newspaper distribution efficient… The process of information dissemination by 
agency, radio and newspaper has become automatic and speedy.  If enough 
eminent men in London say interesting things, and if the News Department and 
I.R.D. do their briefing of publicists well, the news machine will automatically 
carry well-chosen words to the ends of the earth.  There is still a place for the 
selective reinforcement of these words by Information Officer, L.P.S., Guidance 
Telegram etc., but it is a less important place than it used to be.  Priming the 
publicity pump in London is the most important side of the "informing the world 
about Britain and H.M.G." side of our business.30 
Despite the limited campaign against Arab nationalism, IRD's work, particularly through 
Transmission 'X', rounds out explorations of the wider relationship between Egypt and Britain 
following Suez, in which information work takes a back seat, such as Robert MacNamara's study 
                                                
29 Interestingly, IRD returned to the news agency business in Africa at the end of the 1960s, with a shell-company 
buyout of a Kenya agency, Africa Features, in 1968, which was registered as a British company in 1971.  Putatively a 
commercial enterprise, it was in fact heavily subsidised by MI6/IRD in much the same way as the Arab News 
Agency (ANA) had been.  This was a necessity, as the writing was already on the wall for small agencies by this 
point.  Lashmar and Oliver, Secret Propaganda War, p. 81. 
30 G F N Reddaway (RIO Beirut) to Sir John Nicholls (British Embassy, Beirut), December 7, 1963, TNA FO 
1110/1689/PR10547/85. 
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of the wider Anglo-Egyptian détente of 1958-1962.31  Pericentrism, a post-post-revisioninist 
framework for analysis of the Cold War put forward by Tony Smith, looks to the important role 
that the 'junior members' of the international system had in 'expanding, intensifying and prolonging the 
struggle between East and West.'  Any study of propaganda conducted by Britain, and Egypt – as 
'junior members' – in the Middle East or Africa adds to the study of pericentrism for many 
reasons, for example: the courting and co-option of nationalist movements (particularly Arab 
nationalism) by the superpowers (particularly the Soviet Union's efforts to expand into Africa on 
the back of Egyptian influence); the largely independent course charted by Britain towards 
decolonisation, with IRD at the vanguard of shaping the allegiance of future regimes (however 
unsuccessfully); CENTO's anti-Communist/counter-subversive propaganda apparatus, of 
central importance to the Middle East but forged with America very much in the back seat; the 
primacy of Egyptian propaganda as a threat, and the fears of Western nations over possible 
Communist connections to the movement.  Smith's pericentrism is one strand of wider efforts to 
globalise the Cold War beyond the traditional focus on the superpowers, assigning agency to the 
periphery as well as to the central players.  IRD is part of the story in each case.32   
The focus of this thesis is on IRD, and it was written in large part to fill in the gaps in the 
history of the department in the Middle East post-Suez, and in Africa in general.  This process 
has already begun, though in support of other directions of study, in the works of Brennan, 
Franzén, Hashimoto and Murphy already noted.  Beyond any history of the department, 
however, the study of IRD has something further to add: IRD, as one of the primary research 
departments on Communism and Arab nationalism, and one that drew from local information 
offices and the British intelligence and security services, can itself contribute to the analysis of 
Communism and nationalism, provided one approaches their findings with the appropriate 
                                                
31 Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the balance of power in the Middle East, 1952-1967: from the Egyptian revolution to 
the Six-Day War (London, 2003), chapters 8, 9, 10. 
32 Tony Smith, "New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War", Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2000), p. 568, original emphasis; in particular see Westad, Global.  
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degree of caution.  Whilst propaganda itself is a product of policymaking decisions, IRD's 
research, and analysis of open intelligence such as that provided by BBC monitoring, also 
informed British policymaking.  As Hashimoto has shown, from 1956 onwards the Foreign 
Office took responsibility for counter-subversion abroad, and for 'collating and assessing' foreign 
intelligence.33  With the FO progressively taking over from the CO in Africa, IRD became 
increasingly central to British propaganda between 1954 and 1963. 
This thesis has argued that IRD held a principal role in British efforts to contain Arab 
nationalism, and in the transitional phase of decolonisation when Britain still believed she could 
maintain a guiding relationship with successor governments and opinion-shapers in Africa.  A 
study of IRD has less to contribute – perhaps somewhat surprisingly given the central role of the 
department during Suez – with regards to the two stand-out events for Britain in the Middle East 
following the crisis: the British interventions in Jordan in 1958, and Kuwait in 1961.  IRD had no 
part to play in either intervention, or any subsequent justification of British actions – at least, 
there is nothing in the documentary record to suggest that the department had any special part to 
play. 
Despite not being involved in the Jordan or Kuwait interventions, and whilst the 
department's covert actions in the Middle East were largely set aside to foster positive relations, 
the department continued to be involved in political warfare elsewhere in the developing world.  
Between 1965 and 1966, IRD held a central role in Britain's counter-Communist efforts in 
Indonesia.  The aim in Indonesia mirrored, in part, that of the Suez campaign – regime change – 
although this time for avowedly Cold War reasons and with America's full cooperation.   
Norman Reddaway, installed as Political Warfare Coordinator at the RIO in Singapore, worked 
with IRD to encourage activity against local Communists and in an effort to (successfully) 
depose President Sukharno.  The effect of IRD and RIO propaganda is of course impossible to 
                                                
33 Hashimoto, "British Intelligence", pp. 43-47. 
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measure, though the British certainly believed it had been effective, hardly a laudable 
achievement as Western propaganda aimed to dehumanise Indonesian Communists, and up to 
half a million Communists were massacred.  In a parallel with Suez, David Easter has pointed to 
IRD's use of black propaganda during the department's campaign in Indonesia.34 
Within the confines of this thesis there are still areas that would likely yield much of 
interest.  The nations studied could easily have been expanded to include more on the Aden 
protectorate or Pakistan, for example.  Yet it would not have been possible to study Aden in 
isolation from the Aden emergency, which took place beyond the limits of this thesis, and IRD 
only became involved in the protectorate towards the end of the period under study.  Pakistan, 
as a member of CENTO, suggests the need for greater inclusion, but any expansion would have 
drawn India in by necessity.  The study of propaganda agencies beyond IRD has not been 
considered here, and the efforts of the British Council, the Colonial Office Information 
Department, IPD's overt campaigns and British propaganda connections with American 
agencies would have provided a more holistic picture of propaganda in the region. 
Comparisons could be drawn between IRD's work in the Middle East and Africa and the 
department's campaigns in Asia and South America (in the case of the latter, IRD's work remains 
unstudied).  There are likely to be many similarities in how IRD conducted propaganda in the 
various regions of the 'developing' world.  It is also likely that the department's experience in the 
Middle East informed campaigns conducted elsewhere.  The domestic, British side of what has 
been studied here – particularly IRD's domestic campaigns regarding decolonisation – would 
further flesh out this thesis' findings.  With a focus on 'priming the publicity pump' from 1963 
onwards, domestic campaigns would have taken on an increasing importance worldwide.  As 
such, any research that looks beyond 1963 will likely have to incorporate IRD's domestic work to 
a greater degree. 
                                                
34 David Easter, "Keep the Indonesian pot boiling: Western covert intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 
1966", Cold War History, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2005), pp. 68, 63. 
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In addition to the above omissions, some pertinent material remains out of reach.  The 
files at the BBC Written Archives Centre at Caversham are closed on the subject of the BBC's 
Monitoring service, though the monitoring reports themselves are available.  The BBC's side of 
what was effectively a partnership between BBC monitoring and IRD therefore remains untold.  
In contrast, the IRD files retained at the FO's Hanslope Park may soon be made public, though 
in what proportion of the total, or over what timescale is unknown – as is their content.  Given 
that files from that 'migrated' archive that have already been released were related to British 
colonial activities, there may well be files of relevance to the matters discussed in this thesis.  If 
there are, whether they are corrective or simply add colour, remains to be seen. 
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